

AFRICAN HUMAN MOBILITY REVIEW

Volume 1 Number 1 January – April 2015

Upholding refugee rights: Cessation, transnationalism and law's limitations in the Rwandan case

Macroeconomic determinants: analysis of 'Pull' factors of international migration in South Africa

Local Integration and Congolese Forced Migrants in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

The impact of remittance on poverty: evidence from the South African National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS)

The Somali diaspora, the migration-development nexus and state-building in Somaliland



Scalabrini Institute
for Human Mobility
in Africa

AHMR

Chief Editor

Dr Mulugeta F. Dinbabo University of the Western Cape, South Africa

Board Members

Dr Beneberu Assefa Wondimagegnhu Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia

Dr Delali Margaret Badasu University of Ghana, Ghana

Dr Edmond Agyeman University of Education, Winneba, Ghana

Dr Ernest Angu Pineteh Cape Peninsula University of Technology, South Africa

Dr Joseph Yaro University of Ghana, Ghana

Prof Laurence Piper University of the Western Cape, South Africa

Dr Linda Oucho African Migration and Development Policy Centre, Kenya

Prof Loren Landau University of Witwatersrand, South Africa

Dr Lothar Smith Radboud University, Netherlands

Dr Meselu Alamnie Mulugeta Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia

Prof Raul Delgado Wise Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, Mexico

Dr Razack Karriem University of the Western Cape, South Africa

Dr Sharon Penderis University of the Western Cape, South Africa

Prof Shimelis Gulema Stony Brook University, New York

Prof Thomas Faist Bielefeld University, Germany

AHMR is an interdisciplinary peer-reviewed on-line journal created to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects (socio-economic, political, legislative and developmental) of Human Mobility in Africa. Through the publication of original research, policy discussions and evidence research papers, AHMR provides a comprehensive forum devoted exclusively to the analysis of contemporaneous trends, migration patterns and some of the most important migration-related issues. AHMR is published by the Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA) a member of the Network of the Scalabrinian Centers for Migration Studies, with institutions in New York, Paris, Rome, Buenos Aires, Basel, Sao Paulo and Manila.

Articles and reviews in AHMR reflect the opinions of the contributors.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the written permission from the publisher.

Copyright © 2015 by the SCALABRINI INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN MOBILITY IN AFRICA

47, Commercial St, 8001 Cape Town – South Africa

Tel. 0027 021 465 6433 Email: editor@sihma.org.za

Webpage: www.sihma.org.za

African Human Mobility Review

Volume 1 Number 1 January – April, 2015

ARTICLES

- 1 Upholding refugee rights: Cessation, transnationalism and law's limitations in the Rwandan case.
Laura Parker
- 27 Macroeconomic determinants: analysis of 'Pull' factors of international migration in South Africa
Mulugeta F. Dinbabo & Themba Nyasulu
- 54 Local Integration and Congolese Forced Migrants in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Christian Pangilinan
- 79 The impact of remittance on poverty: evidence from the South African National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS)
Seyfe Worku & Joyce Marangu
- 101 The Somali diaspora, the migration-development nexus and state-building in Somaliland
Monica Fagioli-Ndlovu

Upholding Refugee Rights: Cessation, Transnationalism and Law's Limitations in the Rwandan Case

Laura Parker¹

Abstract

The cessation clause epitomises the 1951 Refugee Convention's internal barriers to the full achievement of refugees' rights. By examining the controversial application of this provision in the case of Rwandan refugees, this paper demonstrates the resultant infringements on refugees' human rights, and signals a key obstacle in understanding refugee experiences: institutional insistence on subjugating refugee perspectives and knowledge. This top-heavy 'knowing what's best' for refugees must cede to alternative conceptualisations of refugee rights, especially in the well-worn durable solutions debate. A rights-based approach would see transnational mobility as a solution to challenges endured by camp-based refugees in particular. The Rwandan case study is grounded in theories of today's membership-based nation-state paradigm, and questions whether re-inscribing refugees as primary agents of their own repatriation (with or without return) can bridge the divide inherent in the exclusionary citizenship-centric logic which ultimately structures the refugee rights system, and can adequately address problems rooted in complex identity politics.

Keywords: Cessation clause, refugees, repatriation, rights, Rwanda, UNHCR

Introduction

Protection space for the displaced is increasingly beleaguered, globally. Upholding refugee rights in the era of 'Fortress Europe,' post-9/11 Islamophobia and multiplying, interconnected armed conflicts, is a Sisyphean pursuit. Against such a backdrop, this article focuses on a particular challenge found *within* the international legal regime governing refugee protection: the 'ceased circumstances' cessation clauses. This article discusses the global treaty enshrining specific refugee rights, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (hereafter referred to as the 'Refugee Convention'), in whose first article the cessation clauses feature. Here the

¹ Independent researcher, presently unaffiliated. Much of this research was undertaken while an MA candidate in 2013 at School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. P.O. Box 77539, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. E-mail : lauraparker@hotmail.com

understanding of ‘refugee rights,’ however, is more expansive: the term encompasses ‘human rights.’ That the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is referenced in the Refugee Convention’s preamble underscores this aspiration, whilst the major international human rights instruments drafted afterwards also confer protections and freedoms on refugees.

Various limitations to refugee rights are inherent in the Refugee Convention; not in itself unusual, since most human rights are qualified. To conceptualise such limitations as internal challenges to refugee rights is no exaggeration: the lived experiences of those subject to such limitations often amount to rights violations. ‘Challenge’ is invoked to cover encroachments upon rights, practical impediments to exercising rights, and more outright breaches. Fundamental to the refugee rights regime is protection against *refoulement*, however the Refugee Convention wavers this for those merely suspected of having committed certain serious crimes (Article 1[f]), in contrast to the inviolability of non-*refoulement* in human rights treaties. Additionally, the Convention ‘excludes all mention of civil and political rights once a person has attained refugee status’ (Harris Rimmer, 2010, p. 1), again restricting protection standards beyond those of human rights regimes. Indeed the Refugee Convention’s less than generous language (‘burden,’ the ‘problem of refugees’) characterises an entire system that circumscribes our understanding of refugees as primarily individuals and rights-bearers, rather than aid recipients requiring logistical management.

The ‘ceased circumstances’ cessation clauses, Articles 1(c)(5) and (6), epitomise the Refugee Convention’s internal barriers to the full achievement of refugees’ rights. They assert that a refugee (or person of no nationality) ‘can no longer, because the circumstances with which he has been recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality’ (or former habitual residence). By examining the controversial application of this provision in the case of Rwandan refugees, the resultant infringements on refugees’ human rights are demonstrated, and signal a key obstacle in understanding refugee experiences: institutional insistence on subjugating the perspectives and knowledge of refugees themselves. This top-heavy ‘knowing what’s best’ for refugees must cede to alternative conceptualisations of refugee rights, especially in the well-worn durable solutions debate: a rights-based approach

could see transnational mobility as a solution to challenges endured by camp-based refugees in particular.

After analysing the cessation clauses and their application to Rwandans, the more systemic challenges to the human rights of refugees are considered, grounding this case study in theories of today's membership-based nation-state paradigm. The study examines this system's attendant rights challenges in the context of repatriation, and evaluates the search for solutions that uphold rights and re-inscribe refugees as primary agents in such responses. It is debatable whether this can bridge the divide inherent in the global refugee regime, between the heroic imaginary of the international community and humanitarian laws, and an abstract refugee Other, 'subjected to the law but... not law's subjects' (Douzinas, 2000, p. 104). However, recognition invites understanding: therefore such power hierarchies are critiqued throughout.

Cessation: On Paper and in Practice

The cessation clause (the articles are popularly conflated thus) is almost as divisive amongst scholars as it is for refugees. It is deemed a contravention of the freedom of choice, based on 'the outrageous proposition that "international law... requires that exile should not... be perpetuated forever particularly without a good cause"' (UNHCR Inter-Office Memorandum on cessation for pre-1991 Ethiopian refugees, cited in Verdirame & Harrell-Bond, 2005, p. 112), and through which refugees' supposed 'protector' Agency 'call[s] on states to do less' (Verdirame & Harrell-Bond, 2005, p. 113). Alternatively, it is promoted for solving protracted displacement, enabling 'a right not to be a refugee' (Aleinikoff & Poellot, 2012, p. 9), or even dismissed as an administrative formality which 'may not have any direct impact on the life of the individual(s) concerned' (Feller et al., 2003, p. 546). Its instrumentalisation as a means of limiting asylum applications by 'designat[ing] a country of origin as generally "safe" in the context of refugee status determination' (Feller et al., 2003, p. 546), also encourages violations of the right to seek asylum. Subsequent discussion of cessation in the Rwandan context eschews an overly legalistic approach, favouring socio-historical analysis, indispensable, for meaningful response to the rights challenges these refugees face. One questions whether legal rights frameworks can adequately address problems rooted in complex identity politics, particularly in the Great Lakes, where transnational ethnic identities interact, often violently, with

nationally-delineated citizenship, whose exclusionary logic ultimately structures the refugee rights system.

Countries of asylum may revoke refugee status following fundamental changes in the country of origin that end the circumstances which caused the status to be granted. This terminates those rights accompanying refugee status: refugees' rights hinge upon states' sovereign right to control access to the political community. Beyond ascertaining the change in circumstances (a resource-intensive exercise, readily compromised), and abiding by the *refoulement* prohibition (through individual status determination of those continuing to allege fear of persecution), the asylum state wishing to mandate repatriation has no further obligations. Therefore, UNHCR interprets this provision liberally, with a view to minimising violations of refugees' rights. Nonetheless, UNHCR's interpretation, albeit authoritative, does not bind states. Various guidelines on cessation have been issued since 1991, although this interest only arose once repatriation became northern states' preferred durable solution, suggesting that global power hierarchies, rather than refugees' needs, set protection priorities (Siddiqui, 2011, p. 7).

These guidelines emphasise that change must be fundamental, durable, and establish effective protection in the 'home' country (UNHCR, 1999). Timescales are proposed for assessing durability of change, and examining a country's human rights record is advised, particularly following a violent regime overthrow. The threshold for mandated repatriation is thus relatively high, in contrast to that required for voluntary repatriation (the only kind UNHCR may promote or facilitate, as per its Statute). When refugees opt to return, UNHCR can assist them without ascertaining whether fundamental change has occurred (indeed voluntary repatriation frequently happens soon after hostilities wane) before reconstruction or reconciliation processes; here the emphasis is on refugees' consent and agency. This adds to the conflation of the rules binding UNHCR and those binding states: the latter may invoke the fact that UNHCR assists return to insecure locations as justification for mandating repatriation to places perceived as safer. The complementary 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention) increases potential for confusion in African contexts: despite affirming 'the essentially voluntary character of repatriation [to be] ...respected in all cases' (Article 5[1]), its own 'cessation clauses' (Articles 1[4][f] and [g]) 'functionally impose expulsion, because they apply without

regard to the cessation of the risks of persecution or violence in the State of origin’ (Fitzpatrick and Bonoan, 2003, pp. 529-530). Additionally, given the OAU Convention’s recognition of refugees *prima facie*, on grounds of generalised violence, ‘an end to hostilities has typically been used as a key indicator that repatriation can take place’ (Hovil, 2010, p. 2). This ignores the way war ‘may profoundly reshape a polity and, in the process, create new threats to particular individuals who may continue to require protection as refugees’ (Hovil, 2010, p. 2), signalling the need to foreground rights-based protection and ‘durable solutions,’ rather than perpetuating state-centric preferences for return.

UNHCR insists that the exemptions permitted to group status cessation under Articles 1(c)(5) and (6) of the Refugee Convention, which affirm that cessation shall not apply to a statutory refugee ‘able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence,’ are also applicable to Convention refugees (those forced to flee post-1951). Whilst literal interpretation is possible, state practice upholds the view that allowing exemptions to the cessation clause has become an international norm reflecting ‘a general humanitarian principle that is now well-grounded’ (UNHCR, 2003, para. 21). James Hathaway continues to denounce the extension of this provision, stating that ‘UNHCR has regrettably invoked an unwieldy claim of customary international law’ (Hathaway, 2005, p. 942), a view inferred from the decision not to formally extend exemption when drafters of the 1967 Protocol were considering the original Refugee Convention’s temporal scope, and backed up with restrictive judgments in Australian and German litigation of cessation clause exemptions. This reiterates the malleability of treaty law, again hinting that rights-based legal regimes contingent on interpretation by states can themselves exacerbate refugees’ problems. There is less consensus around guidelines elaborating the ‘compelling reasons’ for exemption. Although reasons such as persistent trauma, especially in the context of genocide, are widely accepted, it is improbable that in the Rwandan case, ‘every person who feared the genocide or acts/threats of severe violence be exempted’ (Cliche-Rivard, 2012). UNHCR also suggests that strong family or economic ties to host countries are justified under this provision. State practice, exemplified in the Rwandan situation, contradicts this, allowing third-generation refugees to be returned, despite cultivating land or running businesses in Uganda. This may violate numerous socio-economic rights, and also constitute a potentially

traumatic second upheaval; additionally, if large numbers of returnees are visited upon post-conflict societies with weak economies, there is a risk of reigniting conflict due to resource disputes.

All the aforementioned guidelines insist on the value of objective country of origin information from multiple sources being provided by UNHCR to states assessing whether conditions are ripe for a cessation declaration. This epitomises the marginalisation of refugees' own knowledge and understanding of the circumstances affecting the continuation of their exile. The objective and subjective components comprising the 'well-founded fear' from which refugee status stems, are theoretically given equal weight in status determination processes. Declarations of group cessation undermine the subjective element that constitutes refugeehood, through the homogenisation of individual experience and fears into an assumed group dynamic, deemed interpretable, or knowable by foreign states. UNHCR further assuages individual subjectivities in the Rwandan context, referring to 'reluctance' and 'apprehension' rather than 'fear' (UNHCR, 2011b, para. 2). This dilution of the refugee subjective opens up space for the subjectivities of the state; political and economic motives can easily displace individuals' personal concerns in the decision-making frame. The 'objectivistic interpretation of the cessation clause' belies an apparent legalistic neutrality, constructing an image of refugees as 'rational actors when they decide to return but moved by extraneous motives if they decide to stay' (Chimni, 2004, p. 62). Rwandan government comments that 'Rwandan refugees must not hide behind illogical arguments,' epitomise this rhetoric (*Réunion Tripartite*, 2013b). Deconstructing such representations is vital to understanding the disenfranchisement of refugees within the very regime designed to protect their rights.

Rwandan Reactions

According disproportionate weight to international institutional 'knowledge' of the political dynamics of displacement may backfire, as has historically been exemplified in the Rwandan context. After the 1994 genocide, UNHCR misjudged Rwandan refugees' fears and motivations, and encountered great difficulties managing camps in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), resulting in their effective appropriation by *génocidaires* in exile. The Agency distributed hyperbolic repatriation propaganda (Pottier, 1999), and did not

facilitate communication between the camps and returnees, cementing perceptions that ‘UNHCR was aligning itself with Kigali’ (Pottier, 1996, p. 420). Consequently, it was discredited by Rwandans across the region, despite greater commitment to unmediated information through ‘come-and-see, go-and-tell’ visits and through sharing statistics on returnee integration with counterparts in host countries. UNHCR’s recommendation in 2009 that asylum states apply the cessation clause to this population has thus sparked vociferous campaigns by refugees and advocacy groups. Many perceive UNHCR to be prematurely acquiescing to Rwanda’s persistent lobbying for cessation, casting further doubts on its impartiality. Almost two decades on, the allegation that ‘at no point has the international community sufficiently understood camp conditions and political processes to feel confident that it understood “the pulse” of the refugee mass’ (Pottier, 1996, pp. 428-9) arguably remains valid. The Rwandan government has also mistrusted UNHCR given the *génocidaire* screening debacle in DRC. It is conceivable that willingness to regain governmental cooperation has driven the Agency’s support for cessation, and dissuaded it from addressing other tensions that instil fear in Rwandan refugees abroad, namely the widespread belief that Kigali orchestrated the M23 forces in Congo.

After multiple postponements, contravening the principle that ‘refugees should not be subjected to constant review of their... status’ (UNHCR, 1999, para. 2), the clause came into effect on 30 June 2013 in Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the Republic of Congo for Rwandans displaced between 1959 and 31st December 1998. Other countries refrained from declaring cessation, citing legal and logistical considerations, amongst others (IRIN, 2013). The Government of Rwanda, however, has frequently used broad brush strokes to cloud over legal nuance, resulting in misinformation in the Kigali-aligned press. References to UNHCR itself ‘implementing’ or ‘declaring’ the cessation clause (rather than ‘recommending’ that it be invoked by states, the only entities with the capacity to do so), and unwieldy claims that this clause is now ‘invoked’ or ‘declared’ internationally, rather than on a country-by-country basis, pepper official discourse (MIDIMAR, 2011). Affirmations such as ‘Rwandans who fled the country between 1959 and 1998 have lost their refugee status across the world’ (Government of Rwanda, 2013), coupled with suggestions that non-implementing countries would be ‘in flagrant violation of international rules for this status’ (New Times, 2014a), and warnings to refugees themselves (‘You never know what will happen on the day they will

lose the status; what if their property is vandalized by nationals in host countries,' and 'help these people return when they can actually carry their belongings other [*sic*] than wait for a night raid where they may be thrown on trucks and deported promptly' [Mukantabana, 2013]), illustrate how 'the deployment of international refugee law – in particular the concept of cessation – has become one framework for... manipulation: it has been used as a threat rather than a mechanism for generating protection... political manoeuvring with refugees caught somewhere in the middle' (Hovil, 2013).

This diverse demographic for which cessation has been invoked or recommended encompasses predominantly Tutsis who fled Rwanda around independence and under Hutu majority rule; those who fled during the 1994 genocide, and mostly Hutus who fled the invading forces that ended the genocide and remain in power. The inclusion of a cut-off point, implying persecution of a different nature persists, hints that change in Rwanda is not yet fundamental. While prospering economically, and visibly at peace, Rwanda curtails freedom of expression and opposition politics through discriminatory application of 'divisionism' laws banning 'genocide ideology,' and its human rights record attracts criticism. Dissidents continue to seek asylum abroad, in small numbers, where they have been pursued by government agents (BBC, 2010, 2011 and 2014). The *gacaca* community-courts which tried vast numbers of suspected *génocidaires* concluded mid-2012, removing what the international community deemed a significant cause of fear for refugees remaining abroad. However, the collective guilt they helped construct around Hutus persists; reconciliation is arguably cosmetic; suspicions run deep and assumptions prevail that those who fear return must be genocide perpetrators (Straus & Waldorf, 2011). Indeed the initial failure to distinguish *génocidaires* from Rwandan civilian refugees in DRC cemented this tarred-by-association perception early on. Returnees in recent years continued to receive assistance from UNHCR and its partners more than a year after their date of return, implying that sustainable livelihoods (and the host of economic and social rights these anchor) are not guaranteed, particularly in rural areas (Cwik, 2011).

These 'push factors' have led many Rwandan refugees to fear violations of their rights were they to return under the cessation clause. However, the choice of alternatives formally triggered by the cessation clause is problematic in practice. Resettlement prospects are negligible, and UNHCR admits the

dearth of local integration opportunities regionally (UNHCR, 2011b). NGOs and refugees have reported aggressive official acts which appear to further preclude this option. Rwandans in eastern DRC are subject to discrimination and targeted violence amid sporadic unrest which mobilises ethnic divisions. Rwandans encamped in Uganda have seen their plots reallocated to Congolese refugees (Hovil, 2010 p. 1), and some suffered forcible return to Rwanda by Ugandan authorities; others died in the process (UNHCR, 2010). Mass deportations of Rwandans also took place from Tanzania in 1996, and Burundi in 2009. By November 2013, only 26 Rwandan refugees in the Republic of Congo had requested to return voluntarily to Rwanda, and only 19 requests for local integration (remaining in the Republic of Congo but as a Rwandan immigrant, with a Rwandan passport) had been received, compared to 4026 requests for exemption from cessation (*Réunion Tripartite*, p. 6).

Many other Rwandans see no point in pursuing the final option of seeking exemption and retaining refugee status through individualised status determination (RSD). Indeed following the declaration of cessation in certain states in June 2013, it was noted that ‘no proper system has been created for those with “compelling reasons” to be exempted’ (Cacharani & Cliche-Rivard, 2013), and the potential for substandard mechanisms is real. NGOs reported in 2013 that ‘Liberian refugees in Gambia applying for exemption from cessation, which came into force in June 2012, have not received documents verifying their request for exemption; they find themselves without valid documentation’ (FAHAMU, 2013). In Uganda, rejection under some form of RSD aiming to allow exemption from the cessation clause, could be seen as a foregone conclusion. In 2010, 98% of asylum applications by Rwandans had reportedly been denied (Cwik, 2011), while in 2011, 95.5% were denied (UNHCR, 2011c), suggesting a climate in which the ‘rebuttable presumption’ that refugees no longer have well-founded fears of persecution is in fact unchallengeable (UNHCR, 1999, para. 32). Whilst recognition rates of Rwandans undergoing RSD by the Ugandan government rose to 41% in 2013 (UNHCR, 2013), this is a new development whose durability cannot yet be assessed; continued mistrust on the part of Rwandan refugees in Uganda is understandable. Similarly, in Malawi, the only country which did invoke the cessation clause for which UNHCR publishes recognition statistics of Rwandan refugees, acceptance rates decreased significantly, in the period just prior to cessation, from 46.5% in 2011 to 20.4% in 2012 (UNHCR, 2011 and 2012). This potentially fosters refugees’ doubts about the ‘rebuttable presumption’

and the value of individualised exemption processes in this context too. However, the recognition rate of Rwandan refugees by the Malawian government, as reported by UNHCR, leaps to 100% in 2013, although the caseload statistics upon which this is based are not published (UNHCR, 2013). Nonetheless, this high rate, whether it comprises new arrivals or individualised exemption proceedings for those subject to cessation, strongly signals the persistence of persecution in today's Rwanda, undermining the notion that change here is fundamental and durable.

Given that the population subject to cessation includes individuals who fled in 1994, it is important to note that UNHCR's Guidelines on Exemption Procedures specify genocide as a distinct act of persecution, a 'compelling' enough reason to trigger an exemption to status cessation (UNHCR, 2011, para. 27). Paragraph 28(b) of these Guidelines also identifies 'development of a deep-seated distrust of the country [of origin], even if it may at times seem irrational' as a plausible response to severe persecution. That they were issued while the Agency was advocating the cessation for a large group of refugees who experienced genocide further delegitimises UNHCR as incoherent and uncomprehending in the eyes of Rwandan refugees, fomenting resistance to its policies. These concerns are well known to UNHCR, through direct consultations and external advocacy (Hovil, 2010, p. 3). Refugees' perspectives have been knowingly side-lined, rather than merely overlooked unawares. The survival strategising that this disingenuous attitude and the climate of mistrust and uncertainty necessitate, such as 'disappearing from the official radar and pretending to be Ugandan or Congolese', amounts to the denial of 'not just effective national protection, but also most of the rights concomitant with refugee status, the international protective "citizenship" that is triggered in the absence of national capacity' (Hovil, 2010, p. 4).

Rights violations induced by cessation can take place both if the refugee remains in the country of refuge, as well as when they are returned. If an individual is not granted exemption to the cessation of their status, yet they have no intention of returning, unless an alternative migration status is accessible to them, they effectively remain undocumented, or even stateless, in the former country of asylum. Precarious migration status commonly exposes people to exploitative working conditions and attendant infringements of rights to dignity and security, located in the Preamble and Article (9) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),

as well as to detention and deportation, which may amount in some cases to *refoulement*. The question of non-returning, non-exempted Rwandese refugees remains unresolved for countries such as the Republic of Congo, which nonetheless intends to pursue cessation regardless (*Réunion Tripartite*, 2013a and 2013b). Potential rights violations abound also for those whose return is carried out under the application of the cessation clause. A Rwandese exile of the anti-Tutsi pogroms of the 1970s, who has built up a successful livelihood in Kampala would see many of their economic (and potentially property) rights violated if forced to repatriate under the cessation clause. A refugee child of the 1990s from Rwanda living in Zambia would have their ties to the only country they have really known cut when obliged to return, spelling clear infringements of social and cultural rights. A Francophone refugee schooled in the Republic of Congo could face discrimination at school, or when job-hunting back in Rwanda given the now-influential Anglophone communities who returned from their own, earlier exile after the genocide ended (Longman, 2011).

The right to non-discrimination, enshrined in its many guises in almost all international human rights treaties, most notably in ICCPR Articles (2), (3), (4)(1), and (26), may prove unevenly upheld in a context where some harbour beliefs about the background of those who only return twenty years after the genocide's conclusion. Although a collection of imputed characteristics and actions (i.e. assumptions that a returnee participated in the genocide) may not lead to outright persecution in the vast majority of cases, this should not preclude acknowledgement of rights violations, of non-discrimination and economic rights in particular, in a place where diverse groups of returnees, following profound social and demographic upheaval, compete for scarce resources. Indeed the existence of a small number of serious rights violations, such as the persecution of a returnee on account of anti-government activism, should not diminish the significance of widespread incidences of less egregious socio-economic rights violations, which can affect large groups of 'cessation returnees.' The potential for human rights violations, both for 'cessation returnees' and those who defy its invocation to stay in countries of asylum, is high. Declarations of cessation must be taken with the utmost caution.

Rights-speak

It is debatable whether refugee rights differ from, or are supplementary to, the regular array of human rights that states agree to respect and protect. The Refugee Convention rights, rather than an additional protective layer, are more like stop-gap protections, directly complementing the human rights rendered most unattainable in situations of displacement. They form a safety net, special protections that neither enhance existing rights regimes, nor are remedial, legally speaking. The Refugee Convention has no complaints mechanism by which to procure redress for violations of its provisions, unlike major human rights treaties such as the Convention Against Torture or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Practically, however, the formal response mechanisms these instruments prescribe are out of refugees' reach and forced displacement and its concurrent injustices are rarely addressed in national and international courts. Lofty ideals of 'access to justice' discourses are downscaled; in a forced migration context this is generally understood as relating to 'access to asylum' through legal aid in (often) northern states.

Whether this difficulty in securing legal rights amounts to the disenfranchisement of refugees is debatable. If refugees cannot exercise their human rights, do they still possess them? What does formal possession of rights mean in practice, if rights are not upheld? And does such a challenge to the very concept of 'refugee rights' even matter, when advocating for a less exclusively legalistic approach to rights in general? The prevalence of 'human rights' as a buzzword through which claims of unjust treatment, or community ideals, are expressed has arguably devalued the concept of human rights in the popular imagination. It is suggested that while 'rights-speak' is a useful idiom and advocacy tool uniting societies globally, it also crowds out other ways of voicing experiences of persecution and flight and requesting tolerance, respect and humane treatment. Adherence to legalistic methods of interpreting refugees' problems is risky, for 'law and rights... nominate what exists and condemn the rest to invisibility and marginality' (Douzinas, 2013, p. 66). To assert a claim to a right can distract from the foundations of that right, the moral justifications based on contested notions of what is right or wrong that both law and humanitarian actors shy away from in an attempt to assert neutrality.

The inclusive exclusion Giorgio Agamben diagnoses at the heart of the refugee rights paradigm, rights attached to membership as citizens, not deriving from

bare humanity (Agamben, 1998), could thus be rendered a bypassable obstacle, affecting only one sphere of engagement (the legal). To activate alternative strategies for the protection of refugees' safety and dignity at all stages of flight would overcome his almost paralytically pessimistic critique that 'precisely the figure that should have incarnated the rights of man *par excellence*, the refugee, constitutes instead the radical crisis of this concept' (Agamben, 1995, p. 116). This would render extra-legal, non-rights-based educational or collaborative economic ventures a potential response to what are traditionally expressed as rights violations. Far from utopian, UNHCR's 'Imagine Co-Existence' programmes following conflict in the Balkans illustrate these methods and ideals, as do initiatives targeting host communities more generally. A fresh conceptualisation of refugees' ordeals outside a rights-framework may also help address their restricted freedoms in countries where rights discourses are especially politicised and manipulated by right-wing governments *du jour* to exclude foreigners.

One does not seek to dismiss rights frameworks as a means of understanding the challenges refugees face. While political, historical and social complexities do get simplified into rights formulae, this is understandable, for human rights movements aim to place checks and balances on the exercise of political power. However, the flipside is also true, and to understand how 'rights have also become the main tool of identity politics' (Douzinas, 2009), it is necessary to examine how power and politics shape rights themselves. The distinction between citizen and alien is central to nation-building projects. Citizens are accorded certain rights; their collective identity is constituted in contradistinction to the Other. The refugee, by bursting into the nation-state space and claiming rights purely on account of their humanity, disrupts this fictional division: 'breaking up the identity between man and citizen, between nativity and nationality, the refugee throws into crisis the original fiction of sovereignty' (Agamben, 1995, p. 117). The refugee thus threatens the constitutive fabric of the nation, and in asking for recognition, reminds citizens of the Other within. The limitations of legal responses are self-evident: 'The law divides inside from outside and is then asked to heal the scar or bandage it by offering limited protection to its own creations' (Douzinas, 2000, p. 358).

The 'Right' Direction: Going Back or Moving Forwards?

In order to invigorate the sometimes dead-end discussions of durable solutions for Rwandan refugees, it may be helpful to re-examine concepts of repatriation and return. If exercising rights depends on officially 'belonging' to a state, the three idealised durable solutions essentially enact a 'right to have rights' (Hannah Arendt, cited in Long, 2010, para. 17). Repatriating involuntarily, however, under the cessation clause, is unlikely to re-construct the ruptured bond between state and citizen required for national protection to have meaningful effect. Reducing repatriation to a physical act of border-crossing fails to capture the political nature of this process, and refugees' agency therein. To gain membership of a protective polity engenders some measure of influence towards shaping that community, generally through voting rights; political agency is central to protection (Long, 2011a). This reinstatement of rights and membership may well occur away from the 'home' state, separating citizenship from residency. Katy Long argues that 'return is not synonymous with repatriation: movement is not the cause of displacement but a symptom, and may in fact provide an important remedy to some refugees' needs' (Long, 2010, para. 238). Conversely, the international system's fixation with sending refugees 'home' idealises pre-flight conditions, which may be unwarranted, or even nonsensical in the case of refugee children born abroad. One answer would therefore be to leverage, rather than restrict, as per current tendencies, the very mobility that characterises refugees' lives. Also termed 'transnationalism' (Van Hear, 2006), this strategy offers clear advantages, at least on paper.

Facilitating refugees' continued stay in the country of asylum, without requiring their naturalisation, can be achieved by issuing country of origin passports, and activating alternative channels to regularise their presence as migrants. This is viable only for those who agree to be seen as voluntarily re-availing themselves of the 'home' country's protection through the acquisition of the national passport and use of the consular authorities. It implies the re-forging of the previously broken link with the country of origin, repatriation decoupled from physical return. This option respects multifaceted, internationalised identities, and is more realistic than waiting for other highly improbable 'traditional' durable solutions, such as third country resettlement or integration through naturalisation. Even if full naturalisation were on offer, which is rare, refugees may not wish to acquire the citizenship of the asylum state as it can preclude any eventual option of return, however unrealistic in the present, particularly as many states do not allow for dual citizenship. By

relinquishing citizenship of the country of origin, refugees may risk a period of undocumented 'statelessness' in the not-unprecedented event that delays in issuing the 'new' citizenship arise. Foregoing one's original citizenship may also annul claims to land or property owned before flight, or bar participation in transitional justice initiatives, such as accessing reparations.

More immediately, transnationalism facilitates access to certain rights potentially compromised by return, especially if involuntary, as can be the case under the cessation clause. The right to freedom of movement, already inherently violated under encampment, a default experience for many refugee populations in Africa, would be protected, and the compromised autonomy that is so central to forced displacement would be restored. Sustainable livelihoods, particularly through cross-border trade, often off-limits to refugees, could be pursued, anchoring economic rights. This also permits refugees' gradual re-establishment in countries of origin, as to travel there at will, and for intermittent periods, avoids straining fragile post-conflict economies where community relations may be fraught, exiles resented by 'stayees,' and land disputes a risk. Transnational refugees may channel diaspora wealth, enriching countries of origin. Transnationalism loosens institutional frameworks predicated on simplistic, linear migration trajectories (flight, exile, home), corresponding more realistically to refugees' multi-directional displacement and travel histories. It may decongest resettlement routes, maximising their protective potential for those in need. Blending '*de facto* local integration with *de jure* repatriation' (Long, 2010, para. 146) creatively restructures the parameters of traditional humanitarian thinking and the citizenship-rights paradigm. This innovative approach helps re-examine 'the idea that the political connections that exist between nation and state, or the cultural connections that associate people and place, are "natural" rather than constructed' (Long, 2010, para. 27). To enable Rwandan refugees in this way, as proven generally successful with Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees in ECOWAS countries (Economic Community of West African States), seems recommendable, particularly in the case of Rwandan refugees in Uganda, Burundi and some countries of asylum that have formally invoked cessation already.

The experience of the ECOWAS regional integration bloc, comprising 15 states in West Africa, is a positive example of the transnationalism model. Refugees, including large populations of Sierra Leoneans and Liberians, who fled during

the 1990s, are explicitly entitled to make use of the bloc's freedom of movement, residence, settlement and employment instruments, much like other migrants travelling within the region (ECOWAS, 2007). Host countries Nigeria and the Gambia worked with UNHCR, Sierra Leone and Liberia to re-issue national passports and workers' visas to refugees from the latter two countries, allowing them to locally integrate, exercise their right to work and access regional labour markets (Adepoju et al., 2007). 'Repatriating in situ' bypassed the struggle for lengthy and costly naturalisation procedures or resettlement, as individuals transitioned from refugees to migrant workers. Defining 'transnationalism' as 'regional citizenship' (a term gaining currency in discussions of the ECOWAS example [Long, 2011b, p. 35]) arguably does more to instil a sense of cooperation among Member States than it does to accurately capture refugees' realities. Indeed the citizenship that transnationalism envisages conferred on refugees is merely the formal restoration of the national citizenship once enjoyed in the country of origin, through a passport and a migrant visa.

No such theories are without complications, however, and transnationalism's applicability in the Rwanda-DRC context in particular should be studied, since movement of Rwandans to and from eastern DRC is highly politicised. Many Congolese fear Rwandan colonisation of eastern DRC (partly for mineral wealth), an opinion 'so deeply rooted that even normal cross-border movements are from time to time portrayed as "infiltration" or even planned large-scale migration of Rwandans to eastern DRC' (Lange, 2010, p. 49). Similarly, the rejection of Rwandan passports by refugees in Zambia (Chawe, 2013), citing fears of surveillance, illustrates that promoting transnationalism, or repatriation without return, would still be highly complex in this particular context. The mere 19 passports requested by Rwandan refugees in the Republic of Congo suggest a similar dynamic there. Independent investigation into individuals' amenability to acquiring passports (and the measure of citizenship this can be understood to confer) whilst remaining abroad is therefore highly recommended in other Rwandan refugee diasporas, both in the region and in Europe and North America.

On a more general scale, while supporting mobility as a route forward for protecting refugee rights, particularly in response to cessation clause-induced status loss, there is a fear that it is utopian against a backdrop of increasing border securitisation and anti-migration rhetoric. One disagrees with James

Hathaway's critique that 'emphasis on solutions "pathologizes" refugees and may be used to undercut enforcement of rights' through rushing to 'de-refugee' people, reducing them to 'persons to be managed' (James Hathaway, cited in Aleinikoff & Poellot, 2012, p. 20). The opposite is true, that by paving another path refugees have another opportunity to 'manage' themselves in their chosen manner. It is precisely this transfer of autonomy that states seek, directly or indirectly, to resist: the borders are where state sovereignty is most readily challenged. Therefore UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner Alexander Aleinikoff's attempt to couch a response to states' resistance in the discourse of human rights misfires. Hyperinflated rights speak, as discussed, does not speak to the deep-seated political motivations behind governments' and voters' aversion to refugees. Ironically, his project of constructing a 'moral fulcrum' to stimulate the protection of rights, contains no morality-based justifications, but is rather a legally positivist endeavour that rests exclusively on pinning down rights on paper.

Alexander Aleinikoff and Stephen Poellot posit that 'refugees have a right to a solution' (2012, p. 6) under international human rights law, deriving from the right to a nationality found in UDHR Article 15. This relies on acceptance of UDHR as customary international law (a widespread, but not universal, viewpoint), and is somewhat convoluted. They submit that since membership in a national community is vital for the effective protection of human rights, and since refugees by definition lack membership, states' legally binding commitment to human rights must necessitate that refugees be provided membership (Aleinikoff & Poellot, 2012, p. 8). They further this by marrying Article 35 of the Refugee Convention (states' duty to co-operate with UNHCR) with Article 1 of the UNHCR Statute ('seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees'), constructing a state duty to help solve protracted refugee situations. States, however, are unlikely to bow to inferred rights and duties in a legal framework they readily violate on other occasions. Although the limits of rights-speak are recognised and the proposal is thus extricated from a strictly legal framework and spun politically as a '*responsibility* to solve,' in an attempt to piggy-back the popular evolving 'responsibility to protect' concept, one remains wary of this effort to cajole states into addressing protection challenges. The R2P discourse should not be conflated with refugee protection, given its many flaws (and in particular its privileging of powerful northern states whose refugee response efforts are frequently minimal or in bad faith), which are beyond the scope of this article.

Inclusive Understanding

Reconceptualising the ways in which the international community can support refugees in upholding their own rights is therefore more necessary than ever, and at times even promising. Such thinking need not be radical: mobility-as-protection suggestions hark back to the Nansen passport era. This identity document's aim was precisely to facilitate refugees' search for employment by travel across international borders (Long, 2010). Responses must have refugees' intensely political, persecution-generated subjectivities at their core; legal and institutional humility are needed. Human rights claims presented in alienating 'legalese' without concurrent efforts to speak to the prejudices and desires motivating harmful actions and policies on their own terms are unlikely to solve the challenges facing refugees. A focus on agency, not Agencies is needed, and strategies prioritised by refugees themselves must be taken on board by UN and other institutions. To excise refugees from their own management, particularly when rights violations arise from within the systems deployed for their protection, in well-meaning attempts to serve this diverse population group's best interests risks rendering them a 'transparent object of knowledge... abandoned to the discretions of public benevolence or private charity' (Douzinas, 2000, p. 361). The desire to comprehend refugees' perspectives by 'domesticating' such Other experiences into understandable frames of reference 'has catastrophic results for the knowing subject.... By refuting the exteriority of the absolute other,' Douzinas argues, they are rendered 'non-subjects, [with] ...no rights or entitlements' (Douzinas, 2000, p. 362). This by no means implies that human rights are a superfluous explanatory framework for ordering and narrating traumatic personal experiences of dislocation; it merely requires that refugees be involved in shaping the discourse, and this is what troubles the gatekeepers of the international refugee governance regime.

To enable a forced migrant to 'represent the avant-garde of their people [and] ...be considered for what he is... a border concept that radically calls into question the principles of the nation-state and, at the same time, helps clear the field for a no-longer-delayable renewal of categories' (Agamben, 1995, p. 117), would entail a drastic reshuffle of the international monopoly on knowledge and a reassessment of 'objective' received wisdom and its relation to refugees' subjective understanding of their own problems. It is doubtful that UN power hierarchies would loosen their grip on the hegemonic, international

perspective that ultimately balances community sentiments (where researched) with operational and political factors, and translates the resulting compromise into actionable policies. ‘We Refugees,’ the article in which Agamben espouses this need for a reshuffle, remains too radically inclusive a prospect to effectively democratise the mainstream. Alternatively, failure to acknowledge refugees’ views on how best to protect their rights may simply stem from operational inexpertise or indeed, as in eastern DRC, a reluctance to engage with complex political sensitivities. Whether down to inertia or constraints imposed by maintaining a façade of impartial neutrality, this ‘creates an environment in which widely expressed popular fears tend to become understood as established facts’ (Lange, 2010, p. 49). ‘Well-founded fear’ does not lend itself as easily to objective interpretation as is often assumed.

Even admitting refugee voices into academic analysis of rights paradigms is hindered by the institutional need for credibility as demonstrated through peer-reviewed journals or INGO research. Consequently only mediated (and translated) refugee voices, with some few exceptions, enter the realm of refugee rights theorising. To ascribe discussions of repatriation without return through ECOWAS-style mobility solutions to non-traditional sources, such as Callixte Kanani’s report on UNHCR consultations with Rwandan refugee organisations,² featured on the highly partial campaign website ‘Rwandan Dialogue for Truth and Justice,’ necessitates a plethora of caveats regarding bias, and the representational issues around bodies claiming to speak on behalf of ‘civil society.’ However, to view communications issues and the misunderstandings of refugees they engender, as the root of challenges to refugee rights is disingenuous.

As the controversy surrounding the application of the cessation clause to Rwandan refugees illustrates, institutional actors may be well aware of these challenges, but find themselves politically (or economically) constrained in responding. Such multifaceted pressures hamper conceptualisation of refugees as rights-holders, even within an entity born of a Convention establishing refugee rights. To expose these ‘unsettling examples of [how] ...an

² ‘...la solution qui sera proposée aux réfugiés intégrés est de solliciter un permis de séjour permanent qui suppose des démarches auprès des autorités de Kigali car un passeport rwandais est indispensable’ (Kanani, 2011, p. 2).

institution created to supervise and promote compliance with refugee law [is] prepared to distort that law in order to promote its own... priorities' (Verdirame & Harrell-Bond, 2005, p. 113) underscores a more general tension; rights, as legal constructs, harbour their toughest challenges within.

Interpretation of refugee rights laws is therefore crucial in order to engender policies that deliver effective protection. Recommending the invocation of the ceased circumstances cessation clauses for Rwandan refugees is an example of the opposite. Agencies must first acknowledge, and then address, institutional biases against refugees' own perspectives and knowledge of their situation. Questioning received wisdom is therefore paramount, whether this is the accepted narrative of refugees' desires to 'go home,' or the comfortable inclination towards well-worn 'durable solutions' to the exclusion of mobility-centric innovations. In the Rwandan cessation debate it is not too late to reinvigorate such discussions, and push for an outcome that is more rights-centric. Where it might take us depends entirely on the views of those refugees affected; meaningfully admitting their voices into academic and other spheres can be considered but an overdue starting point.

References

Primary

1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights

1950 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees

1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention)

Secondary

Adepoju, A., Boulton, A. and Levin M. 2007. Promoting integration through mobility: free movement and the ECOWAS Protocol. New Issues in Refugee Research. Research Paper No. 150. From <
<http://www.unhcr.org/476650ae2.pdf> > (Retrieved January 27, 2015)

Agamben, G. 1995. *We Refugees. Symposium*, 49(2):114-119.

Agamben, G. 1998. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Aleinikoff, T. A. and Poellot, S. 2012. The Responsibility to Solve. The Program on Law & Human Development, Working Paper Series #3, University of Notre Dame. From

<<http://www3.nd.edu/~ndlaw/prog-human-rights/working-papers/AleinikoffResponsibility.pdf> > (Retrieved April 13, 2013)

BBC World News (BBC). 2010. Rwanda ex-army chief Nyamwasa shot in Johannesburg. From < <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10358171> > (Retrieved April 14, 2013)

BBC World News (BBC). 2011. Rwandan exiles in London ‘threatened by hitman.’ From

< <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13475635> > (Retrieved April 14, 2013)

BBC World News (BBC). 2014. South Africa links Rwanda diplomats to attacks. From

< <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26546105> > (Retrieved March 27, 2014)

Cacharani J. and Cliche-Rivard G. 2013. June 30th Cessation Deadlines Inconclusive Conclusion. Rights in Exile. From < <http://rightsinexile.tumblr.com/post/59864019053/june-30th-cessation-deadlines-inconclusive-conclusion> > (Retrieved November 8, 2014)

Chawe, M. 2013. Rwandan refugees in Zambia reject Kigali passports. From <<http://www.africareview.com/News/Rwandan-refugees-in-Zambia-reject-Kigali-passports/-/979180/2078492/-/qsvn4c/-/index.html> > (Retrieved September 27, 2014)

Chimni, B. S. 2004. From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems. *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 23(3):55-73.

Cliche-Rivard, G. 2012. Cessation Clause for Rwandan refugees raises questions. Pambazuka. From <

<http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category/features/81821> > (Retrieved January 27, 2015)

Cwik, M. E. 2011. Forced to Flee and Forced to Repatriate? How the Cessation Clause of Article 1c(5) and (6) of the 1951 Refugee Convention Operates in International Law and Practice. *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, 44(3):711-743.

Douzinas, C. 2000. *The end of human rights*. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing.

Douzinas, C. 2009. What are human rights? From <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/mar/18/human-rights-asylum> > (Retrieved April 14, 2013)

Douzinas, C. 2013. The paradoxes of Human Rights. *Constellations*, 20(2):51-67.

ECOWAS Commission (ECOWAS). 2007. Memorandum on Equality of treatment for refugees with other citizens of Member States of ECOWAS in the exercise of Free Movement, Right of Residence and Establishment. From <<http://www.unhcr.org/49e47c8f0.pdf> > (Retrieved January 27, 2015)

Fahamu Refugee Programme (FAHAMU). 2013. NGO Statement on Africa – Extended Version, Agenda Item 3 (a) i. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee, 56th Meeting. ICVA Network. From

< https://icvanetwork.org/system/files/.../Africa_Written_FINAL_0.docx > (Retrieved November 8, 2014)

Feller, E., Turk, V. and Nicholson, F. (Eds.). 2003. *Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fitzpatrick, J. and Bonoan, R. 2003. Cessation of refugee protection. In: Feller, E., Turk, V. and Nicholson, F. (Eds.). *Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 491-544.

Government of Rwanda. 2013. Rwanda ready to receive all returning refugees as cessation clause comes into effect. From <

<http://www.gov.rw/Rwanda-ready-to-receive-all-returning-refugees-as-cessation-comes-into-effect?lang=en> > (Retrieved November 20, 2014)

Harris Rimmer, S. 2010. Reconceiving refugees and internally displaced persons as transitional justice actors. UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service. From

< <http://www.unhcr.org/4bbb2a589.pdf> > (Retrieved April 13, 2013)

Hathaway, J. C. 2005. *The Rights of Refugees under International Law*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hovil, L. 2010. A Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda. Citizenship and Displacement in the Great Lakes Region. Working Paper No. 4. International Refugee Rights Initiative and Refugee Law Project. From

< http://www.refugee-rights.org/Publications/Papers/2010/10_08_30_Dangerous_Impasse.pdf > (Retrieved April 13, 2013)

Hovil, L. 2013. Playing with people's lives: the plight of Rwandan refugees in the Great Lakes region. International Refugee Rights Initiative. From < <http://www.refugee-rights.org/blog/?p=361> > (Retrieved November 8, 2014)

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN). 2013. No consensus on implementation of cessation clause for Rwandan refugees. From

< <http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/98409/no-consensus-on-implementation-of-cessation-clause-for-rwandan-refugees> > (Retrieved March 27, 2014)

Kanani, C. 2011. *Rwanda/HCR: Cessation de statut de réfugié repoussée*. From

< <http://rdtj.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Cessation-Callixte-Kanani.pdf> > (Retrieved April 15, 2013)

Lange, M. 2010. Refugee return and root causes of conflict. *Forced Migration Review*, 36(1):48-49.

Long, K. 2009. Extending protection? Labour migration and durable solutions for refugees. *New Issues in Refugee Research*. Research Paper No. 176. From < <http://www.unhcr.org/4c03826b9.pdf> > (Retrieved January 27, 2015)

Long, K. 2010. Home alone? A review of the relationship between repatriation, mobility and durable solutions for refugees. UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service. From

< <http://www.unhcr.org/4b97afc49.html> > (Retrieved April 15, 2013)

Long, K. 2011a. Refugee Protection, Solutions and Migration. DRAFT. From

< <http://tinyurl.com/cc2xsm3> > (Retrieved April 15, 2013)

Long, K. 2011b. Permanent crises? Unlocking the protracted displacement of refugees and internally displaced persons. Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. From

< <http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/policy-briefing-series/pb-unlocking-protracted-displacement-2011.pdf> > (Retrieved 27 January, 2015)

Long, K. and Crisp, J. Migration, mobility and solutions: an evolving perspective. *Forced Migration Review*, 35(2010):56-57.

Longman, T. 2011. Countries at the Crossroads 2011: Rwanda. From <

<https://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2011/rwanda#.VMd9UWSUcxc> > (Retrieved 27 January, 2015)

Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR). 2011.

PRESS RELEASE: No Rwandan Refugees After 2011. From <

http://southafrica.embassy.gov.rw/index.php?id=1061&L=0&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=47&cHash=4f3e0dc528fcc58a2f46d0158f57980 > (Retrieved November 20, 2014)

New Times. 2014a. Rwanda calls for Cessation Clause to be implemented. From

< <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2014-10-02/181531/> > (Retrieved November 8, 2014)

New Times. 2014b. Implementing Cessation Clause is an obligation. From

< <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2014-10-03/181544/> > (Retrieved November 8, 2014)

Pottier, J. 1996. Relief and Repatriation: Views by Rwandan Refugees; Lessons for Humanitarian Aid Workers. *African Affairs*, 95(378):403-429.

Pottier, J. 1999. The 'Self' in Self-Repatriation: Closing Down Mugunga Camp, Eastern Zaire. In: Black, R. and Koser, K. (Eds.). *The end of the refugee cycle?*

Refugee repatriation and reconstruction. Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 142-170.

Réunion Tripartite. 2013a. *Réunion Tripartite sur la Cessation du Statut de Réfugié des Réfugiés Rwandais en République du Congo*, 26-27 November 2013. *Compte Rendu*.

Réunion Tripartite. 2013b. *Réunion Tripartite sur la Cessation du Statut de Réfugié des Réfugiés Rwandais en République du Congo*, 26-27 November 2013. Notes from a Participant.

Siddiqui, Y. 2011. Reviewing the application of the Cessation Clause of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees in Africa. Working Paper Series No. 76. Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. From

< http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/working-papers-folder_contents/RSCworkingpaper76.pdf > (Retrieved April 13, 2013)

Straus, S. and Waldorf, L. (Eds.). 2011. *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence*. Madison, Wisconsin and London: University of Wisconsin Press.

UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 1992. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Conclusion No. 69 (XLIII). *UN Doc A/AC.96/804*.

UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 1999. The Cessation Clauses: Guidelines on their Application. From

< <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3c06138c4.pdf> > (Retrieved April 13, 2013)

UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2003. Guidelines on International Protection No. 3: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Ceased Circumstances" Clauses). HCR/GIP/03/03. From

< <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3e50de6b4.pdf> > (Retrieved April 13, 2013)

UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2010. UNHCR condemns forced return of 1,700 Rwandans from Uganda. From

< <http://www.unhcr.org/4c406edb6.html> > (Retrieved April 14, 2013)

UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2011a. Guidelines on Exemption Procedures in respect of Cessation Declarations. From

< <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4eef5c3a2.pdf> > (Retrieved April 13, 2013)

UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2011b. Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy for the Rwandan Refugee Situation, including UNHCR's recommendations on the applicability of the "ceased circumstances" cessation clauses. UN Doc IOM/093-FOM/094/2011. From

< <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4f33a1642.pdf> > (Retrieved April 14, 2013)

UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2011c. Global Trends Report, Data Table Annexes, Table 12. From

< <http://www.unhcr.org/4fd9e6266.html> > (Retrieved September 27, 2014)

UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2012. Global Trends Report, Data Table Annexes, Table 12. From

<[http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/Estadisticas/2013/Global Trends 2012 Annexes.pdf?view=1](http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/Estadisticas/2013/Global_Trends_2012_Annexes.pdf?view=1) > (Retrieved September 27, 2014)

UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2013. Global Trends Report, Data Table Annexes, Table 12. From <

<http://unhcr.org/trends2013/> > (Retrieved September 27, 2014).

Van Hear, N. 2006. Refugees in Diaspora: From Durable Solutions to Transnational Relations. *Refugee*, 23(1):9-14.

Verdirame, G. and Harrell-Bond, B. 2005. *Rights in Exile: Janus-faced Humanitarianism*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Macroeconomic Immigration Determinants: an Analysis of ‘Pull’ Factors of International Migration to South Africa

Mulugeta F. Dinbabo³ and Themba Nyasulu⁴

Abstract

This research empirically examines the macroeconomic determinants of ‘pull’ factors of international migration in South Africa. Using the neoclassical economic model of international migration, an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression was run on time-series data from the World Bank database for the period 1990-2012. Relevant data from the South African Department of Home Affairs’ Annual Reports were also used. GDP per capita, inflation rate, real interest rate, employment rate and public health expenditure were found to be the key determinants which entice migrants away from their countries and direct them to “better off” destinations. The country’s public education system, on the other hand, is not a significant attraction for foreign migrants. The study concludes that the South African government urgently needs to implement not only skilled worker-attractive immigration policies, but also appropriate fiscal and monetary restructuring policies aimed at growing the economy and creating employment opportunities.

Keywords: Education, employment, foreigners, government, inflation, international, migration, ‘Pull’ factors and South Africa

³ Senior Lecturer at the Institute for Social Development, Faculty of Economic & Management Sciences, University of the Western Cape (UWC), South Africa. He obtained a PhD in Development Studies from the University of the Western Cape, South Africa. *E-mail:* mdinbabo@uwc.ac.za

⁴ Independent Development Economics Researcher. He obtained an MA Economics (Development) from the University of the Western Cape, South Africa.

Introduction

International migration is an escalating practice of our times. This process whereby millions of people flow across traditional social and geographical boundaries has altered the global landscape (Hatton, 1995; Lee, 1926). The decision to emigrate depends on a combination of factors, such as lack of social security and justice, political instability, a low level of confidence in the state, as well as better opportunities for work abroad (Kurunova, 2013). However, these flows generate socio-economic and political challenges in migrant destination countries and have thus raised complex questions for policy makers and researchers. In this response, researchers (Castles, 2010; Hatton, 1995; Lee, 1926; Mayda 2003; Mayda, 2010; Nwajiuba, 2005; Rodrick 1995; Stark, 1984; Taylor, 1999) have developed a wide range of theoretical and conceptual frameworks (both econometric and mathematical) aimed at analysing international migration. For example Kurunova (2013) indicates that each theory of international migration focuses on a separate aspect of the migration relationship, such as factors that 'push' or 'pull' migrants, globalisation factors of migration, migration networks, migration implications for the labour market in host countries or the countries of origin, and the impact of migration on income distribution in a given region.

The aim of this research is to provide an empirical investigation into the macroeconomic determinants of 'pull' factors of international migration in South Africa, using the neoclassical economic model of international migration. However, in order to make a case for an empirical analysis, the presence of reliable statistical data is very important, although at the same time the research is limited by it. In this particular research, apart from focusing on registered migration because only official statistics is readily available, selected 'pull' factors such as *GDP per capita, inflation rate, real interest rate, employment rate, public health expenditure and education expenditure* are also included. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression was run on time-series data for the period 1990-2012 collected from the World Bank data base and the South African Department of Home Affairs. Results of the study show that GDP per capita, inflation rate, real interest rate, employment rate and public health expenditure are important migration 'pull' factors.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 gives a general introduction to international migration. Section 2 presents a background to past and recent

trends in international migration in South Africa. Section 3 reviews literature on the subject and generates a theoretical framework for the study. Section 4 presents the econometric techniques used. Section 5 shows and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 presents the conclusions and policy recommendations.

Background

The issue of international immigration into South Africa has a long history spanning several centuries. Cross (2000) observes that its beginnings can certainly be traced to 19th Century white settlement and the consequent establishment of colonial rule, when hundreds of thousands of Europeans permanently immigrated to the country. Thereafter, the opening up of large sugar cane fields in Natal also attracted large flows of immigrants especially from India, as did the establishment of diamond and gold mines in Kimberly and on the Witwatersrand in the late 19th and early 20th centuries which brought in large numbers of laborers from several neighboring countries such as Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. From the beginning of the early 20th century South Africa's population contained a sizeable foreign migrant stock. The 1911 Census for example, revealed that foreign migrants from neighboring countries made up 6 percent of South Africa's total population. The foreign migrant stock reached a total of 836, 000 in 1961 (Peberdy, 1997). Ayala et al. (2013) observe that even though there is no reliable data on the exact immigrant numbers, especially during the pre-Apartheid period, there are at least four international immigration routes that are known in the country's history. These include: contract labourers on the mines, informal immigrants to work in the construction and service sectors, refugees from the Mozambican conflict; and white 'asylum seekers' from neighbouring countries.

The imposition of a white-supremacist form of government (Apartheid) in 1948 had a profound effect on South Africa's migration policy (Peberdy and Crush, 2000). Successive Apartheid governments pursued a racially-oriented policy favouring white immigration while at the same time restricting black/African and later on Jewish inflows into the country. Even though successive Apartheid governments recognised the need for cheap foreign labour to work on the mines and farms, they only encouraged clandestine immigration from neighbouring countries and also blocked foreign immigrants from acquiring temporary or permanent South African residency.

In contrast, white immigrants escaping from political uncertainty in newly-independent African countries such as Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe were offered citizenship between 1960 and 1980 in order to boost the white population in South Africa (Peberdy, 1997; Peberdy & Crush, 1998). The above authors observe that some of the significant colonial and Apartheid-era restrictive migration laws were passed in the years 1913, 1930, 1937 and 1991.

With the end of Apartheid and the consequent ushering in of the democratic era in the country in 1994, the African National Congress-led government has continued pursuing a more restrictive migration policy in the post-Apartheid era (Crush & Peberdy, 2003). Apart from giving out a few amnesties to political asylum-seekers and refugees from some Sub-Sahara African countries, the South African government has generally shown little appetite for immigration. For example, legal labour migration to the country has been on the decline since the early 1990s, as the more restrictive policies put in place have made it difficult for employers to obtain work permits for foreign contract workers (Crush & McDonald, 2003). Despite these restrictive migration policies, international migration into South Africa has continued to surge. The majority of migrants have come from Sub-Saharan African countries mainly in search of employment and other economic opportunities in this regional economic super-power (Adepoju, 1998). The increase in economic immigrants primarily from neighbouring countries has occasionally been met with hostility from the generally poor and unemployed sections of South African society who view foreign migrants as direct competitors for jobs in the primary sectors of the economy. This hostility erupted into violent xenophobic attacks in May, 2008 when several small-scale businesses mainly owned by Zimbabwean, Mozambican, and Malawian immigrants were destroyed by groups of South Africans across several cities (Friebel, Gallego & Mendola; 2013).

Klotz (2000) notes that each year hundreds of thousands migrants from all over the world come to South Africa legally and illegally in search of socio-economic and political opportunities. Kok et al. (2006) categorise these migration inflows into three groups, namely labour mobility, refugees, and permanent migrants. At present it is estimated that the total foreign population in South Africa ranges between seven and eight million. This constitutes approximately 5.7 percent of the country's total population of 51 million (Stats SA, 2012). Although there is significant dispute with regard to

the exact number of illegal immigrants, the same cannot be said about the statistics of foreign people living in the country legally. Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) shows that a total of 142,833 temporary residence permits (TRPs) and permanent residence permits (PRPs) were issued to foreign nationals by the Department of Home Affairs in 2012. In fact, 45.6 percent of the TRPs were issued to nationals from overseas countries (mainly India, China, Pakistan, and Britain), while 54.4 percent were issued to people from the African continent (mainly Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Lesotho). On the other hand, people from the overseas countries accounted for 46.8 percent of PRPs while those originating from the African continent constituted 53.2 percent of the total PRPs issued in 2012 (Stat SA; 2013).

From the above description and other available literature, there seems to be considerable agreement among researchers that economic factors are the main driver of immigration to South Africa. For example the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) observes that the majority of African migrants who go to South Africa do so simply because conditions in their countries of origin have plummeted to a point below their tolerance threshold.. A prime example is the high number of Zimbabwean immigrants currently residing in the South Africa. The organisation further points out that the main driving force is the 'pull' of opportunity in the destination country, as well as the 'push' of abject poverty in their places of origin (Crush & Frayne, 2007). Adepoju (2000) observes that socio-economic insecurity, abject poverty and extreme unemployment in some rural areas of Africa have transformed what could otherwise have been internal migration to urban centres into international emigration to neighbouring, more prosperous nations such as South Africa.

But despite this consensus on economic forces that drive migrants out of their countries of origin, very little is known about the macroeconomic factors that attract ('pull') people to South Africa. The majority of studies (Lucas, 1987; Bhorat et al., 2002; Wocke and Klein, 2002; Bhorat, 2004; Waller, 2006; Lindau and Segatti, 2009; Crush and Williams, 2010; Friebel et al., 2013; Mayda et al., 2013) that have been conducted so far on the subject in the country seem to focus mainly on migration trends and migration effects on the labour market, but not on its macroeconomic determinants. Against this background therefore; it is evident that there is a major knowledge gap in the key macroeconomic determinants of international migration in South Africa and

how these 'pull' factors have affected the foreign migrant inflows into the country in the post-Apartheid era. This study aims, therefore, not only to fill this gap but also to come up with relevant policy recommendations that can help the country maximise the benefits of this human inflow. Furthermore, the aim of this paper is to provide macroeconomic suggestions that could help stem the rising tide of xenophobic feelings against foreigners which are held mainly by the impoverished and unemployed section of the South African population which perceives immigrants as a direct opponents vying for their jobs and other economic opportunities.

Literature Review

There is a great deal of literature (Castles, 2010; Hatton, 1995; Lee, 1926; Mayda 2003; Mayda, 2010; Nwajiuba, 2005; Rodrick 1995; Stark, 1984; Taylor, 1999) on international migration both in developed and developing countries. The majority of these migration theories seek to explain the causes and effects of the movement of people across a specified boundary for the purpose of establishing a new or semi-permanent residence. Two of the major migration theories include Ravenstein's theory of migration, and the 'pull-push' theory of migration. The following section analyses the key understanding of these major theories, and traces their main principles and practical applications.

Ravenstein theory of migration. Ernst Georg Ravenstein (1834-1913) developed a theory of human migration which today is still considered the backbone of the modern migration theory. Using a combination of individual rational choice theory, Newtonian physics, and other rural-urban and developmental perspectives he came up with empirical generalisations on the flow of human beings between places. These empirical generalisations which have come to be called 'Ravenstein's Laws of Migration' were mainly developed from British and other European census data in the 1800s (Ravenstein; 1885). de Haas (2009) gives a summary of these seven laws as follows: (1) most migration occurs within a short distance; (2) The majority of migration movements are from agricultural to industrial regions; (3) expansion of most bigger town centres is as a result of migration rather than natural growth; (4) migration develops in tandem with industrial, commercial and transportation expansion; (5) every migration flow produces a counter-flow; (6) Most women undertake short distance migration while the majority

of men indulge in international migration; (7) economic causes are at the centre of most migration flows.

'Pull-Push' theory of migration. This theory largely builds on Ravenstein 'laws of migration'. According to King (2012) the 'pull-push' migration theory argues that migration comes about because of economic and socio-political factors present in both the source and destination migration countries. Factors such as poverty, unemployment, political repression, poverty etc. drive out ('push') people out of their home (source) countries. On the other hand, there also factors present in the destination countries which pull or attract migrants; these include better income and employment prospects, better social welfare services, political freedom etc. Lee (1966) adds that for the 'pull and push' factors to effectively influence migration there are several intervening obstacles that must be overcome. These obstacles can be physical (e.g. distance), economic (e.g. financial cost of migration), political (international borders), and cultural barriers (e.g. language problems). He further observes that personal factors also play a vital role in migration since people's response to the 'pull and push' stimuli will vary depending of their socio-economic and cultural orientation. From the above theoretical background several models explaining migration have been developed, and these are normally classified in two categories: (1) theoretical models that describe the initiation process of migration; and (2) models that explain the continuation process of migration.

Models Explaining the Initiation and Process of International Migration

The literature identifies a variety of theoretical models (Massey et al., 1993, 1998; Schoorl, 1995) that can be used to model the effects of migration. In the early 1950s, in particular, there was a large body of literature produced on migration. This research does not propose to review all of this literature, nor all of the models available. It surveys some of the main models explaining the initiation and process of international migration. A brief description of models explaining the initiation and process of international migration is given below in Table 1.

Table 1: Models explaining the initiation and process of migration

Models explaining the initiation of international migration	
<i>Theories</i>	<i>Brief description theories</i>

<i>Neoclassical Economic Theory</i>	The theory argues that real wage differences between countries drive people from lower to higher wage regions. This trend continues until wages in all regions equalize and migration stops (Massey et al., 1993, 1998; Borjas, 1989).
<i>Dual Labour Market Theory</i>	The dual labour market states that international migration is determined by ‘push’ (supply) and ‘pull’ (demand) factors in migrant sending and receiving countries respectively. Demand pressures generated in primary sectors of labour markets of more developed countries stimulate the supply of international labour migration from less developed countries (Piore, 1979).
<i>New Economics of Labour Migration Theory</i>	This theory states that migration flows and patterns cannot be explained solely at the level of individual workers and their economic incentives, but that wider social entities must be considered as well. Remittances, and more importantly the possibility of achieving an uninterrupted flow of household income, are the main drivers of international migration (Stark & Bloom, 1985; Taylor, 1999)
<i>Relative Deprivation Theory</i>	The theory indicates that awareness among individuals of the existence of income/wage differentials between migrant-sending countries and migrant-receiving nations is the main incentive for international migration (Stark & Taylor, 1993).
<i>World Systems Theory</i>	The basic argument of the theory is that the reliance on the international market has led to richer countries (core countries) dominating transitional capital at the expense of poor countries (semi-peripheral and core countries). The unequal exchange results in migration from poorer to richer countries (Wallerstein, 1983; Amankwaa, 1995).
Models explaining the process of international migration	
<i>Network Theory</i>	The theory argues that international flows of people between countries generate networks of migrants and other person-to-person linkages between the migrant sending countries and the receiving countries which serve to perpetuate more migration (Esveldt et al., 1995).
<i>Institutional Theory</i>	The theory shows that the international outflow and inflow of migrants attracts and generates both legal and illegal profit and charity organisations which help in perpetuating this tendency by offering financial, material, legal, and logistical support to immigrants (Massey et al., 1993).

In synthesizing all the above theories it is clear that economic factors have played a very crucial role in the development of international migration theory.

Even though at first glance network and institutional theories do not seem to place significant emphasis on economic variables, a close examination of the two theories reveals that their vital aspects can be rendered important drivers of migration. As clearly argued by Jenissen (2004), the presence of a large migrant network will not only reduce the costs of migration but will also increase the chances of migrants obtaining jobs in the receiving country. A similar situation avails where institutions created because of migration flows also reduce the cost of migration.

Empirical Studies Targeting the Macroeconomic Determinants

Several empirical studies (e.g. Bach, 2003; Jerome, 1926; Kelley, 1965; Lichfield and Waddington, 2003; McDonald and Crush, 2002; Nwajiuba, 2005; Tsegai and Plotnikova, 2004; Wentzel and Bosman, 2001; Wentzel and Viljoen, 2006; Wouterse and Van den Berg, 2004) have been undertaken by researchers across the globe specifically targeting the macroeconomic determinants of migration.

For example, Jerome (1926) was one of the first to study this issue. He examined United States (US) immigration from Europe over a hundred year period prior to the imposition of U.S. immigration quotas in the 1920s and concluded that economic conditions in the United States were primarily responsible for short-cycle movements in European emigration to the U.S. On a similar note, Kelley (1965), in agreement with Jerome's findings, also observed that economic factors, mainly employment opportunities, were the main reason for the rising emigration of people from Britain to Australia between 1865 and 1935. All the different migration models employed in his analysis confirmed the above findings. Several similar studies have also been undertaken in Africa. In one such study aimed at establishing the main reason for migration from Nigeria to other countries, Nwajiuba (2005) found that economic factors account for 80 percent of the reasons people are attracted to foreign nations, while educational factors take up only 18 percent of the 'pull' factors.

In Burkina Faso, Wouterse and Van den Berg (2004) found that employment opportunities and the possibility of earning higher income lure the country's poor households into migrating to other African countries. On the other hand, richer Burkinabe households are attracted to overseas countries by the

perceived wealth accumulation prospects present in those countries. In a cross-border migration study targeting the causes of migration by Mozambicans and Zimbabweans into South Africa, Wentzel and Bosman (2001) found that macroeconomic variables were the main determinant. Indeed the two authors found that nationals of the above countries were compelled to emigrate because South Africa offered these people better employment prospects, higher wages, lower average prices of goods, and a more stable currency value relative to their home countries. This study also found that non-economic factors had a very insignificant ‘pull’ effect on cross-border migration to South Africa. McDonald and Crush (2002) conducted several studies to determine the factors that attract international immigrants to South Africa and Botswana. Among all the considered variables, the study found that the economic attraction of the above economies is the main ‘pull’ factor that lures international migrants. In a similar vein, the 2001-02 HRSC international migration survey conducted by Brown University also found that more than two-thirds of all international skilled migrants come to South Africa because of the lure of finding not only ‘suitable’ employment opportunities but also increasing their income earnings (Wentzel & Viljoen, 2006).

Despite the dominance of economic factors in the international migration literature, some surveys show that non-economic factors are the main determinants of migration flows between countries. Researchers such as Lichfield and Waddington (2003), and Tsegai and Plotnikova (2004) found that in Ghana more-qualified citizens are more likely to migrate than less-qualified citizens. They therefore conclude that the likelihood of migration increases with education. Similarly, Bach (2003) found that emigration of South African nurses to Britain has largely been driven by nurses associations and other networks of the South African diaspora present in the destination country. With the above contradiction in the empirical literature it is therefore necessary to conduct empirical research to determine whether or not economic (macroeconomic) factors are the main ‘pull’ factors for migration to South Africa.

Econometric Techniques Used

Todaro and Smith (2009) note that models play a major role in econometric studies, whether theoretical or applied. According to them, a model is a simplified representation of an actual phenomenon. The actual phenomenon

is represented by the model in order to explain it, to predict it, and to control it, goals corresponding to the three purposes of econometrics, namely structural analysis, forecasting, and policy evaluation. In order to analyse the macroeconomic determinants of immigration into South Africa the study employed a theoretical framework largely based on the Neoclassical Economic Theory of Migration. Essentially this theory which was founded by Todaro (1969) and Todaro and Harris (1970), views migration as emanating from differences in endowments of labour relative to capital. The resultant wage differentials drive workers to vacate low-wage, labour-surplus regions in favour of high-wage, labour-scarce regions. Simply put, migration is an economically rational process in which people move from their places of origin to new areas when their net present value income calculation in the new area is greater than the average income in their place of origin (Todaro & Smith, 2009).

It is clear therefore that the theory looks at economic factors such as utility maximization, wage and other factor-price differentials, and ease of labour movement and substitution as the main determinants that drive out and attract people in the process of migration. According to Massey et al. (1998) these economic factors operate at both the micro and macro levels of the economy. The above researchers argue that migration occurs at the macroeconomic level as a result of uneven distribution of labour in relation to other production factors. On the micro level, it is argued that migration occurs on the household and individual level because people use the information available and make rational choices on whether or not to migrate based on informed cost-benefit analyses. To this end researchers such as Sjaastad (1962) and Borjas (1989) derived calculus migration models depicting how individuals come up with decisions to migrate both to areas within and outside their countries, taking into account the costs and benefits of the process. An illustration of this concept is given by Massey et al. (1993) who incorporate computations of probability of escaping deportation from the receiving country, the probability of securing employment in both the country of destination and country of origin and a time component (t). This is specified in the model below as follows:

$$ER(0) = \int_0^t [P_1(t) P_2(t) Y_d(t) - P_3(t) Y_0(t)] e^{-rt} dt - C(0)$$

ER (0): expected net return to migration just before departure at time 0

$P_1(t)$: probability of avoiding deportation from the area of destination

$P_2(t)$: probability of finding work in the destination country

$P_3(t)$: probability of finding work in the country of origin

$Y_d(t)$: total earnings if employed in the country of destination

$Y_0(t)$: total earnings if employed in the country of origin

r: rate of discount

C (0): total of the cost of migrating

From the above formulation, Massey et al. (1993) observe that if the expected net return to migration has a value greater than zero, rationality demands that the individual migrate. On the other hand, if the value is negative then a rational individual stays in his/her home country. Suffice to say that when an individual is faced with a positive net return on migration for several countries, rationality will drive him/her to the country with the greatest value. Borjas (1989) therefore indicates that the neo-classical theory emphasises the importance of taking into account labour market structures, human capital and income distribution both in the country of origin and the country of destination in explaining the individuals' choice of where to migrate. Even though the theory was initially designed to explain rural-urban migration, it has of late been extensively applied to analysing the determinants of international migration. In this regard, Malmberg (1999) points out that some of the advantages of Neoclassical Model of Migration are that it forms the basis of most of the migration models. In addition, Malmberg (1999) argues that the model has a clear logic and simple economic explanation of the causes of both internal and international migration. De Haas (2009) observes that the strength of the neoclassical theory of migration is its dynamism in explaining and forecasting the initial conditions in which it took place. The author further observes that the theory perceives migration as a mode of optimally allocating factors of production. Holding other things constant, migration influences labour to become scarcer in the sending than in the origin region. The opposite occurs with the capital factor of production. Schiff (1997) states that this leads to equalisation of factors of production as wages converge in both the migration source and the destination countries. With this convergence of wages and factor prices, the above researcher argues that migration stops as wage differentials and cost of migration equalise in the long-run.

Despite the above strengths the Neoclassical Theory of Migration is criticised for its minor emphasis on structure and agency which are important notions in social relations (Castles, 2010). The crux of the critique is that since the theory emphasises perfect information and human behaviour as aggregated, it reduces individuals to ‘automatons’ who passively respond to macro-level ‘pull-push’ migration determinants. Its critics argue, therefore, that the theory has limited power to explain migration transformations and social relation patterns (de Haas, 2010).

Formulation of the Empirical Model and Measurement

As already alluded to, a considerable amount of empirical literature is available on international migration econometric modelling including authoritative empirical surveys conducted by Borjas (1989, 1994, 1999); Ghatak et al., (1996);, and Mitchel and Pain (2002). These studies have suggested that it is not only macroeconomic factors but also socio-political conditions in receiving countries that attract emigrants. However, since this study contains a small dataset of 22 observations, it is not possible to incorporate all the macroeconomic determinants suggested by some of the above authoritative studies. Instead this study attempts to build an econometric model based on the theoretical foundation set by the Neoclassical Economic Model of Migration as expounded by researchers such as Ahmad et al., 2008; Brucker et al., 2003; and Mitchell and Pain, 2003. The above models look at international migration as a function of various macroeconomic variables. Mathematically this is depicted by the formulation below.

$$IM = f(U_i, \dots, U_n)$$

Where *IM* represents international migration into South Africa, and *U* gives a set of macroeconomic variables that attract foreign migrants to the country.

Following the neoclassical theoretical framework and the majority of empirical studies carried out on the subject, the model considered the following macroeconomic variables: employment rate (ER); per capita gross domestic product (GDPPC); inflation rate (INFLR); government spending on health and educators (PUBEXPH and PUBEXPEDU); and employment rate (EMPR). Therefore the relationship between international migration and the

above macroeconomic variables is given in the mathematical formulations below.

$$IM = f(GDPPC, INFLR, RINTR, EMPR, PUBEXPH, PUBEXPEDU)$$

The above function is then reduced into the following linear regression equation

$$IM = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 GDPPC + \alpha_2 INFLR + \alpha_3 RINTR + \alpha_4 EMPR + \alpha_5 PUBEXPH + \alpha_6 PUBEXPEDU + \mu$$

Where α_i represents regression coefficients, and μ represents the random/stochastic error term.

Following the tradition used in many international migration studies, this research operationalises the above macroeconomic determinants as follows:

International migration is approximated by total migrant stock i.e. the percentage of foreign nationals in the total population of South Africa.

This is a more practical and feasible way of measuring the total number of foreign migrants considering the unreliability and unavailability of data on this topic. Annual per capita gross domestic product was used to approximate the standard of living in South Africa which shows the average distribution of national income to each individual residing in the country. Additionally, the study used annual employment rate as the number of job opportunities available in the country per year. Furthermore, the country's cost of living and the stability of the economy approximated by the annual inflation rate are also used. Annual government expenditure on education and health as a percentage of the GDP was used to approximate state provision of social services and welfare. Similarly, the value of the annual real interest rate was used to measure the stability of business and the investment climate in South Africa. The model also incorporated the random error term to approximate other unobservable macroeconomic factors that affect international migration to South Africa but they have not been captured in the model.

Data used in the study. It must be stated that data on immigration inflows into South Africa are poor and unreliable, just as in other Sub-Saharan African countries. This is mainly due to weaknesses in immigration data collection

agencies, and the laxity of border control regulations in the country which sometimes makes it easy for illegal migrants to evade border controls (Shaw, 2007). In order to address these concerns the study used secondary annual data from the World Bank and Annual Reports' of the Department of Home Affairs from 1990 to 2012.

Diagnostic Tests for Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) Regression: Before OLS regression could be conducted on the time series, several regression diagnostic tests had to be performed in order to come up with accurate, efficient, and unbiased results. However, the reliability of the above OLS regression estimation technique is guaranteed only if the assumptions of the BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimates) hold. Violation of these properties leads to spurious regression and hence incorrect conclusions (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). Therefore to ensure the adherence to the BLUE properties the following diagnostic tests were conducted on the time series: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test, Multicollinearity Test, Breusch-Godfrey Test, Ramsey RESET Test, and Shapiro-Wilk Test.

Research Findings and Interpretation

The OLS regression diagnostic results showed no evidence of non-stationarity, multicollinearity, autocorrelation, model misspecification, and abnormally distributed residuals. This therefore gave research license to perform OLS regression, the results of which are summarised in the table below.

Table 2: OLS regression results

Explanatory Variables (regressors)	Variable Coefficient	Standard Error.t	Prob>t	Prob>F	R-Squared	Number of observations
GDP per capita	.0011725	.0002295	0.000	0.000	0.8723	22 years
Inflation rate	-.0889871	.0975325	0.376			
Real interest rate	-.0282949	.1188547	0.815			
Employment rate	.0271968	.03098	0.394			
Public health expenditure	.5068833	.22313	0.038			
Public education expenditure	-.0009993	.1267186	0.994			
Constant	.0288834	2.58864	0.991			

Source: authors' secondary data analysis using Stata

From the above results it can be seen that GDP per capita has a positive effect on immigration flows into South Africa. Indeed, a one percent increase in the country's standard of living results in a 0.0011725 increase in the level of foreign migration. Being Africa's leading economy and a middle-income country, South Africa boasts a higher standard of living relative to most of her Sub-Saharan counterparts. Its annual GDP per capita of approximately \$3000 U.S. is a major source of attraction to the majority of immigrants from impoverished developing countries both from the African continent and beyond (Adepoju, 2003). A study by Facchini et al. (2013) on foreign labour migrants mainly from Zimbabwe and Mozambique also concurs with the above assertion by concluding that the prospect of a higher living standard relative to that present in their countries of origin drives thousands of immigrants into South Africa.

Table 2 also reveals that in South Africa there is an inverse relationship between inflation rate (cost of living) and the flow of foreign immigrants. In other words, a unit decrease in South Africa's cost of living increases the volume of immigration by 0.0889871 percent. This is not surprising given the fact that South Africa's economy has generally been stable relative to the majority of the source countries that the immigrants originate from, e.g. the Sub-Saharan African countries. With the average annual inflation rate (cost of living) averaging below 10 percent since the early 1990s, foreign migrants have found the country attractive for settlement. Studies by Macdonald and

Crush (2004) also confirm the fact that cost of living is one of the macroeconomic ‘pull’ factors for migration into South Africa.

A rise in the level of real rate of interest reduces the movement of foreign citizens into South Africa. From the above results, it is clear that a percentage expansion in the annual value of real interest rate reduces immigration into the country by a factor of 0.0282949 percent. This is not surprising considering that South Africa is one of the most stable economies, and hence foreign-investor friendly, countries in Africa. This is evident in the consistency of interest rates which have remained below 6 percent since the 1980s. Confirmation of the positive impact of this on international migration inflows may be inferred from 2013 documented migration statistics which showed that 1.1 percent of temporary residence permits were issued for business/investment purposes (Stat SA, 2013).

South Africa’s employment rate is another factor that attracts foreign migrants. From the above table, a unit increase in the employment level generates a corresponding 0.0271968 percent increase in total immigration into the country each year. Despite the current high unemployment level in South Africa, it is slightly lower when compared to that of most of its neighbouring countries, such as Zimbabwe. Additionally, Cross (2006) observes that South Africa’s economy has the biggest absorption capacity for urban labour migration in relation to any other African economy. The country is widely viewed by most Sub-Sahara African economic migrants as an attractive employment destination. The main ‘pull’ factors for skilled foreign workers in South Africa’s labour market include better salary and retirement packages, opportunity to gain international work experience and increased career choices (Du Plessis, 2009; Rogerson & Rogerson, 2000). In addition; some researchers such as Sibanda and Zuberi (2004) even claim that some South African employers prefer recruiting immigrants to locals because of the former’s willingness to accept lower wages and other poorer employment conditions.

In a similar vein, an increase in the level South African government expenditure on health services results in a 0.5068833 percent expansion in the number of foreign nationals attracted to the country. This shows that well-funded public health facilities are a ‘pull’ factor for immigrants. Gushulak and MacPherson (2001) observe that international migration benefits the health

status of migrants by offering them a chance of treatment for pre-existing illnesses and/or reduces their probability of contracting new illnesses in the destination country. Therefore increased government spending on health services will more likely attract immigrants to South Africa since the country will be able to provide better public medical facilities than the countries that migrants originate from.

However, the study's results also indicate that improved education facilities are not a 'pull' factor for migrants into South Africa. This is shown by the Table 2 which states that a 1 percent increase in government spending on education reduces migration level by a factor of 0.0009993 percent. The negative relationship between education and immigration can perhaps be explained by the deteriorating public education system which paradoxically is one of the main reasons fuelling emigration of skilled professionals, such as health personnel from the country (Williams & Shaw, 2006; Bezuidenhout et al., 2009). It is a known fact that South Africa's education standards are deteriorating quite rapidly in relation to other middle-income countries and even some poorer Sub-Saharan African countries. The public education system is now characterised, among other things, by: low education quality; declining pass rates at all levels; under-qualified teachers; poor teacher morale; and weak management (SAC SIS, 2009). This may help to explain why the education standards do not have a significant impact on foreign migration into the country as the regression results in Table 2 show.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that South Africa today faces an unprecedented inflow of migrants from all over the globe, the majority of whom have the potential to positively contribute to the country's development efforts. Several macroeconomic factors inside the country have been identified as fuelling this international migration. In relation to those of the origin countries these macroeconomic 'pull factors' include South Africa's higher standard of living, lower cost of living, stable economy, attractive investment climate and better state funding of social services such as health and education. Afolayan (2001) notes that if the government and other relevant stakeholders do not critically analyse these 'factors of attraction' the country's socio-

economic development agenda will not be able to maximise the positive benefits from this human inflow but will suffer the full brunt of its negative consequences.

Recommendations

From the study it is clearly evident that the South African government has to holistically address some macroeconomic constraints that prevent it from maximising the positive contribution that international migrants make to the country, and hence achieve sustainable socio-economic prosperity for all its population. This could greatly diminish the fears and resentment that the local population generally harbour against foreign migrants. Some of the major macroeconomic reforms the government can implement are given below.

- The country needs to significantly increase its annual GDP growth rate so that it surpasses its demographic expansion rate. This can be done by undertaking structural macroeconomic reforms using monetary and fiscal instruments aimed at stimulating aggregate demand, while at the same time controlling its population growth rate through family planning and civic education programmes. In the long run this will increase its standard of living as per capita GDP growth rates rise, thereby attracting more skilled foreign migrants and appeasing the majority of its poor citizens.
- The government and the South African Reserve Bank also need to control annual inflation rates by balancing the levels of aggregate demand and supply in the economy. This will reduce and eventually stabilise the cost of living as the country's aggregate price indices come down. The cost of living is a very important macroeconomic variable determining migration in South Africa as shown in the study by Rogerson and Rogerson (2003) which showed that high inflation rates cause 71 percent of all emigration of skilled South African medical workers to rich Western countries such as Britain, Australia, Canada and the United States of America.
- Monetary authorities in the country also need to implement policies that optimize the bank rate and exchange rate values in order to attract foreign investment. A lower bank rate and a stable value of the South

African Rand will boost investor confidence and as the economy expands will attract not only direct foreign investment but also skilled foreign workers. ;.

- The high unemployment situation in the country also needs to be addressed urgently. The OECD (2013) observes that South Africa's unemployment rate, which is currently in excess of 35 percent, can be addressed by, among other things, relaxing state regulation in product markets, encouraging competitive interaction between product and labour markets, and increasing the GDP growth. These reforms in the labour and product markets will generate employment opportunities both qualitatively and quantitatively and help to entice skilled immigrants into the country. At the same time such reforms would ease xenophobic sentiments of the largely unemployed native population.
- The government also needs to employ appropriate fiscal policies, such as increased funding of social services, in order to improve the quality of its education and health sectors. Deteriorating public education standards due to poor government funding, among other things, has been blamed for the sluggish performance of the economy and the emigration of skilled South African workers to the West, respectively (OECD, 2013; Bezuidenhout et al., 2009).

References

- Adepoju A. (1998). Linkages between internal and international migration: The African situation', *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 50: 387-395.
- Adepoju A. (2000). Issues and recent trends in international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa', *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 52, pp.383-394.
- Adepoju, A. (2003). Continuity and changing configurations of migration to and from the Republic of South Africa', *International Migration*, Vol.41 (1): 12-19
- Afolayan, A.A. (2001). Issues and Challenges of Emigration Dynamics in Developing Countries, *International Migration*, Vol. 39(4), pp. 1-38.

- Ahmad N. Hussain Z. Sial M.H., Hussain I. and Akram W., (2009) 'Macroeconomic Determinants of International Migration from Pakistan', *Pakistan Economic and Social Review*, Vol. 46(2): pp.85-99.
- Amankwaa, A.A. (1995). The world economic system and international migration in less developed countries: An ecological approach. *International Migration*, Vol. 33(1), pp. 95-113.
- Appleton, S., Morgan, W.J. and Sives, A., 'Should teachers stay at home? (2006). The impact of international teacher mobility', *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 18, pp.771-786.
- Appleyard R. (1992). Migration and Development: An Unresolved Relationship', *International Migration*, Vol.30, pp. 251-66
- Bach S., (2003). International Migration of Health Workers: Labour and Social Issues', *Sectoral Activities Programme Working Paper*, International Labour Office. Geneva.
- Bezuidenhout M.M., Joubert G, Hiemstra L.A. and Struwig M.C., (2009). Reasons for doctor migration from South Africa', *SA Fam Pract*, Vol. 51(3), pp. 211-215.
- Black, R., (2004). Migration and pro-poor policies in Africa', *Globalisation and Poverty*, University of Sussex, Development Research Centre on Migration.
- Borjas, G., (1988). Immigration and Self-Selection', *The American Economic Review*, Vol.77, pp. 531.
- Borjas, G., (1989). Economic Theory and International Migration', *International Migration Review*, Vol. 23, pp. 457.
- Brucker H., Siliverstovs B. and Trubswetter P., (2003). International Migration to Germany: Estimation of a Time-series Model and Inference in Panel Cointegration', *Journal of Economic Literature*., pp.43-49
- Castles, S., (2010). Understanding global migration: a social transformation perspective', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 36(10), pp.1565–86.
- Crush J. and Williams V., (2010). Labour migration trends and policies and Southern Africa', *SAMP Policy Brief*, Vol.23.

Crush, J. and Frayne, B., (2007). The migration and development nexus in Southern Africa. Introduction', *Development Southern Africa*, Vol. 24(1), pp.1-23

de Haas, H., (2010). Migration and Development: A Theoretical Review', *International Migration Review*, Vol. 44(1), pp. 227-264.

de Haas, H., 'The internal dynamics of migration processes: a theoretical inquiry', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 2010b, Vol. 36(10), pp. 1587–617.

Du Plessis T.H., (2009). *South African Expatriates As Potential Entrepreneurs: An Exploratory Study*, PhD Thesis, Unpublished. Potchefstroom, North-West University.

Ellerman D., (2003). 'Policy Research on Migration and Development', *Policy Working Paper 3117*, Washington D.C.; World Bank

Esveldt, I., Kulu-Glasgow, I., Schoorl, J.J. and Van Solinge, H., (1995). *Migratiemotieven, migratienetwerken en partnerkeuze van Turken en Marokkanen in Nederland*, The Hague: NIDI.

Facchini G; Mayda, A.M. and Mendola M., (2013). 'South-South Migration and the Labour Market: Evidence from South Africa', *Journal of Economic Literature*, pp. 1-24.

Friebel, G., Gallego, J. and Mendola, M. (2013). 'Xenophobic attacks, migration intentions and networks: Evidence from the South of Africa', *Journal of Population Economics*, Vol.26, pp. 555–591.

Ghatak, S., Levine, P. and Price, S., (1996). Migration theories and evidence: An assessment', *Journal of Economic Surveys*, Vol. 10.

Ghosh, B. (1998). *Huddled Masses and Uncertain Shores. Insights into Irregular Migration*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Greenwood, M.J., (1983a). 'The Economics of Mass Migration from Poor to Rich Countries: Leading Issues of Fact and Theory', *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, May Vol. 73(2), pp. 173-177.

Greenwood, M.J., (1985b). Human Migration: Theory, Models, and Empirical Studies', *Journal of Regional Science*, November, Vol. 25(4), pp. 521-544.

Gujarati, D. N., (2003). *Basic Econometrics*, McGraw-Hill Inc.

- Gujarati, D.N. and Porter, D.C., (2010). *Essentials of Econometrics, 4th Edition*, McGraw Hill.
- Gushulak B.D. and MacPherson D.W., (2002). Health issues associated with the smuggling and trafficking of migrants', *Journal of Immigrant Health*, Vol. 2, pp. 67-78.
- Harris, J. and Todaro, M., (1970). Migration, unemployment and development: A two-sector analysis, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 60, pp.126-127.
- Hatton, T. and Williamson, J., (2002). What Fundamentals Drive World Migration? *Australian National University Discussion Papers 45*, pp. 1-2.
- Hatton, T.J., (2002). A model of U.K. migration, 1870-1913. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 77, pp. 407-415
- Jennissen R., (2004). Macro-economic determinants of international migration in Europe', *Unpublished Ph.D Thesis*, University of Wageningen.
- Jerome, H., (1926). *Migration and Business Cycles*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Publication No. 9,).
- Kelley, A.C., (1965). International Migration and Economic Growth: Australia, 1865-1935,' *Journal of Economic History*, September, Vol. 25(3), pp. 333-354.
- Kirchgassner, G. and Wolters, J., (2007). Introduction to Modern Time Series Analysis', Berlin, Springer.
- Klotz A., (2000), 'Migration after apartheid: deracialising South African foreign policy'. *Third World Quarterly* 21: 831-847.
- Kok, P., Gelderblom, D. and Van Zyl, J. (2006). Introduction. In Kok. P., Gelderblom D, Oucho J. and Van Zyl J. (Eds.), *Migration in South and Southern Africa: dynamics and determinants*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. pp. 1-25.
- Kurunova, Y. (2013). Factors of International Migration in EU-8. *International journal of academic research*. 5(6):275-278
- Landau, L.B. and Segatti, A.W.K, (2009). Human development impacts of migration: South Africa case study. Working Paper 2009/05.
- Lee, E.S. 'A. (1926). Theory of Migration', *Demography* Vol.3, 1926, pp. 47-57

- Litchfield, J., and Waddington, H., (2003). Migration and Poverty in Ghana: Evidence from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, *Sussex Migration Working Paper No. 10*, 2003, Sussex Centre for Migration Research.
- Lucas, R.E.B., (1987). 'Emigration to South Africa's Mines', *The American Economic Review*.
- Lucas, R. E. B., (2006). Migration and economic development in Africa: A review of evidence', *Journal of African Economies*, Vol.15, pp.337-395.
- Maddala, G.S. and Kajal, L. (2009). *Introduction to Econometrics 4th Ed.*, Wiley, New York.
- Maharaj, Brij. (2004). "Immigration to post-apartheid South Africa." Global Migration Perspectives No. 1. Global Commission on International Migration. Geneva.
- Malmberg, G. (1997). Time and Space in International Migration, in Hammar, T., Brochmann, G., Tamas, K. and Faist, T. (eds.), *International Migration, Immobility and Development. Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, Oxford: Berg, 21-48.
- Manik, S., (2010). The migration of Indian teachers from KwaZulu Natal, South Africa to the United Kingdom: escaping adverse leadership and management, *Journal of Social Science*, 2010, Vol. 25(1-2-3), pp.109-120.
- Massey, D.S., (1988). Economic Development and International Migration', *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 14(3), pp. 383-413.
- Mayda, A., (2010). International migration: A panel data analysis of the determinants of bilateral flows', *Journal of Population Economics*, Vol., 23, pp. 14-17.
- McDonald A.D. and Crush J., (2002). *Destinations Unknown: Perspectives on the Brain Drain in Southern Africa*, Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.
- Mitchell, J. and Pain, N., (2003). The Determinants of International Migration into the UK: A Panel Based Modeling Approach, *NIESR Discussion Paper No 216*, 2003, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London.
- Nwajiuba, C., (2005). 'International Migration and Livelihoods in Southeastern Nigeria', *Global Migration Perspectives No. 50*, 2, Global Commission on International Migration.

OECD Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development, 'Economic Surveys: South Africa', 2013, OECD, Paris.

Peberdy S. and Crush J., (1998), 'Rooted in Racism: The origins of the Aliens Control Act'. In: Crush J. (ed.), Beyond Control: Immigration and Human Rights in a Democratic South Africa, pp. 18–36. IDASA, Cape Town.

Peberdy S., (1997), 'Ignoring the history of undocumented migration is akin to ignoring those who have helped build South Africa'. *The Sunday Independent*, 22 June 1997 <www.queensu.ca/samp/>. (Retrieved May 20 2014)

Peberdy S., and Crush J., (2001). Invisible travellers, invisible trade? Informal sector cross border trade and the Maputo Corridor Spatial Development Initiative, *South African Geographical Journal*, Vol. 83 (2), pp.115-123;

Peberdy, S., and Rogerson, C., (2000). Transnationalism and Non-South African Entrepreneurs in South Africa's Small, Medium and Micro-Enterprise (SMME) Economy', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 34(1), pp. 5-40

Piore, M.J., (1979). '*Birds of passage: Migrant labour in industrial societies*', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Ravenstein, E., (1885). 'The Laws of Migration', *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, Vol. 48, pp167–235.

Rogerson C.M. and Rogerson J.M., (2000). 'Dealing in scarce skills: Employer responses to the brain drain', In: J Crush (Ed.): *Losing Our Minds: Skills Migration and the South African Brain Drain. Migration Policy Series No.18*, Cape Town: Idasa, p. 71.

Schiff, M., (1997). South-North migration and trade: survey and policy implications, *Policy Research Working Paper*, 1997, Vol. 1696, The World Bank.

Schoorl, J.J., (1995). Determinants of international migration: Theoretical approaches and implications for survey research', In: Van der Erf, R. and Heering, L. (eds.), *Causes of international migration*, Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, pp. 3-14.

Sibanda T., and Zuberi, A., (2004), 'How Do Migrants fare in Post-Apartheid South African Labour Market?', *International Migrant Review*, Vol. 38(4), pp.1462-1491.

Sjaastad, L., (1962). The Costs and Returns of Human Migration, *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 70, pp. 80-81.

South African Civil Society Information Service (SACSIS) (2009). <www.sacsis.org.za> (Retrieved March, 12, 2014).

Stark O., (1984). Migration Decision Making: A Review Article', *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 14, pp. 251-259

Stark, O. and Bloom, D.E., (1985). The new economics of labor migration', In: *American Economic Review*, Vol. 75(2), pp. 173-178.

Statistics South Africa, 'Census 2011', 2012a, Stats SA, Pretoria

Statistics South Africa, 'Documented immigrants in South Africa (2012', 2013b) Stats SA, Pretoria

Stern M. and Szalontai G., (2006). Immigration policy in South Africa: Does it make economic sense? *Development Southern Africa*, Vol. 23(1), pp. 123.

Taylor, J.E., (1999). The new economics of labour migration and the role of remittances in the migration process, In: *International Migration*, Vol. 37(1), pp. 63-88.

Todaro, M. and Smith P., (2009). *Economic Development: 11th Ed'*, Addison-Wesley-Longman, Massachusetts

Todaro, M., (1969). A Model of Labour Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries', *American Economic Review*, Vol. 59, pp.138-140.

Tsegai, D., and Plotnikova, M., (2004). Migration and Household Income Differentials in the Volta Basin of Ghana: A Sample Selection Approach, *Paper presented at Canadian Economics Association 38th Annual Meetings*, June

Van Rooyen J., (2000). *The New Great Trek: The Story of South Africa's White Exodus*, Pretoria: Unisa Press

Wallerstein, I., *Historical capitalism*, (1983), London: Verso.

Wentzel M.E., and Bosman M.A., (eds), (2001). 'Causes of cross-border migration to South Africa from Mozambique and Zimbabwe', *Unpublished HSRC Report*.

Wentzel, M. and Tlabela, K., (2006). Historical background to South African migration', In Kok, P., Gelderblom, D., Oucho, J. and Van Zyl, J. (Eds.), *Migration*

in South and Southern Africa: dynamics and determinants, Cape Town: HSRC Press. pp. 71-96.

Wentzel, M., Viljoen, J. and Kok, P., (2006). Contemporary South African migration patterns and intentions', In Kok, P., Gelderblom, D., Oucho, J. and Van Zyl, J. (Eds.), *Migration in South and Southern Africa: dynamics and determinants*, Cape Town: HSRC Press. pp. 171-204.

Wocke, A. and Klein, S., (2002). The implications of South Africa's skills migration policy for country competitiveness', *Development Southern Africa*, Vol. 19(4), pp. 441-454.

Wouterse, F. and van den Berg, M., (2004). Migration for Survival or Accumulation: Evidence from Burkina Faso. Wageningen University and Research Center, Mansholt Graduate School of Social Sciences.

Wozniak, A., (2010). Are college graduates more responsive to distant labor market opportunities?' *Journal of Human Resources*, Vol. 45, pp. 944–970.

Local Integration and Congolese Forced Migrants in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

*Christian Pangilinan*⁵

Abstract

Thousands of unregistered Congolese forced migrants live in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Some of them have lived in the city for years but their long-term futures remain undecided. Although many originally arrived for asylum-related reasons, the vast majority are not recognised as refugees or have only temporary legal status. In the context of discussions over possible legal solutions or residency for such people, this paper relies on interviews, focus groups and a survey of Congolese forced migrants in Dar es Salaam to ascertain their views on local integration as a possible option; local integration being a traditional permanent solution to the search for refuge. Results indicate that many Congolese forced migrants are locally integrated to a significant extent, although many continue to face significant challenges in terms of discrimination, economic self-sufficiency, safety and education. The paper concludes that, in light of their preferences and their degree of integration, there should be a variety of policy options for Congolese forced migrants. Some Congolese forced migrants indicate that asylum is a desired solution, some prefer naturalisation, or temporary legal residence, and some even consider assistance towards repatriation to be acceptable.

Keywords: Citizenship, naturalisation, refugee, Tanzania

Introduction

The presence of unregistered forced migrants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania has been documented since at least 2003 (Willems, 2003). As yet, permanent solutions for such unregistered migrants have not been developed. This paper presents results from interviews and discussions with Congolese forced migrants and others on local

⁵ Peking University School of Transnational Law, Building B, Peking University, Shenzhen Graduate School, University Town, Nanshan District, Shenzhen, China 518055. christiandpangilinan@gmail.com

integration in Dar es Salaam. It aims to address whether Congolese forced migrants in the city consider local integration an acceptable durable solution and the extent to which such forced migrants are in fact already locally integrated.

Many Congolese forced migrants have negotiated safe legal and cultural spaces for themselves in Tanzania outside the official asylum system, but continue to face stigmatisation as ‘refugees.’ This, in turn, limits the willingness of many to consider official asylum procedures or permanent local integration. Those who decide against applying for asylum and who do not have other legal documentation are often left in hiding. However, many Congolese forced migrants consider temporary residence to be acceptable, and some are willing to consider naturalisation in Tanzania as an option.

Responsive policy options for Congolese forced migrants in Dar es Salaam may therefore involve a variety of approaches: local integration including a path to citizenship for long-term migrants who have established new lives in Dar es Salaam; legal residence permits for migrants who have resided in the city for some time but who are not willing or ready to commit to naturalisation; support for repatriation for migrants who are effectively stranded but wish to return; and safe access to asylum procedures for forced migrants who wish to apply for refugee status.

Background

Although Tanzania has a history of generosity towards refugees, the arrival of large numbers of refugees in the 1990s from the Great Lakes region eventually led to increased restrictions on refugees’ freedom of movement and to less support for refugees’ self-sufficiency (Veney, 2006). By 1998, new refugee legislation imposed heightened restrictions on refugees (UNHCR & DANIDA, 2010). The 2003 National Refugee Policy reaffirmed what had evolved into a policy of refugee containment (MHA, 2003).

Refugee encampment remains government policy, but urban areas like Dar es Salaam and Kigoma Town in Kigoma Region continued to host populations from refugee-producing countries as well as others colloquially known as refugees or who may have refugee claims. This population includes refugees

who had been recognised as refugees and left camps or settlements without authorisation (Sommers, 1999). As a result of their unauthorised residence outside camps, these refugees risk the loss of their refugee status and penalisation for their presence or work outside settlements (Sommers, 1999; Jacobsen, 2005).

Persons from refugee-producing countries who had arrived without seeking or obtaining refugee status are also present in Dar es Salaam (Mann 2002). Reasons for unauthorised departure from camps include a desire to escape camp conditions, personal safety, family reunification and self-realisation (Sommers, 1999; Willems, 2003). Some have reported that they fear registration with the Ministry of Home Affairs' Refugee Services Department or of approaching UNHCR (Asylum Access, 2011). The Ministry of Home Affairs acknowledges the existence of these populations (USSD, 2012). A major national human rights organisation refers to the same population as stateless persons (LHRC, 2012).

The government has indicated that it may allow more refugees to live outside refugee camps, but it is unclear whether a revised policy on refugees will include currently unrecognised urban refugees (Pesa Times, 24 June 2013). Other aspects of a possible policy on urban refugees, such as who would be permitted to reside in urban areas, have also yet to be unveiled (Pangilinan, 2012).

As reported by UNHCR (2014), Tanzania's total recorded Congolese refugee population as of December 2013 is slightly more than 60,000. This number does not include unrecognised Congolese forced migrants or asylum seekers. The size of this population has been subject to differing estimates. Masabo estimates the number of urban refugees, including registered and unregistered refugees, in Dar es Salaam to be around 3,000 (Masabo, 2006).

The Ministry of Home Affairs has provided an estimate of 10,000, although the exact basis of the estimate is unknown (USSD, 2012). Willems asserts the number to be in the tens of thousands (Willems, 2003). Participants in this project varied in their estimates of the Congolese refugee population in Dar es Salaam, but tended to provide estimates in the lower range.

Conceptual Framework

a. Definitional Questions

Throughout this paper, the term ‘forced migrant’ is used rather than ‘refugee’ even though the persons described here may most commonly be referred to as refugees or, in Swahili, *wakimbizi*. Whether the persons described are refugees, even if the initial reason for their departure from the DRC appears related to asylum, may be contentious because the Tanzanian government or UNHCR does not recognise the majority of the people interviewed as refugees.

Refugees are defined by both the 1951 and 1969 Conventions. Under the 1951 Convention, refugees are those who are outside their country of nationality owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion and are unable or unwilling to return to their country (1951 Refugee Convention art. 1(A)(2)). The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa also recognises as refugees persons who are compelled to leave their place of habitual residence to seek refuge in another country owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order (1969 OAU Refugee Convention art. 1(2)).

Under the 1951 Convention refugees are not ‘constituted’ as refugees by national refugee status determination (Kälin, Caroni & Heim, 2011, pp. 1327-1396). Rather, such systems only ‘declare’ a person to be a refugee. By contrast, the 1969 Convention specifically declares that contracting states of asylum determine who has refugee status (1969 OAU Refugee Convention art. 1(6)).

Regardless of whether official recognition as a refugee is necessary for a person to be a refugee, most of the consequences of having refugee status are generally only enjoyed upon actually receiving such status either from a national government or from UNHCR (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2007). As a consequence, status determination is crucial for individuals to obtain legal protection and humanitarian assistance. More problematic are individuals who might qualify for refugee status but do not have official recognition from UNHCR or from a national government. In East Africa this tended to include individuals who settled without authorisation in urban areas (Landau, 2008, pp. 103-124).

Some studies and scholars consider such ‘illegal’ refugees or forced migrants to be ‘urban refugees’ for some purposes (Church World Service, 2013; Hovil,

2007). However, Landau suggests that approaches to urban refugees that include unrecognised forced migrants raise ethical concerns: first, illegal settlement can lead to adverse reactions by states towards all refugees; and second, illegal settlement ‘undermines[s] the value of legal action as a form of protection’ (Landau, 2008, pp. 116-117).

Nonetheless, some ‘illegally settled’ refugees or forced migrants may be eligible to apply for asylum under the refugee definitions provided under either the 1951 or 1969 Refugee Conventions. Consequently, ‘illegally settled’ refugees who wish to apply for asylum may still be persons of concern to humanitarian or other organisations that work with refugees, with the caveat that they may conceivably be subject to penalties for not having immediately declared themselves as asylum seekers (Hathaway, 2005). Second, as will be discussed in the next section, such persons may maintain refugee identities or continue to be identified as refugees in their communities despite their lack of status.

b. Identifying Durable Solutions

This paper addresses local integration for Congolese forced migrants. Definitions of local integration vary, although there is consensus that local integration entails cultural and social integration, economic self-sufficiency, and legal integration (Crisp, 2004; Jacobsen, 2001; Meyer, 2008). Harrell-Bond (1986) suggests that integration reflects a situation in which host and refugee communities are able to co-exist, sharing the same resources, both economic and social, ‘with no greater mutual conflict than that which exists within the host community’. Kuhlman (1991) adds that local integration requires that refugees undergo ‘socio-cultural change [that]... permits them to maintain an identity of their own and to adjust psychologically to their new situation’. He rejects the view that integration requires assimilation. Other measures of local integration, suggested by Banki, include refugees’ economic freedom, liberty of movement, land ownership, self-sufficiency, dispersal, and access to public services such as education and health (Banki 2004).

At present, Tanzania and other East African states usually refer to voluntary repatriation as the preferred outcome for refugees (MHA 2003). Advocates and scholars have re-emphasised the value of local integration as a durable solution when large-scale return to the country of origin is not possible (Dryden-Peterson & Hovil, 2003; Fielden, 2008). Given the low likelihood of resettlement for the vast majority of refugees and renewed instability in the

DRC, *de jure* local integration warrants examination as a possible solution for Congolese forced migrants (UNHCR, 2012).

Methodology

Primary research took place from January to April 2013. Before and during this period, the author worked for Asylum Access Tanzania, a legal services NGO based in Dar es Salaam. Research was conducted in collaboration with Asylum Access Tanzania, but research materials, questionnaires and surveys were developed independently.

The principal aim of the research was to assess the extent to which Congolese nationals considered by Asylum Access to be urban refugees were already *de facto* integrated in Dar es Salaam along legal, social and economic lines, refugees' long-term intentions and desired outcomes including whether they intended or desired to remain in Tanzania.

Semi-structured interviews were carried out with key informants within the Congolese community. These included a total of ten forced migrants and church leaders. Six persons from NGOs that work with the same population or work on relevant issues and from academia were also interviewed. Finally, feedback from 14 NGO representatives from other legal aid organisations was also considered through presentations on the population concerned. Of the 30 people participating in interviews and feedback sessions, 15 were women and 15 were men.

Feedback from interviews and material from the literature review was used to develop a structured survey questionnaire to be administered to Congolese forced migrant participants. The questionnaire collected demographic information, information on housing, safety and freedom of movement, communications with the country of origin, relationships with host communities, employment/subsistence, access to services, long-term plans, as well as any other comments made by participants. The questionnaire was translated into French and administered by a registered refugee research assistant in Kiswahili or French.

A total of 51 Congolese forced migrants participated in the survey of whom 28 were women and 23 were men. The majority of participants were Congolese clients of Asylum Access whom Asylum Access had previously identified to

have arrived in Tanzania for refuge. Each participant was, however, asked during the survey for his or her reason for coming to Tanzania and to Dar es Salaam. Purposive sampling was used to identify participants. To focus on local integration, only Congolese forced migrants who had resided in Dar es Salaam for at least one year were invited to participate in the survey.

Five focus groups were held with Congolese forced migrants reaching a total of 25 participants. Participants were selected through opportunity sampling and divided into male and female groups. Limited participant observation was also conducted with three forced migrants. A concluding community meeting was held towards the end of the primary research period with forced migrants and others to present ideas and collect feedback on the possible implementation of an urban refugee policy in Tanzania.

Finally, five focus groups were organised with Tanzanian residents of neighbourhoods in Dar es Salaam in which Congolese forced migrants also lived. These focus groups solicited views on refugees in Dar es Salaam, Congolese refugees in particular, and on attitudes towards integration options towards Congolese refugees. Fifteen men and twenty seven women participated in the focus groups, which were organised in collaboration with three Dar es Salaam-based community services and legal services NGOs.

Result

Participant Demographics and Self-identification

Congolese participants generally distinguished between refugees (whether registered or not) and non-refugees or economic migrants. This indicates that participants did not assume that all Congolese in Dar es Salaam were refugees. As participants describe, refugees constitute a large portion of Dar es Salaam's Congolese population, but that population also consists of individuals whose primary purpose for coming to Tanzania was business-related. Some participants also suggested the presence in Dar es Salaam of Congolese refugees or migrants who have integrated into Tanzanian society in a way that makes it difficult to apply terms like 'migrant' or 'refugee' to them.

One participant described the presence of Congolese 'refugees' who have 'lived here for a long time and have stayed here for a long time. They say they are of

Congolese origin, but have already changed their nationality.’ Such persons may not have legally changed their nationality, and few participants were able to identify Congolese who had legally naturalised, but have effectively ceased presenting themselves as Congolese or even interacting with other Congolese residents.

One survey participant described himself as sometimes not accepting Congolese at his home for fear that they would speak Lingala and expose his Congolese origin. Such persons may therefore represent a category of what Polzer describes as ‘invisible’ refugees or forced migrants who have locally integrated outside the asylum system (Polzer, 2008). The inclusion or exclusion of these invisibly integrated refugees/forced migrants might affect estimates of the size of the Congolese urban refugee population.

In addition, while the amount of time a person has resided in one place can indicate a loss of identification as a refugee, it is not dispositive. For example, in one interview the author asked a Congolese resident of Dar es Salaam who came to Tanzania in 1993 and never obtained refugee status whether he thought of himself as a refugee. He replied that he still thought of himself as a refugee: ‘in terms of the conditions I’m in and because I cannot return to the DRC.’ Some long-term Dar es Salaam residents also described being identified by neighbours as refugees.

Results suggest that many Congolese urban refugees in Dar es Salaam are long-term residents. Of 51 survey participants, a large majority had resided in Dar es Salaam for more than ten years. Many indicated that they arrived in the latter half of the 1990s, although a few survey and unstructured interview participants indicated earlier arrival dates. A smaller percentage of survey participants indicated that they had resided in Dar es Salaam for more than ten years.

Legal Status and Access to Asylum

The legal component of local integration sees refugees ‘granted a progressively wider range of rights and entitlements by the host state’, including rights to employment, to engagement in income-generating activities, to ‘enjoy freedom of movement and to have access to public services such as education’ (Crisp, 2004). This legal process can culminate in citizenship or permanent residence (Crisp, 2004).

The number of Congolese urban refugees who had accessed formal asylum systems was low and few participants indicated that they had either applied for asylum or been previously recognised as a refugee or asylum seeker. Only six of the survey participants stated that they had applied for asylum. Urban refugees who were previously resident in a refugee camp and then left without authorisation have likely ‘lost’ their status by falling out of the refugee system.

Registered refugees who are not present in the refugee camp during a census may have their ration cards ‘inactivated,’ which is effectively identical to the loss of refugee status. Until the issuance of national identification cards for refugees, ration cards are refugees’ primary identification as refugees. Refugees without valid ration cards may not be able to obtain refugee identification (NIDA, n.d.). They would be unable to do so regardless of whether or not their status has been formally ceased.

Other participants stated various reasons for not having applied for asylum. These included a lack of knowledge about the application process, fear of, or unwillingness to be sent to, a refugee camp or fear of the government generally, and the decision not to apply having been made by a parent or guardian. Six survey participants also reported that they had sought to apply for asylum, but that their applications were not considered.

Another participant described an experience that she and another woman had of feeling detained when they had gone to the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Refugee Services Department to request asylum. They described being transferred from the Ministry’s Refugee Services Department to its Immigration Department, an event that suggested they could be deported.

These results suggest that asylum is a desired option for some Congolese forced migrants in Dar es Salaam, regardless of whether the result is encampment. As a matter of course, this means that some individuals who may qualify for refugee status are willing to forego seeking local integration as an option. However, the results also suggest that some potential asylum applicants are rebuffed, and that some are deterred by the prospect of encampment. Certainly, survey results indicate that a large majority of participants would be interested in applying for asylum if asylum seekers or refugees were permitted to remain in Dar es Salaam. Some forced migrants may also forego applying for asylum under current conditions if they can otherwise obtain legal status in Tanzania.

This is not to say that Congolese urban forced migrants lack access to any options for legal residence besides asylum. In fact, about 75 percent of survey participants report possessing a ‘peasant permit.’ Peasant permits are less expensive residence permits for foreign nationals that were made available to ‘irregular settlers’ (Pangilinan, 2012). In late 2012, these permits were available for ten thousand shillings or about \$6 U.S. (Pangilinan 2012), and were previously available for \$50 U.S. Once generously made available in Dar es Salaam, many Congolese migrants and forced migrants took advantage of the opportunity to obtain legal status through the peasant permits, some with the assistance of Congolese community groups or Asylum Access.

Not all Congolese participants had obtained such a permit. Some explained that the permit’s original cost of fifty dollars was too high for them to afford. One participant, who arrived in Tanzania at the age of eight, described being detained at the Immigration Department for nine hours after he was unable to produce a Congolese passport.

Others may have avoided obtaining permits for fear of what would happen to them should they obtain one and then not be able to afford to pay for its renewal, or should their request for renewal be denied. Permits have since become more difficult to obtain even though the Immigration Department lowered the applicable fees. Some participants also reported difficulties attaching to the permit application process itself, with some indicating that they had undergone the application process but had not yet been given the actual residence permit. These participants use receipts acknowledging that the Immigration Department has received their payment for a permit to verify their legal status.

A few participants described using Tanzanian electoral identification cards to verify their legal status. The use of Tanzanian identification documents reflects a strategy to avoid detection and reporting to authorities. No survey participants reported that they had any current asylum seeker or refugee identification. Twelve reported having no documentation whatsoever.

Impact of Legal Status

Legal status can play an important role in Congolese forced migrants’ ability to express Congolese identity. According to several participants, possession of a residence permit allows the public disclosure of Congolese identity. Not all

participants, however, explained that the possession of a permit enabled them to present themselves as Congolese in all situations. Some described continuing to present themselves as Tanzanian despite having legal status in order to avoid discrimination, maintain continuity between the Tanzanian identity they previously presented, or as a precaution in case they are unable to renew their permits. Possession of a permit was associated with safety from authorities and with employment and engaging in income-generating activities. Participants generally stated, however, that legal status did not address preferences in employment for Tanzanian nationals.

The impact of not having any legal status or documentation includes loss of access to employment, vulnerability to arrest and feelings of insecurity and anxiety. Close to one-third of the survey participants indicated that they had experienced problems with immigration officials. The majority of these reported that they had been detained or arrested by the authorities. Reasons reported for arrest include being reported to immigration officials by landlords and debtors and being arrested while working after being reported to authorities for working without permits.

Some participants also described having been reported to authorities by neighbours. A few participants reported that they or their immediate family members were employed, but lost their positions when employers requested evidence of their legal status or after their lack of legal status was exposed. Frequently, but not always, undocumented Congolese who are detained pay bribes to authorities or have bribes paid on their behalf for their release. Sums paid ranged from Shs. 25,000 to 300,000. Immigration authorities were reported by one participant to have released her when she explained that she was a refugee, albeit without documentation.

Citizenship and Birth Certificates

Of all Congolese participants, only one described knowing of Congolese obtaining Tanzanian citizenship. Given the cost involved in applying for and obtaining citizenship (even when a foreign national is legally married to a Tanzanian), this is not surprising. According to the Immigration Department, applying for naturalisation involves fees of at least 1,500 U.S. dollars (Immigration Services Department, n.d.). This does not include all other fees required.

The high cost of citizenship may drive some forced migrants who seek it to obtain citizenship by illegal means. One participant described some Congolese who had been arrested after attempting to register as Tanzanians to obtain national identification cards.

Children born in Tanzania to non-nationals do not automatically have the option of acquiring Tanzanian citizenship. Rather, citizenship by birth in Tanzania is limited to those with a Tanzanian parent. Children born to Congolese forced migrants in Tanzania, therefore, are also Congolese nationals. For these children, participants report difficulties obtaining birth certificates. One woman described being told that a child has no right to a birth certificate if she could not present the child's Tanzanian father.

Arrival and Survival Strategies

Given the importance of support systems to forced migrants, participants in this project were also asked about the conditions around their arrival in Dar es Salaam and the means by which refugees survive after their arrival.

For several forced migrants, support was available among family members, including parents and spouses. This was especially the case for Congolese forced migrants who arrived in Tanzania as accompanied minors. Of 27 survey participants who arrived in Tanzania as minors, 12 explained that they survived in Dar es Salaam with support from a relative, most often a parent or spouse.

For participants who did not report being supported by relatives when they arrived, paradigmatic accounts involved arrival, a search for Congolese residents in Dar es Salaam, temporary support from other Congolese and then the launch of small scale income-generating activities. Some forced migrants arrive in Dar es Salaam with small amounts of money or capital. Others rely on networks to provide them with housing or employment in areas like tailoring, housekeeping or selling food. A few report being brought from Kigoma to Dar es Salaam specifically for employment by either other Congolese or Tanzanian nationals.

Those without existing social networks typically sought assistance by approaching other Congolese or approaching churches and community organisations for assistance. In such cases, newly arrived forced migrants may

be assisted for a short time until they are able to find their own accommodation. Forced migrants whose savings run out or who do not have savings with them will likely face significant hardship.

No participants described formal structures of support for forced migrants in Dar es Salaam. Although Congolese community groups do exist, their level of support for newly arrived forced migrants is limited. With the exception of one Congolese pastor who described educating newly arrived Congolese on living in Tanzania, no participants describe formal systems that assisted them to acculturate in Tanzania.

Newly arrived forced migrants who do not obtain documentation from UNHCR or from the Ministry of Home Affairs adopt strategies to avoid detection or arrest. A principal strategy involves the adoption of Tanzanian ethnic identities that can explain differences in speech or accent. This can be difficult or impossible for some forced migrants. Some explain that identification as Congolese can become permanent as soon as it is done, which can then lead to ongoing public disputes about their nationality. Others selectively conceal their nationality.

Not all participants, it should be noted, indicated that they had presented themselves as Tanzanian at one point, pointing to the availability of survival strategies that do not involve adopting a Tanzanian identity.

Safety, Housing, Mobility and Transnational Networks in Dar es Salaam

Forced migrants' sense of personal safety, stability and type of housing, and their degree of mobility all reflect the degree and success of integration. Safety encompasses both security in terms of legal residence and freedom from arrest or harassment by authorities, as well as safety within communities of residence and access to authorities for protection (Landau & Duponchel, 2011). Stability of housing reflects self-sufficiency and protection from housing discrimination (Landau & Duponchel, 2011). Types of housing can also reflect economic wellbeing. Mobility indicates forced migrants' ability to move freely within their host country, another indicator of integration.

Safety

While Congolese forced migrants in Dar es Salaam report incidents of harassment by authorities, only a minority of participants report arrest or detention. Primarily, these relate to participants' legal status. None reported egregious conduct such as physical abuse by police or immigration authorities. Offensive conduct by immigration authorities is largely limited to requests for or acceptance of bribes for releasing people who are reported to them on suspicion of being in Tanzania illegally. No systematic raids of neighbourhoods to capture Congolese migrants were reported.

A few participants reported conduct that could eventually lead to *refoulement* such as detention when presenting themselves to authorities for recognition as asylum seekers or the prolonged refusal to process asylum claims. This can place forced migrants with refugee claims in danger or can require them to obtain other government documentation that does not recognise them as refugees, such as ordinary residence permits.

While permits do grant legal status and are credited by many participants with providing them with a sense of safety, permits might not provide adequate protection since they are valid for only two years and their renewal is not guaranteed. Possessing a permit also does not protect Congolese forced migrants from being reported to immigration authorities as illegal immigrants. Indeed, 58 percent of survey participants with residence permits stated that they still fear arrest or detention.

The possibility of arrest is likely related to forced migrants' stated reluctance or distrust to access police services. Distrust of police was not absolute, but the sense that recourse to authorities is not available can contribute to insecurity. The few participants who described reporting crimes to the police said that they were required to demonstrate their legal status or appear to be Tanzanian.

Lacking documentation or legal status does not always lead to feeling unsafe. A few participants without legal status still stated that they generally felt safe in Dar es Salaam, mainly crediting positive relationships with neighbours for their sense of security. Nonetheless, some accounts from participants do indicate that forced migrants without documentation are occasionally in real danger of deportation when arrested. Lack of legal status could therefore subject some Congolese urban forced migrants to the danger of *refoulement*.

Housing and Security of Tenure

With respect to the quality of housing and security of tenure, most participants reported staying in rented rooms or houses. Participants were scattered across Dar es Salaam, with the largest concentrations living in poorer neighbourhoods like Buguruni, Ilala District and Mbagala, Temeke District. While most participants were renting their own accommodation, slightly less than 20 percent of survey participants were categorised as having no permanent residence. These were primarily participants who were staying with a non-relative.

To evaluate security of tenure, participants were asked if they had changed domicile within the preceding 12 months. Those who did were asked for the reason for the change. , One third of the survey participants indicated that they had changed residence. The most cited reason for the change was an increase in rent or an inability to meet rent payments. A few changed residence on their own initiative. Some moved at the request of the landlord for reasons that appeared non-discriminatory, such as the repurposing of the residence for the landlord's family. In just a few cases, participants cited maltreatment or discrimination by the landlord as a reason for their change of residence.

The few instances where participants cited discrimination as reasons for changing residence may indicate stability of tenure after a room or house is rented. But this may not reflect what participants perceive as discrimination when searching for housing or in terms of rent. A few participants described landlords refusing to rent rooms to foreigners. One group of women stated that Congolese are charged more than nationals for renting the same accommodation.

Other difficulties associated with rent appear similar to those faced by non-migrants. These include the frequent requirement to pay one year's rent in advance, living conditions in poor neighbourhoods and the effects of inflation on rent.

Livelihoods

Economic self-sufficiency is a key feature of local integration. Economic integration here is considered to consist of the following:

- Refugees engage in income generating activities, employment or otherwise support their basic needs. Basic needs include housing, food, health and education services;
- Refugees safely engage in economic activities;
- Refugees engage in activities commensurate with their education or other qualifications;
- Refugees participate in the local economy without fear of exploitation and discrimination on the basis of refugee status or nationality.

The inclusion of housing, food, health and education services as basic needs is in line with what forced migrants, asked here about challenges in Dar es Salaam, describe as particularly significant.

Whether forced migrants can meet these basic needs and how they do so reflects their participation in the local economy and their direction towards self-sufficiency. Because accounts of urban refugees elsewhere have identified discrimination as a major barrier and because participants here raise discrimination and exploitation as significant, these are also incorporated as criteria for economic integration.

Also included is the criterion that refugees are able to engage in economic activities in safety to account for whether forced migrants are able or not able to work in conditions that are culturally acceptable and commensurate with acceptable levels of risk.

Income Generating Activities, Employment and Basic Needs

Forced migrants in urban areas necessarily move towards self-sufficiency because of low levels of humanitarian aid and because of a lack of family support systems (Hovil, 2007). In Dar es Salaam, UNHCR assistance to refugees in urban areas is available only to a small group of recognised refugees, leaving the vast majority of forced migrants to fend for themselves without humanitarian support from international organisations or the

Tanzanian government (Willems, 2003). As expected, the majority of survey participants were engaged in economic activities. About 17 percent indicated that they were supported by another person such as a spouse or parent.

Of those engaged in economic activities, the majority of activities were in small-scale business such as street vending, hairdressing, music and carving, and casual labour. Income from street vending can be irregular and can be insufficient to provide for basic needs such as education for children. Street vending itself is physically taxing, requiring vendors to work long hours in the elements for uncertain return. Street vending, however, requires relatively small amounts of capital. With no need to purchase equipment, street vendors serve as agents selling other peoples' products, and receiving commission per item sold.

This is consonant with what a few participants describe as the result of arriving in Dar es Salaam with 'nothing.' Vending and activities such as hairdressing, working in restaurants, loading goods, or working as domestic help are all activities that require little start-up capital, and were cited as types of economic activities forced migrants engaged in soon after their arrival in Dar es Salaam. While a few participants reported having come to Dar es Salaam with arrangements for work, most participants had no such arrangement.

Some participants reported being engaged in more 'professional' activities such as teaching, working as a pastor, or formal employment, but the number was small. Engaging in 'professional' activities or in more formal businesses requires legalisation in the form of work permits or small traders' permits.

Income Generating Activities Commensurate with Experience and Education

A majority of survey participants had achieved some form of secondary education, with a few advancing to post-secondary education. For those with post-secondary or postgraduate degrees or who had worked as professionals in the DRC, finding employment commensurate with their training and experience is difficult. One participant who had worked as a nurse in the DRC attributed her inability to find employment to her nationality. For some, recognition of their qualifications from the DRC was also problematic. One participant with a postgraduate degree from a DRC university spoke of having left her country with no evidence of her education.

Access to Health and Education

Health Services

Many refugees described health services as relatively accessible, although affected by considerations of cost and the possibility of discrimination. Purchasing medicine from a pharmacy was generally seen as straightforward, although new arrivals might find themselves being over-charged for medication. Similarly, treatment at a private clinic generally requires few personal identification documents.

When in need of more extensive services, some participants considered it advisable for forced migrants to present themselves as Tanzanians to avoid the possibility of discrimination. Some accounts of discrimination in accessing health services were very serious, including accounts of doctors neglecting refugee patients or requesting considerably higher fees than would apply to nationals.

Reproductive Health Services

For forced migrant women, access to reproductive health followed a similar pattern to access to health services generally, with cost and the possibility of discrimination playing major roles. For some women, access to reproductive health services was contingent only on having sufficient funds to pay for services and, possibly, to pay health service providers such as nurses a small additional sum to ensure that they are attended to. There is no indication that women who are survivors of sexual and gender-based violence during their flight from the DRC have received appropriate health services since their arrival in Dar es Salaam.

Education

Access to education for children remained a key issue for many participants. Private schools are too expensive for most participants. And, unlike health services, public education requires evidence of Tanzanian nationality. Since the majority of participants' children are Congolese, enrolment is difficult. In order to enrol their children, some forced migrants resort to asking Tanzanian friends or neighbours to enrol their children for them. Some are unable to enrol their children at all. At school, forced migrant children report

experiencing mild discrimination in the form of name-calling as Congolese or as refugees.

Social Integration

Following Crisp and Jacobsen, social integration is defined here as referring, among other things, to refugees' participation in the social life of the host community (Crisp, 2004; Jacobsen, 2001). To Jacobsen, indicia such as the frequency of intermarriage and common attendance at events like weddings and funerals can indicate the degree of refugees' *de facto* integration (Jacobsen 2001). For participants in this project, social interaction with members of the host community is certainly inescapable, but friendship and social inclusion appear to be more difficult to attain.

For many participants, social interaction with Tanzanians is restricted by the need to conceal their nationality. Churches, however, provide a forum in which many participants felt that freer social interaction, including identification as a refugee, was possible. For those who explained where their predominant social sites of interaction were, churches were the most frequently cited forum. As one woman put it, 'at the church we are all equal and belong to God. Discrimination is there but in a very low way, not like on the street.' A pastor from a mixed refugee and Tanzanian church also described free social mixing within his church. Another site of social mixing was the business context. Mourning, an event that involves gathering at the deceased's home, was also considered to be a site of social interaction. Other events such as festivities can frequently involve more social exclusion.

Friction between nationals and forced migrant women may be higher than that experienced by forced migrant men. Compared to Congolese men, women may appear to be more integrated in the sense that they have more frequent interactions with their neighbours. But these interactions can also lead to arguments. A few women described disagreements, in particular between their children and their neighbours' children, as a source of conflict between them and their neighbours.

Forced Migrants' Attitudes Towards Integration

Forced migrants' attitudes toward local integration as an option were mixed. While the vast majority of participants were understandably opposed to the

prospect of repatriation to the DRC as an option either at present or in future, many participants were also reluctant to consider permanent settlement in Tanzania as an option. Several participants argued for a need for their resettlement to a third country while others seemed prepared to accept residence in Tanzania for the foreseeable future but without acquiring Tanzanian citizenship. That forced migrants do not consider pursuing naturalisation as an option to be desirable suggests that policy interventions need to be broader than pursuing naturalisation for long-term forced migrants.

Several participants described their long-term future as uncertain. While their lives in Dar es Salaam were restricted, repatriation was not an attractive option. To return to the DRC after so many years, said one woman, would render her a 'foreigner in her own country.' Others emphasised the recurrence of instability and violence in the DRC as precluding any return. Indeed, many forced migrants expressed their unwillingness to pursue refugee status if that meant that they might eventually be requested to repatriate in the future.

However, many participants were also dissatisfied with conditions in Tanzania. To some, remaining in Tanzania represented the absence of freedom and no opportunity to further develop. For these participants, travelling onward to a third country or resettlement were preferable. The sentiment against permanent settlement in Tanzania was reflected in the majority of participants' rejection of naturalisation as a durable solution, especially if naturalisation would require giving up their Congolese nationality. Some raised discrimination as a factor that made them unwilling to consider naturalisation. Fear of being required to assimilate or of having no option but to remain in Tanzania was also a factor for some.

Rejection of naturalisation as an option was not unanimous. For several participants, naturalisation presented the possibility of making their residence in Tanzania more 'peaceful' or that naturalisation would allow them to continue to enjoy Tanzania's peace, compared to ongoing turmoil in the DRC. Some added that they had already resided in Tanzania for a long period and were accustomed to its way of life. For these participants, extended or even permanent residence in Tanzania could be a possible acceptable option.

Finally, repatriation is a possible option for some participants. Of survey participants, about one quarter indicated that they would wish to repatriate to the DRC either now or at some point in the future. Those who wished to

already repatriate but had not done so indicated that the cost of travel was what prevented their repatriation. Factors that weighed in favour of repatriation included reunification with family member, and the possibility of further pursuing economic interests in the DRC.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Largely through their own struggle, Congolese forced migrants in Dar es Salaam have achieved a notable level of local integration. They have navigated a challenging environment to be able to become mostly economically self-sufficient, though many continue to face stigmatisation and struggle to access key services such as education for their children. Fear of deportation and arrest also continues to arise for some forced migrants.

Considering local integration as a durable solution for Congolese forced migrants will require finding a way to address these concerns. Regularisation of status is particularly important. Without legal status, Congolese forced migrants in Dar es Salaam are unlikely to be able to pursue safe and adequate employment or at least safely engage in self-employment. But such regularisation should not require naturalisation, especially given the hesitation shown by many participants to accept permanent settlement in Tanzania. Other temporary residence options or access to asylum procedures should be made available to other forced migrants as these options will be less likely to discourage them from seeking to formalise their status in Tanzania. With legal residence, forced migrants will be able to become self-sufficient and will be able to reside in Dar es Salaam much more safely.

Legal status is also key to ensuring that forced migrants have access to health care and education. Lack of legal status prevents forced migrants from educating their children. Policy reform, such as the extension of recognition of refugees to include refugees in urban areas, may also be key to ensuring access to education and, in addition, of providing critical medical treatment to forced migrants such as those who have not received treatment despite surviving SGBV during their flight.

However, naturalisation should be considered for forced migrants who have settled and acculturated to life in Tanzania and who have no desire to return to the DRC. For those with no wish to remain or who wish to return to the DRC, consideration should be given to supporting their repatriation.

Working towards policy reform and access to legal status, however, may not be sufficient to respond to the pervasive low-level discrimination that forced migrants describe. Peaceful integration and co-existence between forced migrants and citizens would seem to require some initiative to foster improved mutual understanding, perhaps through efforts to educate citizens about forced migration and refugees, and efforts to prepare forced migrants to live in Tanzania. Forced migrants arrive in Dar es Salaam without access to family networks and without means to begin new lives. Cultural support and support for new livelihoods should be made available as well.

Acknowledgement

I thank Asylum Access Tanzania for participating in this research project, the International Peace Research Association for their support for this research and participants at the Multiple Truths of Asylum workshop hosted by the African Centre for Migration & Society at the University of the Witwatersrand in July 2013 for their comments on an early draft of this paper.

References

Asylum Access, 2011. *No Place Called Home: A Report on Urban Refugees Living in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam: Asylum Access.

Banki, S. 2004, *Refugee integration in the intermediate term: a study of Nepal, Pakistan and Kenya*. UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 108.

Church World Service 2013. *Accessing Services in the City: The Significance of Urban Refugee-Host Relations in Cameroon, Indonesia and Pakistan*. New York: Church World Service.

Crisp, J. 2004. *The local integration and local settlement of refugees: a conceptual and historical analysis*. UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 102.

Dryden-Peterson, S. and Hovil, L. 2003. *Local integration as a durable solution: refugees, host populations and education in Uganda*. UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 93.

Fielden, A. 2008. Local integration: an under-reported solution to protracted refugee situations. UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 158 (2008).

Goodwin-Gill, G. and McAdam, J. 2007, *The Refugee in International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harrell-Bond, B. 1986. *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hathaway, J. 2005. *The Rights of Refugees Under International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hovil, L. 2007. Self-settled Refugees in Uganda: An Alternative Approach to Displacement? *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 20: 599-620.

Immigration Services Department (Tanzania) n.d.. *Tanzania Citizenship*. From <<http://immigration.go.tz/module1.php?id=16>> (Retrieved October 18, 2014).

Jacobsen, K. 2001. The forgotten solution: local integration for refugees in developing countries. UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 45.

Jacobsen, K. 2005. *The Economic Life of Refugees*. West Hartford: Kumarian Press.

Kälin, W., Caroni, M. and Heim, L. 2011. Article 33, para. 1 1951 Convention. In: Zimmerman, A. (Ed.). *The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1327-1396.

Kuhlman, T. 1991. The Economic Integration of Refugees in Developing Countries: A Research Model. *Journal of Refugee Studies*. 4: 1-20.

Landau, L. 2008. Protection as Capability Expansion: Practical Ethics for Assisting Urban Refugees. In: Hollenbach, D. (Ed.) *Refugee Rights Ethics, Advocacy and Africa*. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Landau, L. and Duponchel, M. 2011. Laws, Policies, or Social Position? Capabilities and the Determinants of Effective Protection in Four African Cities. *Journal of Refugee Studies*. 24: 1-22.

LHRC (Legal and Human Rights Centre) 2012. *Tanzania Human Rights Report 2012*. Dar es Salaam: LHRC.

Mann, G. 2002. 'Wakimbizi, wakimbizi': Congolese refugee boys' and girls' perspectives on life in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. *Environment and Urbanization*. 14: 115-122.

Masabo, J. 2006. *Report on the Survey of Refugee Population in Dar es Salaam*. On file with author.

Meyer, S. 2008. *FMO Research Guide: Local Integration*. From <<http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/climate-change-and-displacement/fmo046.pdf>> (Retrieved October 18, 2014).

MHA (Ministry of Home Affairs) 2003. *The National Refugee Policy*. Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Home Affairs of Tanzania.

NIDA (National Identification Authority) n.d., *Usajili ya Wakimbizi*. From: <http://www.nida.go.tz/swahili/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=72&Itemid=115>.

Pangilinan, C. 2012. Implementing a Revised Refugee Policy for Urban Refugees in Tanzania. *Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration*. 2: 5-9.

Polzer, T. 2008. Invisible Integration: How Bureaucratic, Academic and Social Categories Obscure Integrated Refugees. *Journal of Refugee Studies*. 21: 476-497.

Sommers, M. 1999. Urbanisation and its discontents: urban refugees in Tanzania. *Forced Migration Review*. 4: 22-24.

UNHCR 2012. *State of the World's Refugees 2012*. From: <<http://www.unhcr.org/51b1d61d0.html>> (Retrieved October 19, 2014).

UNHCR 2014. *2014 UNHCR country operations profile – United Republic of Tanzania*. From: <<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c736.html>> (Retrieved October 19, 2014).

UNHCR and DANIDA 2010. *Evaluation of the protracted refugee situation (PRS) for Burundians in Tanzania*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

USSD (United States State Department) 2012. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 – Tanzania*. From: <<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dlid=186250>> (Retrieved October 19, 2014).

Veney, C. 2006. *Forced Migration in Eastern Africa: Democratization, Structural Adjustment, and Refugees*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Willems, R. 2003. *Embedding the Refugee Experience: Forced Migration and Social Networks in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania*. Ph.D thesis (Unpublished), Gainesville: University of Florida.

The Impact of Remittance on Poverty: Evidence from the South African National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS)

Seyfe Wurku & Joyce Marangu⁶

Abstract

The study uses two approaches to assess the impact of remittance on poverty in South Africa. The first approach compares the level of poverty between remittance receiving households and non-receiving households using the FGT index. The second approach uses the logit regression model to estimate how remittance determines the probability of falling into a state of poverty. The findings show that remittance non-receiving households have a higher head count ratio compared to remittance receiving households. The probability of remittance non-receiving households being in a state of poverty is also higher than remittance receiving households. Whereas the poverty gap is higher for remittance receiving households compared to remittance non-receiving households, both groups of households have the same poverty severity level.

Keywords: Migration, Foster-Greer-Thorbecke, Logistic regression, Upper Bound Poverty line

Introduction

Remittances from migrants have grown into an important source of foreign currency for developing countries across the globe. Official estimates place the remittances for developing countries at US\$ 334 billion (World Bank, 2010). Unrecorded remittances are assumed to amount to more than 50 percent of the official records. Overwhelming evidence indicates that remittances reduce poverty. This paper makes use of the South African National Income Dynamics Study, 2012 to determine the impact of remittances on poverty in South Africa. The next section reviews the existing literature on remittances and poverty.

⁶ Development Studies Researchers, Institute for Social Development, Faculty of Economic & Management Science, University of the Western Cape (UWC), South Africa. Correspondence address: seyfud22@gmail.com,

This is followed by an explanation of the methodology and findings of the study. Finally, the policy implications of the research are discussed.

Literature Review

Poverty and Migration Patterns in South Africa

Migration and poverty are two important development issues globally. To date not much literature has focused on the link between these two issues. The Human Development Report 1990 (UNDP, 1990) estimated that 3.1 percent of the 7 billion world population was living and working away from their birth country in 2008 and that this number is rising. Recent trends indicate that 41 percent of the migrants are based in developing countries and that from the total number of migrants, 47 percent were moving from one developing country to another developing country (United Nations, 2011). This trend in global migration is attributed to regional income inequalities, and the rise in demand for both skilled and unskilled labour.

The Southern Africa region has for a long time had steady cross-border migration patterns for labour purposes. In South Africa, several factors are considered to be responsible for the changes in mobility patterns that are currently being experienced in the 21st century. One of the key reasons is the end of apartheid, a system which curtailed the mobility of people within the country and limited the migration of foreigners into South Africa (Crush et al. 2005). South Africa is a major source of skilled labour in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and a major labour exporter into countries such as Botswana with estimates indicating that there are more South Africans working in Botswana than the reverse (Crush et al., 2005).

The most common form of human mobility in South Africa as in the rest of the SADC region has been rural-urban migration (Crush et al. 2005). This is thought to have a direct impact on rural livelihoods through remittances. Rural or peri-urban households, particularly among the black African population, are highly likely to have one, and sometimes more, migrants who send money back from urban workplaces to the remaining household members (Kok and Collinson, 2006). The main reasons for migration within the country are education and employment.

The poverty level in the sub-Saharan region is one of the highest in the world. The World Bank estimates that at least 314 million people in the region live below the international poverty line of US\$ 1.25 per day. This is a clear indication that far too many people lack access to adequate food, healthcare, education facilities, and other basic human necessities. Although South Africa has experienced a slight fall in poverty levels recently, poverty rates in the country are still very high with nearly half of the population (48 percent) living in poverty. The Eastern Cape and Limpopo are two of the poorest provinces both having poverty rates of 64 percent, while the Western Cape and Gauteng provinces have the lowest poverty rates at 23 percent and 30 percent, respectively. Rural areas are the worst affected with poverty levels as high as 77 percent (Leibbrandt et al., 2010). Moreover, in racial terms, the black population is more poverty stricken than the other races with an estimated 56 percent living below the international poverty line.

Trends in Remittances for Developing Countries

The term “remittance” describes the flow of money or goods from a migrant to their place of origin. It is estimated that between 2004 and 2008 remittances grew by an average 17.7 percent with the highest increase being in Europe and Central Asia at 32.5 percent. In sub-Saharan Africa the increase in remittances has been estimated to be 29.3 percent (United Nations, 2011). Total remittance inflows in developing countries across the globe amounted to US\$ 338 billion, with sub-Saharan Africa receiving the lowest percentage of this amount.

An estimated half a billion people, or nearly 8 percent of the world’s population, were said to be the beneficiaries of remittances in the year 2005. Between 2002 and 2007, a 107 percent increase in remittances was experienced in the developing countries, and mostly the low and middle income ones. In South Africa, the remittance amounted to US \$0.7 billion and was much lower compared to Nigeria, the highest earner at US \$3.3 billion (Vargas-Lundius et al., 2008).

Estimates on remittances are generally considered to be inaccurate, and under-reported, because they include only amounts sent through official channels such as banks and money transfer services; they fail to include remittances through unofficial channels, such as money sent home with returning migrants, which are estimated to constitute an additional 50 percent

(Gupta et al. 2007). The cost of sending remittances is very high, with the sub-Saharan region having the highest rates. Based on the World Bank's 2011 estimates, the average cost of sending \$200 in the region amounted to US\$24.8 which is double the cost in South Asia where it costs only US\$ 12.3 (Ratha, 2012). Currently there is no officially recognised framework for determining in kind remittances including goods.

Remittances, have become the second most important source of external funding after Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in developing countries (World Bank, 2004). Most of the remittances go to rural households and are mainly related to intra-regional migration, especially in Western and Southern Africa (Vargas-Lundius et al., 2008). This indicates that migrant workers have a major impact on the economies of developing countries, particularly African countries where remittances as a proportion of the GDP were estimated to constitute a 0.9 percent GDP increase between 1995 and 2009.

Studies based on household data in various sub-Saharan African countries have found that the majority of remittances go towards meeting basic consumption needs. A survey of migrants indicates that 69.7 percent of migrants send remittances to their home countries to meet essential household needs (United Nations, 2011). Remittances are mainly personal transactions to relatives and friends, and they make a significant contribution to the welfare and of the recipient households. It has also been found that remittances have a multiplier effect due to an increase in household expenditure and welfare (Gupta et al., 2007).

Impact of Remittances on Poverty

Remittances play an important role in reducing poverty. They do not, however, appear to have a similar effect on inequality since it is argued that migrants, particularly international migrants, do not come from the poorest households (Vargas-Lundius et al., 2008). Nevertheless, recent studies in the Pacific region suggest that the negative impact of remittances on income inequality is only short term as the formation of networks helps reduce migration related costs making it affordable for poor people (Brown, 2008).

Remittances are expected to lessen poverty since they can be received directly by the poor. Evidence suggests that remittance-receiving households generally have higher incomes and greater expenditure, as well as a lower

likelihood of suffering extreme poverty, compared to households that do not receive remittances (Ratha, 2013). The impact of remittances on the reduction of poverty can be understood from both the micro and macro perspectives (United Nations, 2011). While poverty may be a motivating factor in migration and subsequent incoming remittances, the relationship between remittances and poverty does not appear to be unidirectional. In Senegal, for instance, poor households pool resources to cover the migration costs for skilled members who in turn remit their income, creating a steady flow of income to supplement the poor household (Gupta et al. 2007). Other research on the dynamics of poverty and migration suggests that economic conditions such as the GNP per capita and the distribution of income play important roles in international migration. In an empirical analysis using 233 poverty surveys from 76 developing countries, 24 of which are in sub-Saharan Africa, it was found that a 10 percent increase in remittances as a percentage of GDP is related to slightly more than a 1 percent decline in the poverty headcount and poverty gap which measures how far below the poverty line one's income lies (Gupta et al. 2007).

Evidence from the Philippines reveals that wealthier households derive a larger share of their income from international remittances. Data from the Family Income and Expenditure Survey 2000 (FIES) indicate that high income households have a higher amount of income from international remittances as a proportion of the total household income (Bargess and Haksar, 2005). However, the FIES includes both remittances and income from investments and therefore may be an indication of the share of capital income from migrants. A study conducted on 1000 households in three villages in Egypt found that the number of poor households in rural Egypt was reduced by 9.8 percent where household incomes include remittances. In addition, it was found that 14.7 per cent of the total income of poor households came from remittances (Adams, 1991:73-74). More recently, during the Arab Spring remittances in Egypt grew exponentially from US \$7.15 billion to US \$14.32 billion between 2009 and 2011, giving a clear example of how remittances can act as a lifeline to poor households (Ratha, 2013).

In a study to determine whether international migration and remittances reduce poverty in developing countries, Richard et al. (2005) constructed and analysed a set of data on international migration, remittances, poverty and inequality from 71 developing countries. The study looks at income levels,

income inequality and the geographical setting. Results indicate that migration and remittances lead to a significant decline in the level, depth (amount by which the average expenditures (income) of the poor fall short of the poverty line) and severity of poverty in developing countries. “After instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international remittances, a 10% increase in per capita official international remittances will lead to a 3.5% decline in the share of people living in poverty.”

Another study uses survey data from 7680 households between 1986 and 1987 to determine the impact that remittances have on poverty and welfare in Lesotho’s rural and urban population (Gustaffson and Makonnen 1993). Results show that 35 percent of the total household income is from remittances. The study further shows that if the households received no remittance at all, there would be a 32 percent fall in consumption levels as well as a 26 percent rise in poverty head count. There would also be a 52 percent rise in the poverty gap index (measure in percentage terms of how far the average expenditures/income of the poor falls below the poverty line).

Similarly, Taylor et al. (2005) using data from 1782 households from a 2003 survey of a rural population in Mexico show that both the poverty headcount and poverty gap reduced by 77 and 53 percent, respectively with a 10 percent increase in remittances. Household surveys carried out in Burkina Faso in the period 1994-5 were used to determine the impact of remittances on income inequality and poverty. The study, which considered remittance income as a potential substitute for household earnings, showed that in rural households the percentage of people living below the poverty line declined by 7.2 percent owing to international remittances (Lachaud, 1999). In another study, Chukwuone et al. (2012) use data from the Nigerian National Living Standard Survey, 2004 to analyse the impact of remittances on poverty in Nigeria. Nigeria is an important remittance-receiving country, having the highest remittance in the sub-Saharan region. Using a logit model and introducing instrumental variables and the propensity score matching method they estimate that internal remittances reduce the number of people living below the poverty line by 11.14 percent. They also lead to a 9.7 percent drop in the country’s poverty gap.

In South Africa, previous research has found remittances to be particularly important in poverty alleviation especially in rural areas. Woolard and Klasen (2004) for instance, found that from 1993 through 1998, the change in income

from remittance was responsible for 10 percent of the household poverty transitions in KwaZulu-Natal. A few studies have concluded that remittances have no significant impact on poverty. For instance, Knowles and Anker (1981) showed that urban-to-rural remittances in Kenya do not have a significant effect on the overall income distribution. Internal remittances might even have a negative impact on income inequality, widening the gap between the rich and the poor, as has been found in some studies. For instance, comparing the Gini coefficients of households with and without remittance income in the Punjab in India, Oberai and Singh (1980) found that urban-to-rural remittances deepen the inequality gap in rural areas. However, the overwhelming empirical evidence indicates that remittances from migrants do alleviate poverty.

Data

This study used the third round of the South Africa National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) (Wave III). NIDS is a national panel dataset covering all of South Africa. The First Wave (Wave I) was conducted in 2008, while the second round (Wave II) was carried out in 2010 and third round (Wave III) was collected in 2012. The dataset includes different socio-economic information of a nationally representative sample of over 28,000 individuals in 7,300 households selected from 400 Primary Sampling Units across the country.

Empirical Methodology

Two different approaches were followed to assess the impact of remittance on poverty in South Africa. The first was to compare the level of poverty between remittance receiving households and non-receiving households using the FGT index and the second was the estimation of the logit model to see how access to remittance determines the probability of falling in a state of poverty.

a) Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) measurement of poverty

FGT measurements of poverty were used to measure the impact of remittance on poverty. According to Foster et al. (1984) the FGT measurement of poverty is grounded on calculations of poverty measures taking income shortfalls of the poor as weights. For the purposes of this study FGT is used to analyse the

impacts of remittance on the incidence, depth and severity of poverty. In our analysis we use the national upper-bound poverty line (R620).

The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke formula is expressed as:

$$P_{ai} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^q \left(\frac{y_i - z}{z} \right)^a \dots \dots \dots [1]$$

b) *Logistic regression model*

The logistic regression model is a binary regression model in which the dependent variable takes the binary value (0 and 1). For the purpose of this study, households were classified as poor and non-poor. Poor households are households whose per capita expenditure is less than the poverty threshold and non-poor households are those whose incomes are above the poverty threshold. The logistic model for the purpose of this study is stated as follows:

$$\Pr (Y_i=1) = \alpha + \beta_1 RD_i + \beta_2 X_i + \epsilon_i \dots \dots \dots [2]$$

Where,

- Y_i is the probability that the household will be classified as poor
- RD_i is a remittance dummy which represents 1 for households that receive monthly remittance and 0 for households that do not receive monthly remittance.
- X_i represents different household characteristics which include: household size, per capita income (in Rand), geographical type (urban or rural) and characteristics of household head; gender (male or female), population group (Black, Coloured, Indians/Asians, White), age (years), education status (years).


Results

In this section we present the results of the analysis. It will begin with a presentation of descriptive statistics on household demography and characteristics, followed by an FGT index analysis of poverty and logit regression, and give interpretations thereof.

a) *Households and remittance income*

This study uses the third wave of the NIDS survey. The third wave was released in 2012. It includes 10,236 households and 31,994 individuals in urban and rural areas in all the nine provinces of South Africa. From the total of 10,236 households 11% of the households received some kind of remittance from relatives or non-relatives that live in South Africa or abroad. The remaining 89% of the households do not receive any kind of remittance income. Figure 1 shows the distribution of households by monthly remittance income.

Figure 1: Distribution of households by monthly remittance income



Source: Own calculation using NIDS wave 3 survey

The total household income of remittance receiving households was divided into four quartiles. This indicates the proportion of remittances to household income. The result in Table 1 shows that the poorest households receive more than half of their income from remittances (56.8%). Low income countries generate 36.45% of their income from remittance. The middle income and richest households derive 28.6% and 21.2% of their income from remittances, respectively. On average low income households remit more than high income households.

Table 1: Proportion of remittance income to total income by different income group

4 quantiles of household monthly income	Summary of monthly total income per remittance		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Poorest	0.568	0.283	349
Low Income	0.364	0.234	284
Middle Income	0.286	0.247	260
Richest	0.212	0.256	226
Total	0.379	0.291	1119

Source: Own calculation using NIDS wave 3 survey

The average remittances by different household income groups were compared. Households with lower total household income derive a larger proportion of that income from remittances, however, they receive lower average amount of remittance compared to higher income households (See Table-2).

Table 2: Average monthly remittance income by different income group

4 quantiles of household monthly income	Summary of monthly total income per remittance		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Poorest	663.1	440.8	349
Low Income	954.2	625.5	284
Middle Income	1336.3	1197.5	260
Richest	3026.7	6606.8	226
Total	1370.8	3167.2	1119

Source: Own calculation using NIDS wave 3 survey

The average remittance income by different household size was analysed. Table 3 shows that households with from 6 to 10 members receive a higher amount of average remittance income per month, followed by households with from 1 to 5 members. Households with higher members of between 21 and 39

receive lower average remittance income. This shows a negative relationship between monthly household remittances and household size.

Table 3: Average monthly remittance income by household population size

Household Size	Summary of monthly total income per remittance		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
1-5	1372.8	2654.2	806
6-10	1403.3	4441.6	278
11-20	1095.7	1526.2	33
21-39	558	780.6	2
Total	1370.8	3167.2	1119

Source: Own calculation using NIDS wave 3 survey

Remittances to households in urban and rural areas were considered. Households in rural areas on average receive R614 monthly remittance which is higher than urban households that receive on average R505. The result strengthen the argument that rural households receives higher remittance income compared to urban households. The difference in average income between rural and urban households is statistically significant at 95% confidence interval (see Table 4).

Table 4: Average monthly income by geographic type

	Household geographic type			t-value
	Urban	Rural	Total	
Monthly remittance income	614	505	1119	3.3261

Source: Own calculation using NIDS wave 3 survey

Remittances to households in the different provinces were analysed. Households in Gauteng and the Northern Cape receive higher average monthly remittance income. Households in the Western Cape receives a lower amount of monthly average remittance income. Table 5 below shows the monthly average remittance income by province (see Table 5).

Table 5: Average monthly remittance income by province

Province	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Western Cape	908.4	1623	107
Eastern Cape	1391.1	4131	158
Northern Cape	1638.5	1721	37
Free State	1287.7	2165	98
KwaZulu-Natal	1390.2	4447	288
North West	1305.7	1597	100
Gauteng	1793.8	3221	126
Mpumalanga	1388.1	1995	47
Limpopo	1315.8	1215	158
Western Cape	908.4	1623	107

Source: Own calculation using NIDS wave 3 survey

b) Households head characteristics and remittance income

The different characteristic of household heads for remittance receiving households were analysed. Comparison of the average remittance received by different population group and gender. Table 6 shows Africans, Asian/Indian and White population groups. On average male headed households received higher monthly remittance income than female headed households. For the Coloured population group on average female headed households received higher government grants than male headed households. The average difference between female and male headed households among all population groups is statistically insignificant at 99% confidence interval.

Table 6: Average monthly remittance income by population group and gender of the household head

	Africans		Coloured		Indian/Asian		White	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Average Monthly Remittance	1431	1390	610	929	10500	2580	5670	3411
t-value	0.1427		1.1123		1.4951		0.6500	

Source: Own calculation using NIDS wave 3 survey

Employment status was coded into two categories, employed and unemployed. Unemployed includes unemployed (strict definition), unemployed (broad definition) and not economically active. It was found that households with household head unemployed received the highest amount of monthly remittance income compared to employed household head. The difference in average monthly income between employed and unemployed household head is statistically insignificant at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval (see Table 7)

Table 7: Average monthly remittance income by household head employment status

	Household head employment status			t-value
	Employed	Non-employed	Total	
Monthly remittance income	420	170	590	0.7135

Source: Own calculation using NIDS wave 3 survey

Table 8 shows the distribution of average monthly remittance income by household head education status. Households where the household head has college education and above received a higher remittance than other education statuses, followed by high school diploma. Households with a

household head education level of no school received the lowest remittance compared to other education statuses.

Table 8: Average monthly remittance income by household head education status

Household head education status	Summary of monthly income from remittance		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
No school	894.9	1429.6	73
1 to 5 years	998.4	1294.4	67
6 to 11 years	1233.4	1989	294
High school	2193.7	5095.9	139
College degree	2323.3	2412.9	15
Total	1419.4	2982	588

Source: Own calculation using NIDS wave 3 survey

Before analysing the impact of remittance on poverty, the relationship between household expenditure and monthly remittance was tested. The result in Table 9 shows there is a linear positive, but weak relationship between monthly household expenditure and household monthly remittance.

Table 9: Pearson correlation between household monthly expenditure and monthly remittance received

	Total monthly expenditure	Total monthly expenditure
Total monthly expenditure	1.0000	
Monthly remittance	0.1926	1.0000

Source: Own calculation using NIDS wave 3 survey

c) The FGT measurement of poverty

The upper-bound national poverty line (UBPL) of R620 is used to determine the head count, depth and severity of poverty among households. DASP (2.3) software is used to analyse the FGT index.

Table 10: FGT index results

Poverty measures	Remittance non-receiving household	Remittance receiving household	Total
National upper bound poverty line (R620)			
Head count (P0)	52%	49.3%	49.7%
Poverty Gap (P1)	22.6%	23.2%	22.7%
Poverty Severity (p2)	12.9%	12.9%	12.9%

Source: Own calculation using NIDS wave 3 survey

As can be inferred from Table 10, the headcount index for the entire survey is found to be 49.7%. This means that out of the total households, 49.7% of the households live below the UBPL. The poverty gap index was found to be 22.7%. This shows that on average the income/consumption needed to eliminate poverty in the country should increase by 22.7%. The poverty severity of the households is 12.9%.

The breakdown of the poverty indices by access to remittance illustrates that remittance non-receiving households have the highest percentage of poor people compared to remittance receiving households. The FGT analysis shows that 49% of remittance receiving households are under the UBPL, while 52% of remittance non-receiving households live below the UBPL.

However, the poverty gap is higher among the remittance receiving households compared to non-remittance receiving households. For remittance receiving households the cost of eliminating poverty is 23.2% of the poverty line. For non-remittance receiving households the cost reduces to 22.6%. The poverty severity index, on the other hand, is widely used to compare poverty rankings between two groups. The higher the severity index, the greater the inequality of the distribution among the poor and the severity of poverty. Table 10 shows that both groups have the same amount of poverty severity.

d) Logistic regression

A binomial Logit regression model was used to see if remittance determines the probability that households will fall into the state of poverty or not. The study uses the national upper bound poverty line of R620 to classify the poor and non-poor. Table 11 shows the stata output of the logistic regression.

Table 11: Logistic regression results

Variable	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	Odds ratio	Marginal effect	P> z	Robust Std. Err.
Remittance grant dummy	-0.011	0.125	0.988	-0.002	0.000*	-0.011
Household monthly per capita income	-0.101	0.046	0.361	-0.241	0.000	-0.101
Household size	1.62	0.078	5.091	0.387	0.000	1.62
Gender of the household head	0.098	0.098	1.103	0.023	0.316**	0.098
Coloured dummy	-0.516	0.133	0.596	-0.116	0.000	-0.516
Age of the household head	-0.029	0.003	0.970	0.007	0.000	-0.029
Household education	-0.127	0.014	0.880	-0.030	0.000	-0.127
Geographic type	-0.387	0.095	0.678	-0.92	0.000	-0.387
Constant	7.19	0.391			0.000	7.19
Number of observations= 4,064 LR chi2 (8)= 2505.59 Prob>chi2=0.0000 Pseudo R2=0.4500						

Source: Own calculation using NIDS wave 3 survey

In order to check if the model adequately fits the data, the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of fit statistic is used. The result shows that the model fits the data very well as the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistic was insignificant (Prob > chi2 = 0.1651) (refer Appendix I).

The remittance dummy is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. The result of the odds ratio also shows remittance reduces the probability of being in a state of poverty by 98.8%. The sign of the coefficient also shows that remittance reduces the probability of being in a state of poverty. Hence, based on the above analysis it is possible to conclude that while remittance reduces the probability to be in a state of poverty other variables remain the same.

An increase in household monthly per capita income reduces the probability of households being poor. The result of the odds ratio and marginal effect shows that household monthly per capita income significantly reduces the probability of households being poor. In addition, the analysis also shows that living in urban areas reduces the probability of being poor, as opposed to living in rural areas.

The result shows households with a high number of household members have high probability of being in a state of poverty. Other variables remain the same and an increase in one household member increases the probability of households being in state of poverty by 38.7%. The result is significant at 99% level. Gender of the household head is another important characteristic of households that has a positive relationship with the probability of a households being in a state of poverty. However, the result is insignificant at 90% confidence level.

The age and education status of the household head have negative and significant impact on the household probability of being in state of poverty. Moreover, the marginal effect of education shows a contribution of 3% in reducing the probability of being poor, whereas the marginal effects of age are very low (less than 1%). Regarding the race dummy variable, Coloured households have less probability of being poor compared to African households and the result is significant at the 1% level. Asian/Indian and White dummy variables are illuminated in the backward stepwise regression.

CONCLUSION

This paper, using the third round National Income Dynamism Study of South Africa, attempts to critically evaluate the impact of remittance on poverty. It uses two different approaches to evaluate the impact of poverty on headcount, depth, severity and also the probability of households being poor, comparing remittance receiving and non-receiving households.

The first approach using the FGT indices shows that remittance receiving households have a lower headcount ratio compared to remittance non-receiving households. On the other hand, the poverty gap is higher among remittance receiving households compared to non-receiving households. Both groups of households have the same poverty severity level.

This study has also provided empirical evidence that remittance reduces the probability to be in a state of poverty. Using a multivariate logit model, the empirical finding confirms that remittance reduces the probability to be in the state of poverty by 98.8%, other potential determinants of poverty remained constant. In addition to remittance, household per capita income, education of the household head, age of the household head and living in urban areas compared to rural areas also reduces the probability of a household being in the state of poverty.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Future research might look at the impact of remittance on poverty if the current remittances increase, and understand how migration and remittances affect human capital investments and local labour productivity.

REFERENCES

- Adams, R.H. 1991. *The effects of international remittances on poverty, inequality and development in rural Egypt*. IFPRI Research Report 86. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.
- Brown, R.P.C. 2008. *Remittances and Development in the Pacific: Effects on Human Development in Fiji and Tonga*. Paper presented at the ESCAP, EGM Meeting on Migration and Development, Bangkok, September 2008.
- Burgess, R. Haksar, V. 2005. *Migration and Foreign Remittances in the Philippines*. IMF Working Paper. Asia and Pacific Department. WP/05/111. IMF
- Chukwuone, N. Amaechina, E. Enebeli-Uzor, S.E. Iyoko, E. & Okpukpara, B. 2012. *Analysis of Impact of Remittance on Poverty in Nigeria*. Working Paper 2012-09. Partnership for Economic Policy.
- Crush, J. William, V. & Peberdy, S. 2005. *Migration in Southern Africa. Global Commission on International Migration*.
- Foster, J., Greer, E. & Thorbecke, E. 1984. *A Class of Decomposable Poverty Measures*: *Econometrica* vol 52(3), pp. 761-768.

- Gupta, S. Pattillo, C. & Wagh, S. 2007. *Making Remittances Work for Africa. Finance and Development*. Vol. 44(2).
- Gustafsson, B. & Makonnen, N. 1993. *Poverty and remittances in Lesotho*. Journal of African Economies. Vol 2(1):49-73.
- Knowles, J.C. & Anker, R.B. 1981. *Analysis of income transfers in a developing country: The case of Kenya*. Journal of Development Economics. Vol. 8(2):205-226.
- Kok, P. & Collinson, M. 2006. *Migration and Urbanisation in South Africa*. Report 03-04-02. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. SS
- Lachaud, J-P. 1999. *Remittances, Inequality and Poverty in Burkina Faso*. Working Paper No. 40. Bordeaux: Center for Development Economics, University of Bordeaux.
- Leibbrandt, M et al., 2010. *Trends in South African Income Distribution and Poverty since the Fall of Apartheid, OECD Social, Employment and Migration*. Working Paper No. 101. OECD Publishing.
- Oberai, A.S. & Singh, H.K.M. 1980. *Migration, Remittances and Rural Development: Findings of a case study in the Indian Punjab*. International Labor Review. Vol. 119(2):229-242.
- Ratha, D. 2012. *Outlook for Migration and Remittances 2012-14*. Tenth Coordination Meeting on International Migration. New York: World Bank.
- Ratha, D. 2013. *The Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction*. Policy Brief No. 8 September 2013. Migration Policy Institute.
- Richard, H. Adams, J.R. & Page, J. 2005. *Do International Migration and Remittances Reduce Poverty in Developing Countries? World Development*. Vol. 33(10):1645-1669.
- Taylor, J.E. Mora, J. Adams, R. & Lopez-Feldman, A. 2005. *Remittances, inequality and poverty: Evidence from rural Mexico*. ARE Working Papers 05-003. Davis, CA: University of California, Davis Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics.

United Nations. 2011. *Impact of Remittances on Poverty in Developing Countries*. New York and Geneva: United Nations.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1990. *Human Development Report 1990*. New York (NY): Oxford University Press.

Vargas-Lundius, R. Lanly, G. Villarreal, M. & Osoio, M. 2008. *International migration, remittance and rural development*. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

Woolard, I. & Klasen, S. 2004. "Determinants of Income Mobility and Household Poverty Dynamics in South Africa" in *Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA) Discussion Paper*, Bonn.

World Bank. 2004. *Global Development Finance*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

The Migration-Development Nexus in Somaliland: Critical Voices from the Somali Diaspora

*Monica Fagioli-Ndlovu*⁷

Abstract

International development agencies have recently started to mobilise the Somali diaspora for state-building programmes. Somali diaspora experts and government officials are critical of state-building programmes run by UN agencies. By relaying critical voices from Somali diaspora experts involved in state-building programmes in Somaliland, this article looks at the emergence of the idea of migration for development. After reviewing recent critical works by transnational migration scholars, this article also draws on the work of African diaspora scholars. The latter have critiqued the mobilisation of the African diaspora as a way to serve only the Millenium Development's Goals, yet failing to empower the African state (Clark, 2010; Zeleza, 2010). The article discusses how Somali diaspora experts are mobilised by international organisations in development and state-building programmes in Somaliland, and yet excluded from decision-making processes involved in those programmes. Despite the exclusion of Somali government officials and diaspora experts from the design of programmes run by UN agencies, the Somali diaspora and some local officials have been particularly active in creating the economic and political foundations that have enabled a re-emergence of the state in Somaliland and Somalia.

Keywords: Decision-making, diaspora expert, migrant, QUESTS-MIDA

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 2000s, the Somali diaspora is increasingly described by international actors and scholars of development as a potential instrument of “institution-building,” “peace-keeping,” “post-conflict reconstruction,” and

⁷ Researcher, The New School, New York.

“economic development” (Gundel, 2002; Sorensen-Nyberg, 2004; Lindley, 2009).

Although numbers are not certain, the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) reported that there are over one million Somalis living in diaspora (UNDP, 2009), constituting about 14 percent of the overall Somali population. The largest diasporic population resides in the Horn of Africa and Yemen, followed by the Gulf States, Western Europe, and North America. More recently, Malaysia and Australia have also become increasingly popular destinations for this diaspora. Somalis living outside Somalia have been described as an “active element in the equation of state-building and the restructuring of the political system” in Somaliland (UNDP, 2009). To confirm this, in 2011-2012, ten out of twenty-nine of Somaliland’s government ministers were returnees from the diaspora, many of whom have dual citizenship and continue to maintain transnational connections or even live in two countries. Similar patterns have long been noted in Puntland and are becoming increasingly apparent within the government in Mogadishu. The Somali diaspora has also been particularly involved in development and service delivery, as well as in the creation of business networks with neighbouring countries and the Gulf countries. International development reports stress that the main contributions of the diaspora in Somalia are remittances and financial resources. In fact, as much as 80 percent of total investments funding new small and medium sized enterprises within the country come from the diaspora (UNDP, 2009).

It is therefore important to understand the key role played by diasporic Somalis, together with local Somalis, in relation to the ongoing processes of state-building and national development in Somalia. Recently, Somali diaspora experts have been recruited by international development agencies, such as UNDP and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to participate in capacity-building programmes within state institutions in Somaliland (a self-declared independent state, not recognised by the UN, since 1991, in the Northwestern region of former Somalia), Puntland (a federal state since 1998, in the North East region of former Somalia), and south Somalia. This article presents some interviews with Somali diaspora experts who participated in a programme called Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) in Hargeysa, Somaliland. The programme is managed by IOM across different African states and supports different development programmes sponsoring the direct

involvement of the African diaspora in their home country. In Somalia, IOM deployed MIDA in partnerships with different other international organisations, local and foreign governments and diaspora associations. In partnership with UNDP, IOM developed a programme called Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support (QUESTS)-MIDA⁸, designed to employ experts with a Somali background to support capacity-building programmes in Somali institutions.

Over the last twenty years, policy analyses and reports have featured and identified migration and diaspora populations as a seemingly unlimited resource for national development. This enthusiasm about the beneficial impact of migration for development policies, which has been ongoing since the 1990s, has been put into perspective and critically examined by scholars of transnational migration, human geography and the African diaspora. This article follows anthropologist and African diaspora scholar Kamari Clarke's suggestion to understand new forms of exclusion in the African world that are embedded in the current humanitarian mobilisation of the African diaspora in development projects. It presents some critical voices of Somali diaspora experts recruited by QUESTS-MIDA and discusses how they were mobilised by international organisations, but excluded from political and decision-making processes. Despite being excluded from the design of programmes run by UN agencies, the Somali diaspora and some local officials have been particularly active in creating the economic and political foundations that have enabled a re-emergence of the state in Somaliland.

The ultimate migration-development nexus and its recent criticisms

This interest in the Somali diaspora is part of a current, dominant view in international development policy that sees migrants and diaspora as agents of and contributors to development. Yet, it is only recently that migration and diaspora have been perceived as resources for national development in migrants' countries of origin. According to some analyses, a shift in international development policy can be traced to the early 1990s with the Ascensio report that identified migrants as a resource for creating national

⁸ See the programme official website at www.quests-mida.org

development in their home countries, and marked a critical turning point in the discursive field of international migration policy (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002). More recently, scholarly works have historicized the relation between development and migration in three different phases since the 1950s and 1960s, and consider the shift that occurred in the 1990s as not really representing a new interest. According to these scholars, the ongoing re-emergence of the migration-development nexus is the third re-articulation of similar policy discourses of the past (Gamlen, 2014; Faist, Kivisto & Fauser, 2011). The idea that migration had a positive impact on development first emerged with modernist theories in the 1950s and 1960s. After the economic crisis and contestations in the 1970s, dependency theories criticised modernist theories and their optimistic view of migration for development. In the 1990s, thanks to neoclassical economic theories, the perception of migration as a resource for development circulated with renewed enthusiasm. More recently, this enthusiasm has encountered the cautionary skepticism and critiques of transnational migration, international development and human geography scholars.

Studying the implications of the migration-development nexus, some scholars have looked into the history of the analytical concepts of migration and development as two separate categories. Each category has its complex trajectory and, precisely because of the many theories and approaches within the history of each concept, they come to the conclusion that “there are several reasons why international migration will not automatically lead to development” (van Naerssen, Spaan & Zoomers, 2008:2). In other words, the problem with the nexus between migration and development is precisely the way in which the nexus is taken for granted, instead of being analysed as a result of two distinct phenomena that have been drawn together only under specific historical conditions.

Similarly, scholars of transnational studies have approached the study of the migration-development nexus as a policy and theoretical construct, which reflects the paradigm shifts occurring in dominant development theories (Faist, Kivisto & Fauser, 2011:5). Unlike other critical analyses of the migration-development nexus, human geography scholars take for granted the link between human mobility and development since its first theorizations in the 19th century, estimating its impact in both pessimistic and optimistic terms. As Gamlen (2014) writes:

“There has long been agreement that development and migration are fundamentally linked, and these links have been important to geographers since the early days of the discipline. The idea that economic development drives emigration dates at least back to the 19th century geographer Ernst Ravenstein (1885, 1889), and the relationship between migration and resource distribution was also salient to the political geography of his younger contemporary, Friedrich Ratzel (see Glick Schiller, 2009). Geographers have thus been integral to debates about human mobility and development since their inception.” (Gamlen, 2014:582)

Recently, the description of migration and diaspora as an opportunity for economic growth in home countries has grown into the first UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development organised in 2006. The UN High Level Dialogue brought about the creation of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) with its first meeting in 2007 in Brussels (Piper, 2009:94). Moreover, UNDP recently reinforced the view that migration can play a positive role in national development in the 2009 Human Development Report (Gamlen, 2010). In the last twenty years, the “migration-development nexus” has also been re-articulated in both policy papers (Ghosh, 2006; Nyberg-Sorensen, 2004) and scholarly works (Adepoju, Van Naersessen & Zoomers, 2008; Brinkerhoff, 2008; Piper, 2009; Castles & Delgado Wise, 2008; Faist, Kivisto & Faurer 2011; Bakewell, 2012).

In contrast to the enthusiasm about the positive impact of migration on development expressed by the UNDP, the World Bank and other international agencies, many scholars from different perspectives raise cautionary doubts or even radical criticism of migration-development policies, as well as their implications and impact. Some scholars of transnational migration (Glick Schiller and Faist, 2009) have criticised the belief held by many international agencies that consider migration a solution to problems of underdevelopment (UNDP, 2009). At the heart of some of these critiques is the accusation that international agencies, as well as scholars in migration studies who practice the migration-development “mantra”, have lost sight of the asymmetries in the discourse on migration and development that relegates nation-states in the Global South to a marginal role. To address these asymmetries, Nina Glick Schiller has proposed an alternative global framework of analysis that must exceed the “methodological nationalism” still prevalent in migration studies.

This perspective, focused on the nation-state, neglects the study of particular localities in relation to ongoing processes of global restructuring of financial markets (Glick Schiller & Faist, 2009). An alternative view based on “a global perspective on migration” instead allows for an analysis that addresses the asymmetries and exposes the paradox inherently formulated in migration policies that perceive migrants as simultaneously agents of national development, and threats to nation-states’ frontiers (Glick Schiller & Faist, 2009). Other scholars of migration share a similar criticism of the migration-development nexus by bringing attention to the social issues within the debate (Piper, 2009). They call for a more central role for migrants in this debate, extending beyond the dominant discussions in the field, which focus on the economic and structural impact of migrants’ participation in national development primarily as economic actors through their remittances.

Scholars of transnational migration also criticise the nexus because of its emphasis on development, a vague concept with implications of linear progress and growth. The valorization of development discourse serves to conceal the ongoing processes of border securitization and the restrictions of migrants’ mobility rights, dynamics that are not peripheral, but central to, the problem of migration and diaspora (Glick Schiller & Faist, 2009).

The term “transnational” appeared in migration studies at the beginning of the 1990s, and helped to see migration as a phenomenon not only resulting from economic and rational reasons (or the idea that migrants are all acting rationally according to the model of the *homo economicus*), but also as the simultaneous outcome of different factors, such as nationalism and racism. This approach allowed for the inclusion of both countries of origin and destination in the same analytical framework (Isolato, 2009). Although scholars who pioneered transnational migration studies intended to bypass “methodological nationalism” and to expose capitalist processes of restructuring labour resources globally (Glick Schiller et al., 1994; Glick Schiller, 2009; Coutin, 2007), the transnational approach was also re-appropriated later to support “neoliberal political purposes” in support of the promotion of international development and security policies that prevent the mobility of many migrant workers (Isolato, 2009). In other words, processes of developmentalization and securitization of migrants and refugees’ mobility are simultaneous and coeval. Projects of national development, which focus on the participation of migrants in their home countries, are also meant to serve

security concerns around national borders raised by destination countries (Isolato, 2009).

More recently, studies on the migration-development nexus from a transnational perspective have raised further criticism by addressing the assumptions that characterised the last hype about the nexus. By placing the migration-development nexus against the backdrop of ongoing socio-economic, cultural and political, structural transformations, they question the optimism surrounding the positive impact of remittances for development (Faist, Kivisto & Faurer, 2011). In fact, there are no concluding research data about the efficacy of migrants' remittances on origin countries. Moreover, because migration cannot be proved to be the formula that can fix all problems of underdevelopment, social welfare and democratic governance, it follows that the basic assumption in policies that promote migration for development is simply unsubstantiated.

Human geographers have expressed similar pessimism about the latest optimistic migration-development “mantra” (Kapoor, 2004; Gamlen, 2014). Their critiques challenge the nexus because it is not really new, because it is “driven by hidden political and economic agendas”, and because it is characterised by “simplifications and exaggerations” (Gamlen, 2014:581).

This article also questions the ongoing optimistic views that continue to sustain and deploy programmes such as QUESTS-MIDA in Somalia. Indeed, the enthusiasm that international agencies and policy makers invest in the migration-development nexus often conceals other concerns about security of North European and North American national borders and about citizenship rights and integration in migrants' host countries (Faist, Kivisto & Faurer, 2011). Most importantly, the migration-development nexus is often invoked by international policy actors as a solution to problems of underdevelopment in migrants' sending countries, but never used to address problems of labour exploitation or the concerns of racial, social, and economic discrimination, that migrants and diaspora experience in host countries.

Interestingly, international agencies and NGOs use the term ‘diaspora’ to refer to Africans (including Somalis) in the diaspora interchangeably with the term ‘migration’. In the literature that sees migration as a resource for development, the terms ‘diaspora’ and ‘migration’ often overlap and are used

interchangeably. By keeping these two terms as separate expressions of diverse theoretical contributions, this article argues that to talk about diaspora instead of migration allows for critical understanding of the implications of the migration-development nexus. In particular, by choosing to focus on the narratives of Somali diaspora experts, this article intends to shift the ongoing scholarly criticism against the migration-development nexus to frame the problems observed in Somalia from a different perspective. The aim of this article is to move beyond a criticism focused on the migration-development nexus, and to redirect the analysis to the relationship between the Somali government and its emigrant population, drawing on an African diaspora perspective.

The politics of African diaspora: mobilisation and exclusion

African diaspora scholars have strongly emphasised the political difference between the terms African ‘migrants’ and ‘diaspora’. The concept of ‘African diaspora’⁹ pays homage to the important historical experiences of Africans in the diaspora. These scholars attest that the concept of African diaspora works against the often impersonalized depiction of African migrants, allowing Africans’ voices and experiences of slavery and economic migration to be more conspicuous and relevant. Building on an African diaspora perspective, this article highlights the use of the term “African diaspora”, taking into account the historical dimensions of slavery, discrimination and racialization, which are invoked and implied in such a term.

Recently, African governments as well as African activists, NGOs, IOs, humanitarian associations and donors, are supporting the invocation of the African diaspora by formulating new claims or what Clarke (2010:49) calls “new ontologies of diaspora”. These new claims diverge from black Atlantic ontologies that were formulated around the centrality of slavery. State-building projects, such as the programme described below (QUESTS-MIDA in Somalia), also support the idea of African diaspora as a resource for national development. Clarke defines these new claims to diaspora as “diasporic

⁹ As Brent Hayes Edwards observes, while many black artists and intellectuals have been practicing and discussing international links and relationships among people of African descent since the 19th century, it was only in the 1950s that the word diaspora began to emerge out “of the growing scholarly interest in the Pan-African movement in particular, and in black internationalism in general” (Edwards 2001:45; Harris 2001).

humanitarianism,” which serves as a tool for what she defines as “neoliberal governance.” By “diasporic humanitarianism,” Clarke (2010:49) means to describe the emergence of new movements or collaborations (i.e. the Darfurian diaspora and the Save Darfur movement) between “those of the Global South with institutions of international power whose mission is tied to the protection of human rights, the eradication of poverty, and the related protection of victims”. Working within this claim, Clarke underlines the rhetorical and institutional power of diasporic humanitarianism, which also serves to recognise the historical parallels between the ways in which humanitarianism has been mobilised in the past, to end slavery, for instance, but which actually works to reproduce new forms of inequalities. For Clarke (2010:49), these new claims of diaspora, which are cloaked in humanitarian terms and language, serve to conceal the problematic “workings of the nation-state and the politics of race and development”. Diasporic humanitarianism is the result of a convergence of international institutions, new global nodes of economic interests, and trade regulations. The UN promotes “capacity-building” programmes in Africa (as well as in other parts of the Global South) in partnerships with donors, policy makers and governments of the Global North (i.e. the G8 state leaders). The Digital Diaspora Networks in Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America, are examples of the UN’s Information and Communication Technologies programmes. Its aim is to create connections between African professionals in the diaspora and African entrepreneurs as a means of addressing the issue of separation among refugee family members. Clarke argues that while the use of the UN’s language of humanitarianism actually mobilised African diasporic elites, these kinds of interventions propose only external solutions to African problems.

Clarke’s appeal to reconsider the history of the category of African diaspora helps to clarify the political aspirations, black political formations across Atlantic linkages and beyond the nation-state, which the term diaspora has traditionally claimed. It also provides an argument to start unsettling the goals that the Millennium Development agenda¹⁰ sets through international agencies in Africa and across the third world. Her concern echoes some of the

¹⁰The Millennium Development goals established by the UN are eight. Those are: to eradicate poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, ensure environmental sustainability, and develop global partnership for development.

critiques of the millennium-development nexus voiced by transnational migration scholars Glick Schiller et al. (2009), Piper (2009) and Faist et al. (2011), international development scholars Bakewell (2008, 2012) and Davies (2012) and other scholars of the African diaspora Zeleza (2010) and Davies (2007). However, scholars of transnationalism are not concerned about the effects of the mobilisation of the concept of African diaspora on development processes. Their work is more concerned with defining and constructing “transnational migration” as a distinct analytical approach (Levitt & Khagram, 2008; Levitt-Jaworsky, 2007; Vertovec, 2003; Faist et al., 2011). In contrast, Clarke’s argument is significant because it provides an analytical framework that connects the history of slavery, which placed racial exclusion at the foundation of the modern nation-state, to “contemporary exclusions in the African world” (Clarke, 2010:51). By contemporary forms of exclusion, she also means to refer to the dynamics of “brokerage” of postcolonial African states, whose “decisions are brokered outside the country with international donors and institutions” and fail to protect the rights of African citizens (Clarke, 2010:49).

Although Clarke raises many important questions and concerns, she has not been exempted from criticism (Zeleza, 2010; Rahier, 2010). While summarising the debate sparked by Clarke’s intervention is beyond the scope of this article, the discussion she prompted around the new appropriations and mobilisations of the African diaspora as a cultural, economic, social, and political category, highlights the importance of reinserting the historical problems of race and slavery into the ongoing discussions on migration, diaspora and development in Africa. The contribution of historians and anthropologists to African diaspora is a critical reminder of the history of slavery in its present manifestations. These works offer a poignant political dimension to the idea of African diaspora, which, unfortunately, is so often missing in debates by policy makers and academic studies on the migration-development nexus. Including such perspective is crucial precisely because it re-inscribes in contemporary processes of state and nation building Africans’ experiences and accounts of exploitation, exclusion and racialization that are often erased or neglected in policy and academic discussions of governance and state-building in Africa.

Somali diaspora experts are also excluded from decision-making processes in programmes of migration for development. Somali ministries and

government officials do not have the last say in how and when funding for these programmes can be disbursed, because UNDP has direct and exclusive liaison with international sponsors, such as the European Commission or representatives of European governments. State-building is brokered outside the government in Somaliland and Somalia, thanks to interventionist development policies that have characterised much of the development world across Africa so far (Bakewell, 2008). Despite its rhetoric on participation and Somali ownership of the process, QUESTS-MIDA's priorities of intervention are set by the UNDP and foreign donors.

QUESTS-MIDA and SIDP

QUESTS-MIDA is a project created from the collaboration between UNDP and IOM to develop governance skills in former Somalia. It operates through agreements with the governments of Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu in the South Somalia region. The IOM component of the project, MIDA¹¹, is part of a larger reconfiguration of global migration policies, whereas QUESTS was a former project of UNDP Somalia.

QUESTS-MIDA priorities are designed by the Somali Institution Development Project (SIDP), a programme within UNDP Somalia, and in consultation with Somali institutions. The institutions in which Somali experts are to contribute with their skills and knowledge are selected according to UNDP's pre-existing work of capacity-building. SIDP was created in early 2009, was re-designed by mid-2011 and 2012, and is expected to end in 2015¹². The re-design of SIDP, which included the project QUESTS-MIDA, coincided with the time that the author was conducting research between Hargeysa (Somaliland), Garowe (Puntland) and Nairobi (Kenya)¹³. SIDP's task is about "supporting the

¹¹ MIDA is a programme that "aims to build partnerships between host countries and countries of origin of migrants, and encourage the return of African professionals on temporary assignments" (Black 2006:10).

¹² See the current official description of SIDP on UNDP Somalia's official website at: http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/operations/projects/environment_and_energy/Somali_Institution_Development_Project.html

¹³ When doing research in Nairobi, it was not easy to get hold of SIDP's managers, and after many unanswered emails, the author gave up. UNDP field officers, Somali diaspora

[Somali] government to better serve the Somali people.” Its priorities are to develop policy and legislative systems and processes, to develop human resources; to implement a Public Finance Management (PFM) system and public accountability; and to develop physical infrastructure and operational support.

Before joining IOM’s MIDA programme, UNDP had modeled QUESTS after an earlier programme called Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN), a programme to channel back home expertise acquired by migrants abroad, first implemented in Turkey in 1977 and now run by the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme¹⁴. In 2010, IOM took over the implementation of QUESTS-MIDA, while UNDP deals with the work of consultation with Somali institutions and ministers to establish the priorities of the programmes, collect their needs, draft Letters of Agreement (LoA), design a Terms of Reference (ToR) matching the needs in the field, and paying salaries to the experts. IOM deals with the logistics of the programme, the recruitment process in North America and Europe, and takes care of local arrangements to support Somali diaspora experts’ first day in the field and follows the participants’ daily activities with regular meetings every month.

Between April 2010 and July 2011, QUESTS-MIDA recruited seventeen experts from the Somali diaspora to work in Hargeysa in several institutions. Six more experts were to be recruited in the following months while the programme was being redesigned. According to UNDP and IOM officers, the programme was about to be completed in 2012 or 2013 because there was no further funding. The programme was supposed to hire sixty Somali diaspora experts, twenty in each Somali region (Puntland, Somaliland, and South Central). Started in 2006 as QUESTS, the programme was combined with the MIDA

experts, civil servants and Ministers of the Somaliland and Puntland governments were more available for interviews than UNDP officers and managers based in Nairobi.

¹⁴ An account of the official history of Tokten can be found on the official website of Tokten Lebanon at: <http://www.toktenlebanon.org/about/about.php>. The programme was created by UNDP in 1977, and came under the umbrella of the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme in 1994. A current official description of the programme is on UNV’s website at: <http://www.unv.org/en/what-we-do/countries/viet-nam/doc/tokten-channels-global-expertise.html>

component in 2009¹⁵. A thorough process of redesign of SIDP began in 2011, after a new SIDP manager was hired and the programme was still active.

Critical voices from the Somali diaspora

QUESTS-MIDA recruits Somalis in the diaspora with the following profiles: professional experts in Human Resources Management, Public Administration Reform, ICT Policy Development, Tax Law and Revenue Reform, Counselling Psychologist, Educational Planning, Strategic Planning, and Natural Resources Environmentalists/Engineers. The role of these experts is to work in collaboration with what UNDP and IOM have identified as target institutions in Somaliland, such as the Ministries of Planning, Finance, Family Affairs, Labour, and Public Works, the Auditor and Accountant General's Offices, as well as the Central Bank.

In order to understand how knowledge, skills, ideas, assets, and practices about state-building are transferred from Somali diaspora expatriates to people in institutions in Somaliland, while staying in Hargeysa the author conducted a 16 months fieldwork project between the US, UK, Kenya and Somaliland. Between October and November 2011, and then again between March and May 2012, the author conducted participant observations and semi-structured interviews with eleven of the seventeen Somali QUESTS-MIDA experts that worked in Somaliland¹⁶. This was possible thanks to a list of Somali QUESTS-MIDA experts obtained from IOM field officers in Hargeysa, and UNDP officers in Nairobi. The city of Nairobi in Kenya not only hosts the UNDP headquarters (from which QUESTS-MIDA is also administered), but also all the main headquarters and regional offices of international development agencies working in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. Hargeysa, the

¹⁵ An official flyer written by IOM and available online provides some basic facts about QUESTS-MIDA (IOM, March 2014). The programme was extended to December 2013 and it had three phases. In the first two phases forty-two experts were placed in the three Somali regions (Somaliland, Puntland and South Somalia). The third phase planned to place other 20 experts across the three regions.
<http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/IOM-Somalia-QUESTS-MIDA-Qualified-Expatriate-Somalia-Technical-Support.pdf>

¹⁶ The remaining six Somali experts on that list had either terminated their one year contract with QUESTS-MIDA, or were not available for an interview while the author was in Hargeysa.

bureaucratic capital of Somaliland, is a central hub where international development programmes, often planned in Nairobi, are implemented. QUESTS-MIDA primarily targets state institutions and the public sector in the city of Hargeysa.

Overall, the interviews with Somali diaspora experts reveal a disparity between the design and actual enactment of the programme in which they were involved. In the field, they could not practically attend to all the tasks and prescribed duties as drafted in their work plans. After the first round of discussions with them, it was clear that in their daily routines they had encountered many unexpected challenges. In the following excerpts of interviews, four major themes of challenges emerge. First, they complained about lack of material resources. Second, they questioned the very sustainability of the programme. Third, they were surprised at the lack of capacity assessment of their hosting institutions. (UNDP is supposed to evaluate the institutional capacity of hosting institutions and assess their needs according to the suggestions of Somali institution officials). Lastly, and most importantly, they pointed out the intrinsic problem of the programme: QUESTS-MIDA does not allow for Somali diaspora experts and Somali officials' participation in decision-making processes. Final decisions on how and when to intervene with capacity-building programmes depend on UNDP. All these challenges were largely unanticipated in their Terms of Reference, a document that described their job tasks and was prepared by UNDP in consultation with the hosting Somali institution.

A Somali diaspora macroeconomics expert recruited from Norway, hired to work at the Ministry of Planning and National Development in Hargeysa, described the gaps between the work he was supposed to do and the actual reality he faced after he started his job:

“I was supposed to create a framework for the GDP in Somaliland, but it was difficult because there are no data available in the country. So, I started with a review of the fiscal policy, but there is no Central Bank Act in Somaliland at the moment. What we have here is rather a Treasury, and there is no monetary policy analysis available either.

To estimate a GDP you need to find data about agriculture and livestock economy as well as other sectors of the economy, and once

you have these data, you can know a country's GDP's in three or five years. ... You can only create a GDP that is comparable with the world standards, but you need a lot more resources than just one person like me.

I looked at the United Nations System of National Accounts as a model, which was released by the UN in 2008 ¹⁷." (Interview, Hargeysa, October 2011)

The theme of scarce resources, either material or human resources, to conduct and implement their work tasks, reappeared in many interviews. Many had to wait a few weeks, or months, for office space. A Somali, who lived in Sweden for twenty years, a Training and Curriculum Development Expert at the Civil Service Institute in Hargeysa, was frustrated about the lack of financial support from UNDP both to purchase necessary materials and to conduct the activities he planned:

"There was no single book about Curriculum Development. UNDP could not support the cost of the material. In my reports, I asked for it, I need to buy books, I said. My problem was how to work with UNDP, because without the books I can't develop anything. I have no budget to buy books, nor to visit other institutes in South Africa (Public Management Institute), Turkey, or Kenya ... we wrote the budget for these visits, but UNDP rejected it." (Hargeysa, Interview, October 2011)

A Tax Law and Revenue Expert, originally from Mogadishu, who lived in the Netherlands before taking on his one-year position at the Ministry of Finance in Hargeysa, talks about similar challenges:

¹⁷ International standards for national accounting are defined by the United Nations System of National Accounts (USNA). The most recent version was published in 2008 and the integral text is available online on UN statistics official pages: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/docs/SNA2008.pdf>

“I do not have funds, I didn’t have a computer, nor a table, it was hard to get one when I started to work. I did not have an office either.” (Hargeysa, interview, October 2011)

On the same issue of the limited allocated budget for trainings and trainees, a Somali with a background in electronic engineering and management from the US and UK, who worked for one year as a Spectrum Management Consultant at the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication in Hargeysa reported:

“The challenge to work here was the lack of equipment (jamming and scamming equipment), but also the lack of funding to provide training to take the staff to Kenya (where there is an independent committee to monitor the law enforcement process, the Kenya Communication Commission). The funding was promised but IOM didn’t fulfill their promises.

Otherwise, Quests MIDA is a good programme, but there is nothing in place before you come, which I did not realise from my ToR. That said, the idea of speaking to Somali experts is good.” (Hargeysa, interview October 2011)

A few months later, when the author met him again after the completion of his work with QUESTS-MIDA, he reiterated his point about the lack of support and resources needed to be able to attend to his planned tasks:

“...the transfer of skills was not as successful as I wished it to be, it could have been better if we had equipment. I wrote a letter on behalf of the Minister stating that we need equipment, like jamming and frequency scanning equipment, but UNDP said they didn’t have the budget for this. I didn’t have the tools to work here.” (Hargeysa, Interview April 2012)

Many of the Somali diaspora experts and local representatives interviewed found that the programme’s one-year length was too short. One year was not enough to attend to all their tasks.

A Somali financial consultant from Sweden, former lecturer in Macroeconomics in Tanzania, and consultant in the late 1990s with the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank in Somaliland, was hired as Macroeconomics expert through QUESTS-MIDA. In one of our interviews, he addressed the issues of “time” and “sustainability” of the programme:

“I came back here with QUESTS-MIDA. We report to IOM. My contract ends in May. Not sure if they are going to extend it, probably not. They might re-advertise the post.

The problem here is the short time, and when you start, it is not enough. Sustainability is important, and the redesign [of QUESTS-MIDA within SIDP] stopped many things. This programme needs continuity, if you start something, you have to know where you are reaching, then you can redesign, otherwise you do not know what you redesign. This can create disturbance, lack of motivation. Even if I am going to leave, but the programme continues, the person who might replace me should be meeting with us, and continue. This could be better than leaving and starting from zero again.” (Hargeysa, Interview, March 2012)

A majority of Somali diaspora experts described QUESTS-MIDA as lacking continuity and sustainability and they were frustrated about the short timeframe to develop their work. Because of a lack of material resources, they often started attending to their tasks only a few months after their arrival. This left very little time to accomplish their tasks in the remaining part of the year. Things can take a long time, also because many of them needed time to settle in and become familiar with a new social and working environment after their European or North American experiences. Many of them were not familiar with Hargeysa, because their family connections were not from there, although they could still relate to the Somali context. Here a different notion of sustainability and continuity was at stake. The programme was not designed to fit the temporal expectations of Somali diaspora experts and local institutions.

Another shared concern among Somali diaspora experts and government officials was the frustrating experience of exclusion from decision-making processes. Most of their criticism was directed at UNDP’s management.

A Somali from the US diaspora, who had a background on Public Administration and expertise on Gender Based Violence programme planning with UNHCR, was recruited by QUESTS-MIDA as a Gender Technical Advisor at the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA):

“The previous Minister requested an expert for my position, the Letter of Agreement (LoA) between the Minister and UNDP was signed in a different political moment, and nobody went to the current Minister now to ask if having an expert like me at MOLSA was also her priority. When I arrived here she just told me "You find something to do," so I looked at the national policy, and the mechanisms of its implementation, but there were none of these mechanisms in place, so I created them, and a lot of donors came to fund this.” (Hargeysa, Interview, March 2012)

By the time this US-based Somali expert started working as a Gender Technical Advisor at MOLSA in November 2010, the minister had changed. After Somaliland’s election took place in June 2010, another minister was elected. The relationship between her and the new minister was challenging because, as she describes above, the minister was not involved in the decision-making process of the design and recruitment of an expert advisor on gender. Her priority could have been different, but UNDP having committed to a previous agreement, proceeded in its programme, leaving the Somali expert to work on her own in a hostile environment.

When the author returned to Hargeysa (March–May, 2012), during follow-up interviews and conversations with some of the same Somali diaspora experts met a few months earlier, interviewees would often comment on the redesign of QUESTS-MIDA and SIDP. Generally the re-design was described as an imposed and disruptive process that did not leave much room for participation, but created a difficult situation and a feeling of uncertainty and impotence among Somali government officials, diaspora experts, and public servant trainees alike. Many of those diaspora experts hired by UNDP to work at the Ministry of Planning and National Development in Hargeysa were either upset or worried about their situation. They felt as if they were living in limbo, while the programme was re-designed in Nairobi. During the re-design of SIDP programmes, which included QUESTS-MIDA, UNDP suddenly cut their salaries without consulting them on how the re-design could be approached.

It was clear from the interviews that the diaspora expatriates were excluded from decision-making processes which were exclusively led by UNDP. Moreover, QUESTS-MIDA does not have a long-term and comprehensive vision beyond the two or three year budget plans allocated for institution building under SIDP. The current Minister of Planning describes UNDP officers as those who are only giving instructions and neglect the importance of consulting and listening to the needs of those in charge of Somaliland's institutions¹⁸. A Somali diaspora expert pointed out that UNDP officers often interact with Somali ministers, acting like donors and giving them instructions on how to proceed. They are simple intermediaries or implementing agencies that act on behalf of donors. Some Somali experts complained that most of the decision-making process happens in Nairobi, or in New York City.

In Somaliland, experts recruited from the Somali diaspora are supposed to bring knowledge and transfer technical skills, but donors and development agencies do not consider those skills and knowledge to be part of the political process. Yet, this process of reconfiguration of state institutions is also obviously political. International agencies are uniquely concerned with designing programmes that are described as a technical transfer of governance skills. However, in the process of designing capacity-building programmes, setting priorities and creating new civil servants, international agencies, such as UNDP, often neglect Somali institutional representatives. Their political legitimacy and decision-making power is almost entirely suspended. Projects like QUESTS-MIDA are imported into Somaliland as programmes of technical expertise, and kept separate from the formal political process of state-making. Rather than promoting capacity building, QUESTS-MIDA often achieves the opposite objective. By recruiting Somali experts from the diaspora (via UNDP and IOM), this programme reinforces the idea that Somali administrative structures are weak, thereby creating more legitimacy for external expertise and intervention, rather than setting the basis for political autonomy. Yet, the Somali diaspora has been involved in the socio-political and economic process of state-making since the 1980s. (Gundel, 2002; Osman et al., 2007; Kleist, 2007; Horst et al., 2010; Pirkkalainen, 2013). Moreover, Somalis from the diaspora are currently engaging their home government independently, despite the negligence and discrimination experienced with international development actors.

¹⁸ Interview, Hargeysa, April 2012.

Recently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Somaliland officially recognised the Somaliland Diaspora Agency (SDA). Following a few years of lobbying and independent initiatives of engagements with the Somaliland government, the SDA has now become an agency of the MFA. The SDA also recently drafted a policy that should help with coordinating and creating a database of the Somaliland diaspora's investments and initiatives in Somaliland.

“Diaspora strategies” are not new but are a constant and inherent transformation of the nation-state that appeals to its emigrant population (Gamlen, 2011:21). A deeper understanding of diaspora and development should begin by considering diaspora policies and diaspora initiatives, engaging with the state as part of a *longue durée* of relationships between the two (Iskander, 2010). International relations scholar Francesco Ragazzi articulates this point further, saying that “the evolution of emigration policies, the increasing transnationalization of state practices and the proliferation of the diasporic discourse” are “modifications of the state itself” (Ragazzi, 2009:379). Thus, Ragazzi suggests that the mobilisation of diaporas is actually occurring in a variety of ways. Diasporas are being mobilised by their states of origin, by the states that host them, and by international organisations. At the same time, diasporas reach out to their countries, to their host countries, as well as to international agencies (such as IOM) in order to lobby their specific cases. “In brief,” Ragazzi concludes, “the proliferation of state-led diaspora policies must be understood as a process, as the result of the unequal, heterogeneous, yet increasing spread of ‘neoliberal governmentality’ as a modular deterritorialized rationality and practice of power; and, the discourse of ‘diaspora’ has been an effective performative discourse in the legitimation of this shift”¹⁹ (Ragazzi, 2009:10-11).

Following Ragazzi's argument, this article posits that the relationship between Somaliland and its diaspora is better understood as a reconfiguration of the “art of government” under changing historical conditions (Foucault, 1978).

¹⁹ “While in the two previous moments the nation-state model remained the referent despite transnational governmental practices, in the neo-liberal moment the diasporic condition is legitimized and normalized. Dispersion is considered as an economic and political resource: economically through the constant flow of remittances, and politically through the claim of channeling political lobbying.” (Ragazzi 2009)

Within this theoretical framework, the migration-development nexus can be understood both as an instrument for global governance, and the ongoing restructuring of state power in a given historical moment. One of the manifestations of this reconfiguration of state power is its transnationalization through the mobilisation of diaspora discourses. State power in Somalia, and in other African countries, has been reconfigured through the work of outsourced governance by international agencies and Somali diaspora's developmental initiatives. In other words, the "art of government" has been exercised beyond the legal rational state, with the involvement of transnational actors, including diaspora groups and international agencies. If this is only a result of "neo-liberal governance" as Ragazzi concludes in his study, it is to be explored further as far as Somalia is concerned. The unique trajectory of the Somali state, as an African state, needs to be understood in its own terms, beyond the buzzwords "neo-liberal governance".

CONCLUSION: The Somali Diaspora and its Government

While building on the critique of the migration-development nexus from a transnational perspective (Faist et al., 2011), this article draws on the contribution of African diaspora scholars (Clarke, 2010) to highlight the processes of exclusion underlying programmes of state-building in Somaliland.

The QUESTS-MIDA programme is premised on a view of Somalia and Somaliland as weak and fragile states. In general, this view serves only to create more technical capacity-building programmes, brokered outside those states. This understanding is effective in creating the need for the design and funding of yet more migration-development programmes for state-building. Yet, the main effect of such programmes is to disempower and weaken Somaliland and Somalia's autonomous political capacity. Despite this dominant UN view and new forms of exclusions embedded in it, what emerges from Somaliland might be compared to ongoing processes also observed in other contexts. Tiger economies such as South Korea and Malaysia have pursued "post-developmental state strategies,"²⁰ which delegate technical

²⁰ "Transnationality induced by accelerated flows of capital, people, cultures, and knowledge does not simply reduce state power, as many have claimed, but also stimulates a new, more flexible and complex relationship between capital and governments" (Ong, 1999:21).

projects to global enterprises while maintaining control over resources, populations, and sovereignty (Ong, 1999). More recently, anthropologist Biao Xiang has described transnational migration in Asia as the result of a substantial and constitutive relationship between processes of transnational migrations, return and nation building (Xiang, 2013). In Asia, initiatives for return migration are part of the nation-state agenda.

Similarly, transnational business initiatives undertaken by the Somali diaspora, and official policy strategies currently pursued in Somaliland, (the Diaspora policy draft, and the institutionalization of the Somaliland Diaspora Agency) aim at reinforcing the nation-state in Somaliland. The state in Somalia is not weak nor the result of “extravertion” (Bayart, 2000), but it is currently taking on new transnational forms.

To conclude, while migration-development programmes, such as QUESTS-MIDA, weaken Somali government’s political autonomy, Somalis in the diaspora successfully aim at reinserting state power in other productive ways. Official migration-development programmes’ see diaspora as resources for state-building but in practice this article has described how QUESTS-MIDA weakens the Somaliland government’s capacity to govern. In contrast, through lobbying as well as private business initiatives, the Somali diaspora’s priority is to rebuild and strengthen the state in Somaliland and Somalia on their own terms.

References

Ascencio, D. 1990. “Unauthorized migration: an economic development response”, report of the U.S. Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington DC.

Agunias, Dovelyn Rannveig. 2009. *Closing the distance. How governments strengthen ties with their diasporas*. Washington D.C. : Migration Policy Institute.

Basch, L.G., Glick Schiller, N. and Szanton Blanc, C. 1994. *Nations unbound: Transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments, and deterritorialized nation-states*. Langhorne, Pa.: Gordon and Breach.

Bakewell, O. (ed). 2012 *Migration and Development*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Bakewell, O. 2008. 'Keeping Them in their Place: The Ambivalent Relationship Between Development and Migration in Africa', *Third World Quarterly* 29: 1341-58.

Bailey, A.J. 2009. Population geographies, gender, and the migration-development nexus in *Progress in Human Geography* September, 1, pp.1-12.

Bayart, J-F. 2000. "Africa in the world: a history of extraversion" in *African Affairs*, 99, pp.217-267.

Brinkerhoff, J.M. 2008. *Diasporas and development: exploring the potential*. London: Rienner Publishers.

Callaghy, T.M., Kassimir R. and Latham, R. 2001. *Intervention and transnationalism in Africa : Global-local networks of power*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 1998. *The age of migration: international population movemnt in the modern world*. Basingstoke England ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan.

Castles, S. and Delgado Wise, R. 2008. *Migration and development: Perspectives from the South*. Geneve: International Organisation for Migration.

Chamie, J. and Powers, M.G. 2006. *International migration and the global community. A Forum on the Report of the Global Commission on International Migration*. New York: Centre for Migation Study.

Chou, Meng-Hsuan. 2009. The migration-development nexus, European Union and circular migration. Paper for ISA_ABRI Joint International Meeting 'Diversity and Inequality in World Politics,' Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 22-24 July.

Clarke, K.M. 2010. New Spheres of Transnational Formations: Mobilizations of Humanitarian Diasporas, *Transforming Anthropology*, 18(1): 48-65.

Coutin, S.N. 2000. *Legalizing moves: Salvadoran immigrants' struggle for U.S. residency.*

_____. 2007. *Nations of emigrants: Shifting boundaries of citizenship in El Salvador and the united states.*

Davies, R. 2007. Reconceptualizing the Migration-Development Nexus: diasporas, globalization and the politics of exclusion in *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 59-76.

_____. 2010. Development Challenges for a Resurgent African Diaspora, *Progress in Development Studies*, 10(2): 131-144.

_____. 2012 'African diasporas, development and the politics of context' *Third World Quarterly* 33, (1) 91-108

Delano, A. 2010. Immigrant integration vs. transnational ties? The role of the sending state in *Social Research* Winter.

Edwards, B. 2001. The Uses of Diaspora, *Social Text*, 19 (1): 45-73.

Farah, A.O., Muchie, M. and Gundel, J. (eds) 2007. *Somalia. Diaspora and State Reconstitution in the Horn of Africa.* London: Adonis ad Abbey.

Faist, T., Fauser, M. and Kivisto, P. 2011. *The Migration-Development nexus. A transnational perspective.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Faist, T. and Bauböck, R. 2010. *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Foucault, M. ([1978] 1995) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.* New York: Random House.

Gamlen, A. 2008. Why engage diaspora?, Working paper n. 68, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMAPS): University of Oxford.

_____. 2010. The New Migration and Development Optimism: A Review of the 2009 Human Development Report in in *Global Governance: A Review of*

Multilateralism and International Organisations, Special Issue,16: 3, pp. 415-425.

_____. 2011. "Creating and destroying diaspora strategies" Working papers, International Migration Institute, Oxford University.

_____. 2014. "[The new migration-and-development pessimism.](#)" *Progress in Human Geography*, 38(4), 581-597.

Glick Schiller, N. and Faist, T. 2009. Introduction. Migration, development, and social transformation in *Social Analysis*, vol. 53 (3): 1-13.

Glick Schiller, N. 2009. A Global perspective on migration and development in *Social Analysis*, vol. 53 (3): 14-37.

Grugel, J. and Piper, N. 2007. *Critical perspectives on Global Governance*. London and New York: Routledge.

Gundel, J. The Migration-Development Nexus: Somalia Case Study *International Migration* Vol 40 (5) 2002.

Kleist, N. 2007. *Spaces of Recognition. An analysis of Somali-Danish associational engagement and diasporic mobilization*. PhD dissertation. Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen.

Harris, J. 2001. The African Diaspora in World History and Politics. In *African Roots/American Cultures: Africa in the Creation of the Americas*, Sheila Walker ed., Rowman & Littlefield, New York. pp. 104-117.

Horst, C., Ezzati, R., Guglielmo, M., Mezzetti, P., Pirkkalainen, P., Saggiomo, V., Sinatti, G. and Warnecke, A. 2010. *Participation of Diasporas in Peacebuilding and Development: A Handbook for Practitioners and Policy Makers*. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).

Iskander, N. 2010. *Creative state: Migration and development policy in Morocco and Mexico as transnational governance*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Isolato, R. 2009. Politicizing the transnational. On Implications for Migrants, Refugees, and scholarship in *Social Analysis*, vol. 53 (3): 60-83.

Khagram, S., Pang, T. and Sridhar, D. 2009. Are Existing Governance Structures Equipped to Deal with Today's Global Health Challenges. Towards Systematic Coherence in Scaling Up, *Global Health Governance*, II, 2, pp.1-25.

Levitt, P. and Khagram, S. 2008. Constructing transnational studies in Ludger Pries ed. *Rethinking transnationalism. The meso-link organisations*. London and New York: Routledge.

Levitt, P. and B. Nadya Jaworsky. 2007. Transnational migration studies: Past developments and future trends in *Annual Review of Sociology*, 33, pp. 129-156.

Levitt, P., DeWind J. and Vertovec, S. 2003. International perspectives on transnational migration: An introduction. *International Migration Review* 37, (3, Transnational Migration: International Perspectives) (Fall): 565-75.

Levitt, P. 2001. *The transnational villagers*. Berkeley: Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lindley, A. 2009. Between “dirty money” and “development capital”: Somali money transfer infrastructure under global scrutiny in *African Affairs* 108/433 pp. 519-539.

McFarlane, C. 2006. Transnational development networks: bringing development and postcolonial approaches into dialogue. In *The Geographical Journal*, vol. 172, no. 1, March, pp. 35-49.

Mercer, C., Page B. and Evans, M. 2008. *Development and the African diaspora: place and the politics of home*. London; New York: Zed Books.

Naerssen, A. L. van, Spaan E. and Zoomers, E.B. 2008. *Global migration and development*. New York: Routledge.

New African diasporas. 2003. ed. Khalid Koser. London ; New York: London ; New York : Routledge.

Nyberg-Sørensen, N. 2004. Opportunities and Pitfalls in the migration-development nexus: Somaliland and beyond. Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper 21

Nyberg-Sørensen, N., Van Hear, N. and Engberg-Pedersen, P. 2002. The migration-development nexus evidence and policy options state-of-the-art overview. *International Migration* 40 (5) SI 2, pp. 1-43.

Olwig, K.F. 2003. "Transnational" socio-cultural systems and ethnographic research: Views from an extended field site. *International Migration Review* 37, (3, Transnational Migration: International Perspectives) (Fall): 787-811.

Ong, A. 1999. *Flexible citizenship : The cultural logics of transnationality*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Ong, A, and Collier, S. 2005. *Global assemblages*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Oucho, J.O. 2009. How to make the migration-development nexus work for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Engaging Diasporas and migration in development policies and programmes. Paper for *Civil Society Days.Third Global Forum on Migration and Development*, Athens.

Ostergaard-Nielsen, E. 2003. *International Migration and sending countries. Perceptions, policies and transnational relations* New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Piper, N. 2009. The complex interconnections of the Migration-development nexus: a social perspective. in *Population, space and place*, n.15, pp.93-101.

Piper, N. and Grugel, J. 2009. Do rights promote development? in *Global Social Policy* (9), 79, pp. 79-98.

Pirkkalainen, P. 2013. *Transnational Responsibilities and Multi-Sited Strategies Voluntary Associations of Somali Diaspora in Finland*. University of Jyväskylä, PhD thesis.

Portes, A. 2001. New research and theory on immigrant transnationalism, special issue, *Global Networks*, 1 (3).

Portes, A., Guarnizo, L.E. and Landolt, P. 1999 Transnational communities, special issue, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2)

Rahier, J.M. 2010. The Diversity of Diasporic Subjectivities: Different and Separate Ontologies? A Response to Kamari Clarke's "New Spheres of Transnational Formations: Mobilizations of Humanitarian Diasporas," *Transforming Anthropology*, 18(1):66– 69.

Schiller, N. Glick, Basch. L. and Szanton Blanc, C. 1995. From immigrant to transmigrant: Theorizing transnational migration. *Anthropological Quarterly* 68, (1) (Jan.): 48-63.

Schramm, K. 2008. Leaving Area Studies Behind: The Challenge of Diasporic Connections in the Field of African Studies, *African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal*, 1(1): 1-12.

Smith, M.P. and Guarnizo, L. 1998. *Transnationalism from below*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.

Somaliland Diaspora Agency, Diaspora Policy –First Draft, 2011. (Unpublished)

Sriskandarajah, D., MacDonald, A. and Farrant, M. 2006 *Migration and development: opportunities and challenges for policymakers*. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

Sriskandarajah, D. 2005. *Migration and development*. Global Commission on International Migration paper.

The transnational studies reader : Intersections and innovations. 2008. ed. Peggy Levitt. New York ; London: New York ; London : Routledge.

United Nations Development Programme. 2009. Somalia's missing million: the Somali diaspora and its role in development. Hassan Sheikh and Sally Healy eds., UNPD -Somalia report.

Vertovec, S. 2003. Migration and other modes of transnationalism: toward conceptual cross-fertilization in *The International Migration Review*, vol. 37, no. 3. Fall, pp. 641-665.

Vertovec, S. 2009. *Transnationalism*. Key ideas. London ; New York: Routledge.

Vertovec, S. and Cohen, R. 1999. *Migration, diasporas, and transnationalism*. Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

Wright, M.M. 2010. Black in Time: Exploring New Ontologies, New Dimensions, New Epistemologies of the African Diaspora, *Transforming Anthropology*, 18(1):70 -73.

Xiang, Biao. 2007. *Global "body shopping": An Indian labor system in the information technology industry*.

———. 2007. The Making of Mobile Subjects: How Institution Reform and Outmigration Intersect in Northeast China. *Development* .50 (4). 69-74.

———. 2013 'Return and the Reordering of Transnational Mobility in Asia'. In Xiang Biao, Brenda Yeoh and Mika Toyota (eds.) [*Return: Nationalizing Transnational Mobility in Asia*](#). Duke University Press. 1-20.

Youngs, R. 2008. Fusing security and development: just another Euro-platitude? in *European Integration*, vol. 30, no. 3, July, pp.419-437.

Zeleva, P.T. 2010. Reconceptualizing African Disaporas: Notes from a Historian, *Transforming Anthropology*, 18(1): 74-78.



Scalabrini Institute
for Human Mobility
in Africa