Libya

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Libya has been undergoing a period of intense crisis and protracted crisis since 2011. The country used to represent a major destination for labour migration prior to the explosion of violence, and used to host between 1.35 million and 2.5 million migrant workers[1]. Migrant labour was mainly utilised in the construction and health sector, with some migrants being also integrated in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors[2]. More than 796,000 migrants left the country in 2011, yet Libya still represents an attractive destination for low-to-medium skilled migrants, who seek to enter Libya due to its competitive salaries and continuous need for migrant labour[3]. Notwithstanding the country’s employment possibilities, migrants are disproportionately assimilated  into exploitative realities. With growing inflation and economic deterioration, informal employment is developed as a mechanism for the maintenance of a precarious Libyan private sector and for the financing of migrant travels. Nevertheless, extremely low wages and patterns of abuse are very common realities in Libya[4].

Internal displacement has been rocketing over the past years, as the sustained use of artillery shelling and of air strikes in proximity of inhabited areas is destroying local livelihoods. IDPs have increased from 179,400 in early 2018 to more than 401,830 in 2020, and most IDPs are currently being hosted across the municipalities of Tripoli. The majority of the internally displaced are aged between 18 and 59 and there is an identifiable trend that underlines the progressive displacement of children age 6 to 17, who are rapidly growing to be the largest segment of the displaced population of Libya[5]. Crucially, Libya is also a major transit country along the Central Mediterranean Route towards Europe.

In fact, Libya operates as the gatekeeper for the migration crisis in the region, as Europe keeps pursuing joint policies with the country to limit the arrival of migrants on European shores[6]. In 2020, Libya counted at least 625,638 migrants in its territory, and 93% of them arrived from the sub-Saharan and North Africa regions[7]. Among these, at least 348,000 children were reported to be in dire need of help, with more than 315,000 of them being especially hard to reach due to the Covid-19 pandemic[8]. Attention to the condition of migrant children in Libya is crucial, because 93% of those interviewed in Italy reported facing detention and abuse in Libya, and most children are especially isolated from external support[9]. The Libyan national legal framework plays a consistent role in the worsening of migrants’ conditions in the country. In fact, the Libyan law criminalises all forms of irregular entry, stay and exit from the country[10]. Nevertheless, ‘illegal entry’ is utilised as an umbrella term to group all various forms of (irregular) international migration, thus also including victims of human trafficking and those seeking international protection. Punishment for irregular entry includes the payment of a 1000 Libyan dinars fine and up to three years of detention, which eventually lead the migrant towards repatriation, after having served the sentence[11]. What usually happens, however, is that migrants are forcefully detained without having the opportunity to face trial, and often remain in prison for indefinite amounts of time[12]. Such reality is also closely interlinked to Libya’s lack of asylum laws and procedures, and its consistent refusal to sign the 1951 Refugee Convention[13]. Hence, Libya’s legal framework falls short of international standards and law, which instead specifically underline how irregular entry and stay should not constitute a criminal offence per se, and define indefinite detention as arbitrary[14].

Nevertheless, European institutions and states keep pursuing policies for the limitation of migration towards their territories, and largely cooperate with Libya for the interception of migrants at sea and for their disembarkation on Libyan territory, where they face detention and abuse. Such cooperation strongly relies on the European funding of the Libyan Coast Guard, and of Libyan social services and infrastructure[15]. Such joint activities are a tragic product of European securitising policies, and of responsibility-shifting practices for the harsh management of migration flows. Moreover, they exacerbate the vulnerabilities of migrants, who are increasingly being forcefully detained, and who are increasingly exposed to risk of death at sea. The steady growth of human trafficking to and through Libya adds a further layer to the vulnerability of migrants in Libya and there is a corresponding increase in smuggling and the cost thereof. People travelling to and through Libya are exposed to very severe environmental conditions, with minimal access to food, water, and medical support, and are also highly vulnerable to abuse and death. The presence of ongoing armed violence, together with racism and discrimination against people of sub-Saharan origin, inevitably deepens the struggles of the journey. Women, especially, are subjected to sexual exploitation and forced to undergo unsanitary abortions[16]. Cyclical forms of exploitation are likely to be repeated upon repatriation, or even once in the country of destination, as underlined by testimonies from Italy[17].

International operations for the provision of adequate support to local displaced communities are astonishingly underfunded or face new hardships in reaching vulnerable groups due to Covid-19 restrictions on movement. Pope Francis’ appeal for urgent action, in relation to the ongoing armed violence in Libya and the abusive detention of migrants in the country, has been swiftly picked up by Catholic NGOs who have devised and attempted to operationalize a humanitarian corridor between Libya and Italy. Nevertheless, ongoing political pressures in Italy have worsened in the wake of Covid-19, and limited such projects for the time being[18].

 

BACKGROUND/ BASIC INFORMATION

 Libya’s population in 2021 is estimated at 7,017,224 with international migrants making up over 12 per cent of the population in 2017[19] and about 9 per cent in 2020. The country has the Mediterranean Sea to the north and five neighbouring countries: Niger, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia and Chad. Libya’s main ethnic groups are 97% Arab and Berber and 3% other including Egyptian, Greek, Indian, Italian, Maltese, Pakistani, Tunisian, and Turkish[20]. In terms of the religious demographics the majority of about 96.6% of the population are Muslim (mostly Sunni Muslim), 2.7 % of the population is Christian, 0,3% Buddhist and the balance, each less than 0,2%, are Jewish, Hindu, folk religion, other or unaffiliated[21]. Libya has an oil-based economy and has experienced challenges since 2014, with instability on a social,  political and security level, disruptions in oil production, and the decline in global oil prices[22].

 

INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL MIGRANTS

The profile of those migrating to and through Libya varies, but primarily includes young, single men with a low level of education who report migrating to/through Libya for economic reasons[23]. In 2016, this was especially true for those migrating from neighbouring countries such as Niger, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia and Chad, who often reported moving for economic reasons and indicated temporary employment as a core driver for their migration[24]. Most of these migrants moved back and forth from their countries of origin several times. Likewise, in that same year, West and Central African nationals from Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Cameroon and Senegal, reported leaving for economic reasons[25]. On the other hand, East African nationals from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan mainly left their country of origin because of political persecution, conflict and economic distress, and majorly used Libya as a point of transit in their migration towards Europe[26]. This was also the case for those originating from non-neighbouring Arab countries (Syria, Palestine, Iraq), who were often fleeing conflict and were skilled and educated refugees who were prone to travel as family units[27].

Levels of human trafficking for sexual exploitation have been progressively increasing since 2015, and especially target Nigerian and Cameroonian women[28]. Nearly half of all those migrating to Libya seek to remain in the country permanently or temporarily, and are drawn by the country’s job opportunities[29]. Nevertheless, the high levels of instability, insecurity, exploitation and abuse, very often induces migrants to attempt to reach Europe eventually.

Internal migrants in Libya mainly migrate due to ongoing violence, which is especially present in Tripoli and in the Western part of the country[30]. The use of air strikes and artillery shelling in proximity of civilian areas significantly affects the safety of those who inhabit the areas of conflict[31]. Since 2019, over 140,000 people have been displaced solely from the area of Tripoli[32].

 

EMIGRATION AND SKILLED MIGRATION

Libya has a long history of being a key destination for labour migration in North Africa. In fact, an estimated 1.35 million – 2.5 million migrant workers were living in Libya prior to the revolution in 2011, with the majority being employed in the construction and health sectors. Libya represented a good destination for labour migration due to its competitive wages and growing private sector[33]. More than 796,000 migrants left the country in 2011, yet Libya’s migrant population remains significantly high, with approximately 625,000 migrants in the country in 2020[34]. Libya still represents an attractive destination for migrants from neighbouring countries due to its higher salaries and continuous need for migrant labour[35]. In 2019, the Flow Monitoring Surveys conducted by IOM revealed how 84% of the surveyed migrants cited economic reasons for migration. Economic opportunities and employment were also central to the prolonged stay of migrants in the country[36].

 

Today, the profile of labour migrants in Libya is profoundly complex and heterogenous, with people presenting various backgrounds and levels of skills. Overlapping migrant categories and statuses makes it even more difficult to produce linear data on skilled migration in Libya[37]. Currently, Libya’s labour market is profoundly affected by a bloated public sector (which employs 70% of salaried employees), a poorly planned education system and a very weak, yet growing, private sector[38]. The coexistence of factors such as increasing inflation, local dependency on migrant labour and migrants’ need to find the money to finance their travels, overall has a positive impact on the employment status of migrants in Libya. In fact, 76% of the migrants interviewed by the IOM in 2019 were employed, whereas only 52% reported being employed prior to their arrival in Libya[39]. Migrants are primarily employed in construction, water supply, gas and electricity sectors, with some working in agriculture, pastoralism and manual craft[40]. Limited job availability and insufficient skills for the jobs available were reported as core reasons for migrant unemployment[41]. Hence, labour migration towards Libya is currently low-to-middle-skilled, as migrants are generally hired for jobs that Libyans are not willing to do[42]. Out of the 670,000 migrants and refugeed in Libya today, it is not clear what proportion is in the country only to work[43]. However, the majority of the informal labour is occupied by sub-Saharan nationals, whereas there are also Eastern European engineers, Filipino nurses, Indian and Iraqi teachers, and Syrian and Ukrainian doctors[44]. While some migrants may be able to access regular employment, the majority face exploitation and lives on extremely low wages[45]. On the other hand, data concerning the outflow of Libyan skilled nationals is extremely limited, with numbers easily falling into the complexity of exiting migrants. Structural limitations on Libya’s educational system, together with infrastructural deterioration, lack of opportunities and ongoing conflict, all feed into the de-skilling of the national population[46]. Notwithstanding the lack of concrete data, the number of Libyan labour migrants in neighbouring countries such as Egypt and Tunisia are thought to be thousands[47].

 

FORCED MIGRATION

By April 2020 Libya reported a significant increase in the number of IDPs, which rocketed from 187,423 in late 2018 to 401,836, paralleled steadily by the number of returns to Libya (@ 457,324)[48]. This growth in internal displacement is closely interlinked to the protraction of armed conflict, especially in the Western part of the country: approximately 78,878 families were displaced by the sustained use of artillery shelling and air strikes in inhabited areas[49]. Due to the ongoing violence, the municipalities of Tripoli are currently hosting at least 108,000 IDPs, yet the surge of the Covid-19 pandemic promoted the establishment of new restrictive measures that prevented people from leaving at risk areas. In consideration of such limitations, the Tripoli municipalities of Tajoura (33,578 IDPs), Hai Alandalus (13,993 IDPs), and Suq Aljuma (29,825 IDPs), host around 71% of the total IDP population in the Tripoli region[50]. The majority of the IDPs appear to be aged between 18 and 59, and are equally spread along gender lines, yet there appears to be a significant upsurge in the number of displaced children between the ages of 6 and 17[51]. The main driver of internal displacement can be individuated in the growing insecurity within the country, which is currently presenting a situation of protracted armed violence that is negatively impacting civilian settlements. Such reality is paralleled by the deterioration of the economic situation in Libya, in part nourished by inflation, which has determined an important increase in the rents for accommodation, a lowering of wages and buying capacity, and the loss of IDP household’s financial capacity over the protracted crisis. Displacement is also closely interlinked to the general lack of basic services, and of access to them, lack of livelihood opportunities and humanitarian assistance[52].

 

Libya can be understood as the main ‘gatekeeper’ for the migration crisis in the region, since most forced migrants seeking to reach Europe must undertake one of the deadliest journeys in the world, the Central Mediterranean Route, and pass through Libya. In 2020, it was estimated that there were at least 625,638 migrants in Libya, and 93% of them arrived from the sub-Saharan and North Africa region[53]. Due to ongoing armed conflict in the Northern part of Libya, most of the forced migrants (46%) are located in Western Libya, and along the coast[54]. Around 93% of the forced migrants in Libya are adults, and circa 11% of them are females. Most of the forced migrants in Libya report being victims of arbitrary arrest and detention, abuse and discrimination[55]. By the end of June 2020, an estimated 5,475 migrants were intercepted/rescued at sea by the Libyan Coast Guards, and returned to Libya.[56] At least 98 migrants died during their journey across the Mediterranean sea during 2020, whereas 149 remain missing[57]. In December 2018, children represented an estimated 9% of the 663,000 migrants and refugees that were estimated to arrive in the country. Among these, 33% (19,691) were unaccompanied or separated from their families.  In 2020, 348,000 children were reported to be in dire need of help, with more than 315,000 of them being especially hard to reach due to the Covid-19 pandemic, protracted armed conflict and the economic crisis[58]. A study conducted by UNICEF recognised the extreme vulnerability of children in Libya, who face even greater hardships than their adult counterparts, despite having child-specific rights[59]. In fact, children are even more vulnerable to labour exploitation and discriminatory access to healthcare. According to this study, 93% of the children interviewed in Italy reported being held in captivity in Libya[60]. In order to survive in the country, children attempt to go unnoticed and to minimise the time they spend outside of their home or workplace[61]. This exacerbates their vulnerabilities by limiting their possibilities of accessing external support, and deepening their isolation[62]. Child trauma and isolation are even more concerning now, since UNHCR has been forced to put on hold its psychosocial programme for children in Tripoli, due to ongoing conflict[63].

 

Hence, despite the insecurity and armed conflict, Libya remains both a transit and destination country for forced migrants. In 2020, of the 625,638 migrants who arrived in Libya[64], 21% arrived from Niger, 16% from Egypt, 16% from Chad, 13% from Sudan and 8% from Nigeria[65]. The majority of the migrants who undergo assisted return to their country of origin under the EU-IOM Joint Initiative, which required a funding of €357 million and assisted the return of 81,000 African migrants (50,000 of them from Libya), receive no support from the IOM upon return, and are often reintegrated into previous cycles of abuse and exploitation[66]. There are several reported cases of women being trafficked in Libya and forced into prostitution, who are then offered no health checks upon return, and who are forced into previous exploitative situation in their country of origin[67].

 

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

The total number of refugees and migrants transiting and settling in the country do not appear to have decreased in recent years, notwithstanding the presence of ongoing conflict in Libya since 2014[68]. In fact, numbers in arrivals to Libya have increased progressively in the last decade, making Libya a major point of transit and departure of the Central Mediterranean Routes[69]. Whereas Syrians used to mainly transit through Libya on their way to Italy, they increasingly started utilising the Eastern Mediterranean Route towards Europe[70].

Human trafficking in Libya has been significantly increasing over the past decade, with numbers growing from 15,151 in 2012 to 181,436 in 2016. Such growth in the flow of migration also induced the heightening of smuggling prices, which have reportedly increased at least by 30% in the last years[71]. This is also closely related to the deterioration of Libya’s security situation, to the high inflation and foreign currency crises in the country, and to the multiplication of smuggling intermediaries over the years. Crucially, between 2016 and 2018 the Libyan Dinar lost almost 55% of its value, and this both caused the rise in smuggling prices, but also forced migrants to work for much longer periods in Libya in order to earn the money to pay for the sea travel to Europe[72]. Moreover, smuggling prices appear to fluctuate on the basis of multiple factors, including the migrant’s country of origin and perceived economic status, together with the levels of service necessary for the journey and the prices attached to the smuggling network itself[73]. Most of the migrants and refugees transiting through Libya are told about the smuggling routes and the risks involved by close friends and relatives, yet often ignore the most problematic details of the journey, including fluctuating prices and the perilousness of detention in Libya and of the sea journey to Europe. Journeys can be divided into 2 macro-sections: organised travel and step-by-step travel.

The former resemble a complete travel package deal from country of origin to country of destination. Hence, a transnational, structured smuggling network organizes the journey and provides the trafficked with food and accommodation. Costs for this type of travel are very high (5,000 USD), and migrants directed towards Libya must pay the trip at once prior to departure.[74] Step-by-step journeys instead utilise different smugglers for each section of the journey, who are payed separately prior to each departure. Between each stop, migrants usually seek informal employment – which is often exploitative – in order to be able to fund the following section of the journey. This implies the existence of a fragmented smuggling network that is not structured and not hierarchical. Main entry points into Libya are located along the Sudanese border south-east of Kufra, and along the border with Niger to the south of Sebha[75]. The former mainly sees the transit of refugees and migrants from East Africa whereas the latter is mainly utilised by people arriving from West and Central Africa. Ras Jedir (Tunisian border), Salloum (Egyptian border), and Ghat (Algerian border), are secondary entry points[76]. Due to ongoing conflict in Libya and high instability, the north-eastern part of the country is majorly avoided by smugglers, who mainly direct trafficked migrants through one of the aforementioned entrances. Bani Walid is increasingly emerging as a point of transit towards Tripoli, where most people are by reason of temporary employment, planning of the next part of the journey, or detention.

People travelling to and through Libya are exposed to very harsh environmental conditions, unsafe means of transportation, minimal access to food, water and medical support, and abuse[77]. In fact, victims of human trafficking are usually transported on pick-up trucks and rubber boats that are highly unsafe, and are extremely vulnerable to extortion and ill-treatment, including robbery, detention, forced labour, sexual violence and exploitation[78]. Victims of human trafficking are especially vulnerable in Libya due to armed violence, racism and discrimination against people of sub-Saharan origin. IOM has documented that the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation has been increasing over the past years, and it is currently estimated that circa 80% of the girls and women arriving in Europe from Nigeria by sea were likely victims of sexual abuse, and many arrived to the shores of Italy pregnant after being raped during their stay in Libya[79]. Most women report being trafficked by people they know who make false promises of paid employment, better opportunities and employment[80]. When interviewed by the Human Rights Watch, a woman reported: “You pray for your death. You cry until you cannot cry anymore. People die, faint, are beaten, raped. I would not advise even my worst enemy to travel by land”[81]. Women and girls are also often forced to undergo abortions in unsanitary conditions, without having access to pain medication or antibiotics[82]. Moreover they are trapped into relations of debt with their traffickers: these debts, however, are vague and always growing, and smugglers utilise threats, potential retaliation against family members and friends, and juju rituals to compel women to repay their debts and not report their smugglers[83]. This type of violence is also reproduced in refugees and migrants smuggled from Libya once they arrive in Italy, where several accounts documented the forced recruitment of refugees and migrants into formalised sex work networks, and cases of forced nudity and sexual humiliation on male refugee detainees[84].

 

NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM

Libyan law criminalises the irregular entry, stay and exit of migrants, and thus falls short of international standards and law, which instead specify that irregular entry and stay should not constitute a criminal offence. Moreover, international standards define indefinite and mandatory detention to control migration as arbitrary[85]. Crucially, migrants are not criminals per se, and should not be treated as such in front of the law. The UN’s Special Rapporteur Francois Crepeau underlined that “criminalising illegal entry into a country exceeds the legitimate interest of States to control and regulate irregular migration and leads to unnecessary detention”[86]. Nevertheless, in 2010 Libya introduced the Law no.19 on Combating Illegal Migration, which aimed at imposing harsher punishments for smuggling, yet grouped all forms of ‘illegal’ entries in the country under the umbrella term of illegal migration, thus also including those who are victims of trafficking and those seeking international protection[87]. This law punishes irregular entry in the country with a fine of 1,000 Libyan dinars or to a prison sentence of up to three years. It also dictates the deportation of the irregular migrant once the sentence is complete[88]. 2010’s law was built on its antecedent, introduced in 1987: the Law no.6 on Organising the Exit, Entry and Residence of Foreign National in Libya[89]. This determines the forceful deportation of any migrant found on Libyan territory with an expired visa or without one, and also provides for their imprisonment for up to three years. This law criminalises both the irregular migrant and those who have facilitated or assisted their entry and stay in the country[90]. In practice, what happens in Libya is that an overwhelming majority of migrants and refugees held in detention are never truly tried, and are thus kept in indefinite detention without being able to contest the conditions of their imprisonment[91]. This is also closely interconnected to Libya’s lack of asylum laws and procedures, despite the Article 10 of Libya’s Constitutional Declaration of 2011, which define the right to asylum. Libya also historically refused to sign the 1951 Convention in relation to the Status of Refugees, and the 1967 Protocol for the formalisation of UNHCR’s presence in the country. Whilst Libya is party to the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing and Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, it is also currently violating its obligations in terms of the recognition of the right to asylum and the extension of protection to those fleeing persecution[92].

 

MAIN ACTORS

STATE

In Libya migration is governed by various government departments. Libya has the Ministry for the Interior including the General Administration for Coastal Security (GACS), the Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration, the Ministry of Defence including the Libyan Navy which includes the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Coorporation[93]. Libya currently has two coast guard services: the GACS and the LCG both of which combined are often refered to as Libya’s coast guard.[94]  For the last two decades, EU institutions and states have been pursuing policies that sought to limit the number of arrivals of refugees and migrants on Europe’s coasts. Such reality was crucial to the cooperation between Europe (mainly Italy) and Libya, for the interception of migrants at sea and their disembarkation on Libyan territory prior to their arrival on Europe’s coast. In practice, through the naval operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia, Europe provided the Libyan General Administration for Coastal Security, and the Libyan Coast Guard, with 16 speedboats and supported the training of 477 personnel[95]. Moreover, Europe deployed civilian and military personnel in Libya for the coordination of maritime operations, whilst strongly supporting Italy’s decision to remove most of its naval assets in the Mediterranean, to reduce the likelihood of encountering migrants in need of rescue at sea[96].

 

Libya has been implementing joint measures with Italy to tackle migration since the early 2000s. In 2008, the two country signed the “Friendship Treaty”, which had the designated aim to intensify the “fight against terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration”, and through which Italy committed to paying 5 billion dollars in 20 years, in order to finance Libya’s border control equipment, social services and infrastructure[97]. This joint effort intensified in 2016 when new measures were developed, including the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which aimed to improving border security[98]. Europe’s support towards Libya’s border management capacity building activities resulted in an intensification of migrant detention in Libya, and forced return through Libya towards areas of origin and safe third countries. In 2018, Libya’s declaration of a Libya Search and Rescue (SAR) zone off Libya’s western coast (which was previously coordinated by the Italian coast guard), enabled the Libyan coast guard to detect and return shipwrecked migrants back to Libya, and not to the European shores[99]. This also significantly impeded rescue at sea activities by privately-run or charity rescue boats, resulting in a steep decrease in migrants successfully reaching Italy. In fact, 47% of the migrants who attempted to reach Europe were intercepted by the Libyan coast guard and returned to local detention facilities[100]. Between 2016 and 2020, almost 60,000 people have been returned to Libya by its EU-supported coast guard[101]. This also affected the risk of death at sea, which doubled from 2% in 2017 to 4% in 2018, with more than 3,300 individuals deaths in the Mediterranean over the course of the year[102].

 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Multiple international organisations, including UN agencies (UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF), are currently involved migration matters in Libya, to provide humanitarian assistance and document the ongoing situation of indefinite detention and abuse of irregular migrants in the country. UNHCR engages with Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration to push for the release of refugees and asylum-seeker from detention centres and with the Libyan Coast Guard to ensure delivery of uninterrupted life-saving assistance to rescued-at-sea people of concern at disembarkation points[103].The EU-IOM Joint Initiative organises return charters to countries of origin, which granted the assisted return of 81,000 African migrants to their country of origin, and of 50,000 migrants from Libya specifically[104]. Charters were interrupted between March and July 2020 due to the Covid-19, yet they were resumed in August when 118 Ghanaian migrants stranded in Libya were repatriated, after being medically screened and receiving psychosocial assistance by IOM prior to departure[105]. While such initiatives allow for the repatriation of thousands of irregular migrants vulnerable to indefinite detention and abuse in Libya, it is also true that migrants very rarely receive psychosocial support upon arrival, and are often reintegrated in previous cycles of exploitation, discrimination, and abuse[106]. On the other hand, in 2020 UNICEF’s emergency response reached 23,590 people who were displaced from Tarhouna and Sirte due to protracted violence[107]. Moreover, UNICEF also provided access to clean drinking water for 8,131 IDPs, reached 29,000 people with mine/explosive weapons risk education, and delivered primary health care to 323,795 children and women[108]. Nevertheless, UNICEF’s Humanitarian Action for Children in Libya is heavily underfunded, with funding gaps amounting to almost 75% of the US$ 19.8 million necessary to reach 268,000 displaced children across the country[109].

 

CATHOLIC CHURCH

Pope Francis appealed to the international community multiple times, to address the situation of migrants and internally displaced people in Libya, in light of the ongoing violence in the country. The Pope’s calls upon the international community to help those stuck in war-torn Libya highlighted the vulnerability of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers who are subjected to abuse and to exploitation[110]. “There is cruelty. We all have responsibility, no one can feel exempt” – these were the Pope’s words in June 2020, as violence kept raging across the country and over 492,000 IDPs and migrants were in need of humanitarian assistance[111]. Several Catholic organisations responded to the Pope’s call for action. The FCEI – Federazione delle Chiese Evangeliche in Italia (the Federation of Evangelic Churches in Italy) – together with the Tavola Valdese and the Sant’Egidio Community, promoted the development of humanitarian corridors for assisting the legal and safe journey of migrants towards Europe[112]. The aim of the project resides in the establishment of safe pathways for migrants and in the prevention of the surge of deaths in the Mediterranean. Moreover, humanitarian corridors seek to contrast human trafficking by providing safer routes for migrants, to allow vulnerable people to legally enter Europe, and to safely manage immigration[113]. The project is directly subordinated to state security checks, and is in line with the State’s legal framework. The project is born as a ecumenic collaboration between Catholic and Protestant organisations, who unite in order to develop a humanitarian project for the protection of vulnerable refugees and migrants. Originally developed in Italy, it is now also present in France and Belgium[114]. Once in European territory, migrants are provided with accommodation, and are also assisted along a journey of legal, economic, educational and sanitary integration in the national fabric[115]. Whereas such project has been successful for more than 1,000 migrants from Syria, the current political climate in Italy is negatively impacting the establishment of humanitarian corridors with Libya, and is thus preventing the safe transportation of migrants across the Mediterranean. The proactive reaction of catholic NGOs to Pope Francis’ words has been hampered by the political responses of the Italian government, who has allowed for the delineation of a 6-month program for the transportation of 50,000 migrants, but did not equally allow for its implementation[116]. 

 

 

ENDNOTE

[1] BORGNAS, E., COTTONE, L., TEPPERT,T. 2020

[2] ibid

[3] ibid

[4] THE NEW HUMANITARIAN 2019

[5] IOM 2020

[6] AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2020

[7] UNICEF 2020

[8] UNICEF Libya Appeal 2020

[9] UNHCR 2019

[10] AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2020

[11] ibid

[12] ibid

[13] ibid

[14] ibid

[15] Bredeloup, S. and Pliez O., ‘The Libyan migration corridor’. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole, European University Institute, 2011

[16] Human Rights Watch 2019

[17] WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMMISSION 2019

[18] MEDITERRANEAN HOPE https://www.mediterraneanhope.com/corridoi-umanitari/

[19] CIA World Factbook 2021

[20] ibid

[21] ibid

[22] ibid

[23] UNHCR 2017

[24] ibid

[25] ibid

[26] ibid

[27] ibid

[28] ibid

[29] ibid

[30] IOM DTM 2019

[31] ibid

[32] ibid

[33] BORGNAS, E., COTTONE, L., TEPPERT,T. 2020

[34] UNICEF 2020

[35] ibid

[36] IOM Labour Market Assessment 2019

[37] BORGNAS, E.; COTTONE, L.; TEPPERT, T. 2020

[38] ibid

[39] ibid

[40] ibid

[41] ibid

[42] ibid

[43] THE NEW HUMANITARIAN 2019

[44] ibid

[45] ibid

[46] Hassène Kassar, Diaa Marzouk, Wagida A. Anwar, Chérifa Lakhoua, Kari Hemminki, Meriem Khyatti, 2014

[47] ibid

[48] IOM 2020

[49] ibid

[50] ibid

[51] ibid

[52] ibid

[53] UNICEF 2020

[54] ibid

[55] ibid

[56] ibid

[57] ibid

[58] UNICEF Libya Appeal 2020

[59] UNHCR 2019

[60] ibid

[61] ibid

[62] ibid

[63] UNHCR 2020

[64] UNICEF 2020

[65] IOM Migrants Baseline Assessment 2020

[66] EURONEWS 2020

[67] EURONEWS 2020

[68] UNHCR 2017

[69] ibid

[70] ibid

[71] ibid

[72] REACH, Joint Market Monitoring Initiative 2018

[73] UNHCR 2017

[74] UNHCR 2017

[75] UNHCR 2017

[76] ibid

[77] UNHCR 2017

[78] ibid

[79] EURONEWS 2020

[80] HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2019

[81] ibid

[82] ibid

[83] ibid

[84] WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMMISSION 2019

[85] AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2020

[86] Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, 2 April 2012, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/24, and Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 10 January 2008, UN Doc. A/HRC/7/4.

[87] Law no. 19/2010 on Combating Illegal Migration, Article 6. security-legislation.ly/ar/node/32174 (Arabic); In AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2020

[88] ibid

[89] Law no. 6/1987 on Organizing the Exit, Entry and Residence of Foreign Nationals in Libya, Article 18. security- legislation.ly/ar/node/34591 (Arabic); in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2020

[90] ibid

[91] AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2020

[92] ibid

[93] Foreign Affairs Ministry 2020

[94] Info Migrants 2019.

[95] AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2020

[96] ibid

[97] Bredeloup, S. and Pliez O., ‘The Libyan migration corridor’.

[98] UNHCR 2019

[99] ibid

[100] ibid

[101] MELTING POT

[102] UNHCR 2019

[103] UNHCR Global Focus 2021

[104] EURONEWS 2020

[105] IOM 08/21/20

[106] EURONEWS 2020

[107] UNICEF 2020

[108] ibid

[109] ibid

[110] INFOMIGRANTS JUNE 2020 https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/25382/pope-calls-on-international-community-to-help-migrants-in-libya

[111] ibid

[112] MEDITERRANEAN HOPE https://www.mediterraneanhope.com/corridoi-umanitari/

[113] ibid

[114] ibid

[115] ibid

[116] IL SOLE 24ORE https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/migranti-come-funzionano-corridoi-umanitari-fico-non-costruire-muri-ACZZhqV?refresh_ce=1

 

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